RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS AS

CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS IN

SOUTH AFRICA, 1910-2002

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Graduate School of International Studies

University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment

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Doctor of Philosophy

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by

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
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Upon the recommendation of the Dean of the Graduate School of International
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To the people of South Africa

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On a more personal level, I would like to thank my parents, Margaret and Willie Hudson, for allowing me to pursue my education in whatever direction I wanted it to go. Finally, I want to thank Suzette Davis for her support, encouragement, and patience. Thank you for listening to my setbacks, giving me encouragement when I needed it, and sharing the joy of my advances.

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Introduction

Religion and Politics
in Contemporary South Africa

*While every day in the West, roughly 7500 people in effect
stop being Christians, every day in Africa roughly double
that number become Christians.*[1]

"In my Father's house are many rooms." John 14:2a (NIV)

The end of the twentieth century was marked by an obsessive

compilation of retrospective lists, which assessed the greatest moments and the

most important individuals of the previous hundred years. Some observers, still

more ambitious, tried to identify the high and low points of the millennium. Yet

in almost all these efforts, religious matters received remarkably short shrift.

When religious phenomena or individuals were mentioned, they usually were

analyzed detached from the significant role of theological ideas. Martin Luther

King is a notable example. When he is analyzed within the context of the Civil

Rights movement, the role of the black social gospel, or what will be termed the

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[1] J.O. Mills, "Comment," *New Blackfriars,* January 1984, and in Elizabeth Isichei, *A History of Christianity in Africa: From Antiquity to the Present* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1995), 3. Other observers such as A.F. Walls note that one of the most significant events in Christianity in the late twentieth century is that the heartlands of the Church are no longer in Europe, decreasingly in North America, but are rather in Latin America, parts of Asia, and Africa. Please see his discussion in "Towards Understanding Africa's Place in Christian History," in J.S. Pobee, ed., *Religion in Pluralistic Society* (London: E.J. Brill Publishers, 1976), 180 and in Isichei, *A History of Christianity in Africa.* Other citations include Adrian Hastings, *A History of African Christianity: 1950-1975* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 18, and Patrick Johnstone, *Operation World* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishers, 1993), 37.

prophetic Christianity in this study, is often neglected in the academic literature in international and comparative politics. While historians, observers, commentators, and other scholars acknowledge major secular trends in fascism and communism, feminism and environmentalism, some of the most significant changes that occurred in the twentieth century and today are religious in nature.

The world currently is living through one of the transforming moments in the history of Christianity. Over the past five centuries, the story of Christianity has been bound up with Europe and European-derived civilizations, most notably North America. Christianity's new chapter in this millennium has three major themes. First, it is moving south to Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Second, the vast majority of believers will no longer be white, European, nor Euro-American. And third, and perhaps most significantly, the theological beliefs of *southern Christians* will differ in many important aspects from *western Christians*.[2] The era of western Christianity has passed, and the day of southern Christianity is dawning.

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[2] As Kenyan scholar John Mbiti has observed, "the centers of the church's universality are no longer in Geneva, Rome, Athens, Paris, London, New York, but Kinshasa, Buenos Aires, Addis Ababa and Manila." See John Mbiti as quoted in Kwame Bediako, *Christianity in Africa* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press/Orbis, 1995), 154. According to the *World Christian Encyclopedia*, some 2 billion Christians are alive today, about one-third of the planet's population. The largest single bloc, some 560 million people, is still to be found in Europe. Latin America is already close behind with 480 million. Africa has 360 million, and 313 million Asians profess Christianity. North America claims 260 million believers. If we extrapolate these figures to the year 2025, then there will be 2.6 billion Christians worldwide, of which *633 million* would live in Africa, 640 million in Latin America, and 460 million in Asia. Europe, with 555 million, would have slipped to third place. Figures are drawn from David B. Barrett, George T. Kurian and Todd M. Johnson, *World Christian Encyclopedia*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 12-15. For a full analysis of the growth of southern Christianity, see Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

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Three Religious Traditions, Three Religious Contexts—The Dutch Reformed Churches, the South African Council of Churches, and the Pentecostals in South Africa

The Research Question and Subquestions

The role of Christianity and the varieties, or "rooms," of Christian belief in South Africa has been substantial. Religious and church leaders of these "rooms" have had to constantly make choices about assessing the proper relationship between religion and politics. Even before Christians became an overwhelming majority, Christian ideas and institutions were prominent in South Africa's political history. In the nineteenth century, Christian missionaries fanned out into the southern African interior, injecting themselves into the power politics of the region. They were often opposed, and occasionally supported, by whites as well as blacks. In the twentieth century South Africans have used Christian doctrine both to justify and oppose doctrines of racial segregation, most notably apartheid. Christian leadership provided much of the impetus for the founding, in 1912, of the African National Congress. And in the accelerating struggle between white rule and black liberation in the 1970s and 1980s, Christian affiliations, symbols, and rituals were prominent in the spiral of involvement among militants on both sides, and among would-be conciliators in the middle.

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Currently, 72.6 percent of all South Africans claim to be Christian, up from 46 percent in 1911.[3] Moreover, in the twentieth century Christianity has grown the most dramatically among Africans[4]--up from 26 percent in 1911 to 76 percent in 1990. For the remaining ethnic and racial classifications, the numbers are 92 percent for whites, 86 percent for Coloureds, and 13 percent for Indians.[5]

Given the substantial role of Christianity in South African history and political life and culture, this study asks the following research question: Why are there vastly different, and often opposing, responses to political life by religious leaders, traditions, and institutions that fall within a Christian theological framework? This study will address this question by responding to the following sub-questions:

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[3] Richard Elphick, "Christianity in South African History," *Christianity in South Africa*, Elphick and Davenport, eds., 1.

[4] In the apartheid lexicon, "Indian" referred to people descended from India. "Coloureds" referred to people of mixed race, and "African" referred to Bantu-language speakers. In the 1970s, activists began referring to all *nonwhite* South Africans as "black" in an effort to promote a pan-racial identity of all oppressed people. "White" referred to the two major groups descended from western Europe, the Dutch and French Hugenots who would come to be known as Afrikaners, and the British, who arrived at the Cape in 1803. "Africans" as it is used here refers to black, Bantu-speaking peoples.

[5] Data comes from the *Census of the Union of South Africa, 1911: Report and Annexes* (Pretoria: Government and Stationery Office, 1913), 924-5 and Patrick Goldstone, *Operation World: The Day-to-Day Guide for Praying for the World* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1993).

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- What factors have determined and led religious traditions to become involved or not involved in South African political, economic and social dynamics?

- What theological streams of thought serve as the basis for religious behavior in various political contexts in South Africa?

- Why, after theological streams have been taken into account, do some religious organizations become more overtly or directly involved in political, economic and social dynamics than others?

- What role do church types and institutional dynamics within religious organizations play in determining the manner in which religious traditions engage in political life?

- Given all these factors that explain the behavior of religious traditions, what role, if any, do religious traditions play in civil and associational life in South Africa?

Justification and Contribution of this Study

Justification of this Study: New Trends and Trajectories in International Relations and Comparative Politics

Several trends in world politics and the field of international relations merit attention to justify the need for this study. First, with the passing into history the East-West/Cold War confrontation, future conflicts will no longer be

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rooted in defunct Cold War ideologies.[6] Instead, many conflicts will arise from clashes of communal identity, whether based on race, ethnicity, nationality or religion. Such disputes tend to occur at the "fault lines"[7] between rival nationalities *within national borders* where societies are experiencing entrenched economic strains and rising expectations. The fear of a mutually annihilating nuclear exchange between the superpowers of the Cold War era has been transcended by a new specter of the potential for human self-destruction, one in which the seemingly dormant forces of political identity—ethnicity, nationalism, communalism, racism, and classism—resurge to fuel myriad conflicts within states.[8] These conflicts, which often stretch back decades, and perhaps centuries, are among the most intractable and unmalleable sources of conflict. These sources of conflict are the types that most international relations frameworks are least suited to deal with.

Traditions in international politics have emphasized the state as the most important unit of analysis. As an actor, the state is assumed to be unitary, rational, and focused on positioning and *interests* at stake and assumptions grounded in realism, neorealism, game theory and other related realist

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[6] Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, eds, *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), xvi.

[7] I intentionally use Samuel Huntington's oft-cited phrase to indicate that "fault lines" also occur *within* countries and regions and highlight a missing aspect of his analysis which tends to obscure these new realities, which he argues occurs primarily at the level of the international system.

[8] Timothy D. Sisk, *Democratization in South Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 3.

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theoretical perspectives. These theoretical traditions are generally suited for dealing with conflicts that relate to tangible, malleable material interests.[9] Such interests are inherently divisible and subject to compromise. Nonmaterial "identity-based" conflicts, on the other hand, are often not well understood by practical-minded diplomats and high-profile political leaders who operate under assumptions implicit in power politics. What is required is not necessarily a shrewd understanding of the interests of the various rational actors, but the emotional stakes of the parties. These emotional stakes are often deeply rooted in history, in which interpretations of such concepts like justice, freedom, and equality are determined. In other words, what is required is a more thorough and systematic understanding of the existing and evolving *relationships* among the parties at stake in conflict.

Second, the South African case demonstrates the possibility of negotiated settlements in a society historically deeply divided by racial, ethnic, religious, or other forms of ascriptively based conflict. The demise of the apartheid regime, the subsequent negotiation process, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) proceedings, and the current economic transformation process have broadened to include a wider range of civil society actors in South African society. This research asks specific questions of the role

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[9] The body of literature in the realist and neorealist traditions is voluminous. Please see Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), *Theories of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979), and Robert O. Keohane, ed. *NeoRealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

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of religious traditions in this process and their role in civil and associational life in South Africa.

Third, within comparative politics scholarship that analyzes the dynamics of deeply divided societies, there has been an implicit assumption that political and economic conflict can be potentially ameliorated if *only* such societies would adopt certain types of democratic and economic institutions.[10] This research argues against this assumption. Instead, the democratic and economic institutions that will emerge in South Africa are those already present. Their structure and relationship to each other will be driven by how they identify with realities in the South African context. This context is framed by South Africa's historical, political, social, and cultural narratives.[11]

This research investigates the role of religious traditions in South Africa from the perspective of institutional choice. Politics and economics are guided by prevailing political and economic institutions, rule structures, and the existing

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[10] The major work being referred to here is Donald Horowitz's *A Democratic South Africa?: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Much work in this tradition attempts to prescribe an ideal set of post-apartheid political institutions that tend to neglect what institutions and actors are actually emerging on the South African political, social, cultural and economic landscape.

[11] Many astute observers of South African politics share this approach. Two notable voices are Steven Friedman, former director of the Centre for Policy Studies and Fredrick van zyl Slabbert of the University of Stellenbosch. Friedman emphasizes that much scholarship is intent on arguing that if only the right type of constitution is adopted and implemented that it will address the problems of South Africa. Analysis needs to more appropriately address the actors and relationships in place. Van zyl Slabbert, commenting on the negotiations in South Africa in 1989, pointed out that "constitutional preferences have to be related to real political forces and only then can one anticipate the elements of a likely or probable constitution for South Africa." This same observation applies in the current economic climate in South Africa today.

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"universe of ideas."[12] A number of scholars look to ideas as explanations for

policy, suggesting that ideas can be critical in explaining different organizational

outcomes.[13] These studies, as does this one, focus on questions that

organizations ask themselves in changing and different times. Moreover, most of

these studies suggest that the adoption of new policies cannot be explained

solely by changes in objective conditions or material interests. Organizations, to

include religious actors, also draw upon ideas to guide them as to the

appropriateness of their responses to given political and economic contexts.

Fourth, another dynamic of Cold War politics was that nonmaterial

identity-based conflicts were ignored, or in many cases, further exacerbated by

the restrictions that international organizations placed upon themselves against

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[12] Elinor Ostrom argues that rules and norms can play a significant role in rational choice theoretical frameworks. Moreover, this research emphasizes the impact of ideas in evolving religious contexts as particularly salient in understanding and analyzing religious actors and their responses to the various political contexts in recent South African politics. Please see Elinor Ostrom, "Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity," *American Political Science Review* 85 (1) (March 1991): 237-43. The "universe of ideas" concept is drawn from Jane Jenson's study of the women's rights movement in France. Jenson argues that the women's rights movement was not successful until the universe of political discourse changed. Jane Jenson, "Changing Discourse, Changing Agendas: Political Rights and Reproductive Policies in France," in Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds., *The Women's Movement of the U.S. and Western Europe: Consciousness, Political Opportunity, and Public Policy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 64-88.

[13] There is an abundance of research outside of the field of religion and politics, and especially in the field of international political economy, using ideas as explanatory variables. For examples of this literature see John Odell, *U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), Eric Foner, *Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), Judith Goldstein, "The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of the U.S. Agricultural and Manufacturing Policies," *International Organization* 43 ic (Winter 1989); and Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).

becoming involved in the internal conflicts of states.[14] This vacuum, Johnston

and Sampson observe, along with the changing nature of conflict, has resulted in

a marked expansion of the role of organizations and actors outside state

structures, to include religious figures and spiritually motivated laypersons

among them. They have used a variety of mediation and conflict resolution

approaches not normally employed in traditional power politics settings.[15]

Religious organizations and leaders within these organizations are more

likely to affect people at the individual and subnational group—where deep

needs, inequities and insecurities are most often keenly felt—than are most

political leaders who walk the corridors of power. Religious actors are in many

cases constantly addressing fundamental issues of meaning, purpose, morality,

and values. While many observers would acknowledge that movements from

Civil Rights efforts in the United States to the Polish Solidarity Movement had

important religious elements to them, the full acceptance of the role of religious

actors has been frequently ignored, or at least understudied.[16]

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[14] Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, *Religion: The Missing Dimension*, 4.

[15] Johnston and Sampson, xvi.

[16]For a fuller explanation of this "curious neglect," see Christian Smith, ed., *Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism* (New York: Routledge Press, 1996). This study argues against the often rigorous separation of church and state that tends to prevail in American scholarship and desensitized many to the fact that much of the world does not operate on a similar basis. Additionally, please see Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, eds., *Religion, The Missing Dimension* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Another astute observer notes that there has been an excessive tendency among modern historians to regard materialist motivation as the essential undercurrent of change. More attention needs to be paid to the role of nonmaterialist factors as agents of change. See Richard Elphick and Rodney

Contributions to Academic Literature

Several bodies of literature are addressed in this research. The first is the

field of religion and politics. Work in this field treat religious organizations as

the primary units of analysis.[17] This field is concerned with the relationship

between religious organizations and society as a whole. This is especially true

when some segments of the population call upon the churches to act as forces

for social change, as was the case with Latin American churches under military

dictatorships or prophetic South African churches under apartheid.[18] In such

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Davenport, eds., *Christianity in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), xiii. Finally, a recent response to materialist claims can be found in Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar, "Religion and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, " *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36, 2 (1998), 175-201.

[17] Leonardo Villalon, who has conducted research on the role of Islam in Senegalese politics, describes two extremes that tend to pervade the explicit study of religion. At one extreme are assumptions of a historic "essence" which embodies a core set of beliefs, rituals, and practices which are shared by all members of a given religious or faith-based tradition. From this assumption, analysis attempts to isolate and identify this "essence" as the "religious" mode of behavior. At the other extreme are those arguments that point out the sheer diversity and randomness of cultures and particular forms of social and political behavior renders it impossible to employ religion and religious or faith-based behavior as *reliable* units of analysis. Villalon rejects these two extremes. He argues that religion can be seen to perform three functions in society. First, religion articulates a theological construct to explain the meaning and purpose to human existence. Some observers have employed this articulation as the *mythos* of society. Second, religion is viewed as an ideology which lays out the fundamentals of a sociopolitical framework and provides scriptural support for this framework. Finally, religion participates in developing and sustaining civil and social organizations in society which form, in many respects, its source of legitimacy. For a full explanation, please see his *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens in Fatick* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 27-28.

[18] The works of Daniel H. Levine are of significant note here. Please see *Religion and Politics in Latin America: The Catholic Church in Venezuela and Colombia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), *Popular Voices in Latin America Catholicism* (Princeton:

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instances, church leaders must strike a balance among a range of concerns. Strictly sacramental or liturgical issues must be balanced against pressure to become involved in the socioeconomic and political questions of the day.

The second body of literature that this research addresses is state-civil society relations. State-civil society debates have reemerged during the last decade with the passing of the Cold War, the resurgence of seemingly dormant issues around identity, ethnicity, nationalism, and understanding regime change. One important question is what is the role of civil society? Even more specifically, debates center around whether civil society is necessary to the proper functioning of democracy. An examination of South Africa's state-civil society relations can enlarge our understanding of the assumptions undergirding state-civil society literature. Religious traditions will be analyzed as civil society actors as state structures have transitioned from an authoritarian to a democratic regime.

Finally, this literature contributes to the field of conflict resolution. Again, with the passing of the Cold War, innovative theoretical trends have entered the field of conflict resolution. International relations scholars have used the tools of power politics, drawing heavily on the theoretical traditions of

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Princeton University Press, 1992), and an edited volume, *Religion and Political Conflict in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1986). Other significant contributions include Scott Mainwaring and Alexander Wilde,eds., *The Progressive Church in Latin America* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), and Scott Mainwaring, *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil: 1916-1985* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986).

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political realism. Conflict resolution has roots in the fields of social psychology and helping professions. The theoretical streams flowing from these traditions emphasize the emotional stakes, deep felt needs, and identity in the resolution of conflicts.[19] Finally, South Africa is particularly well-suited as a case study in what is called sustainable reconciliation and restorative justice in conflict resolution literature.[20] Religious actors have been an integral part of this process in South Africa.

Justification of the Three Religious Traditions

While there are many religious actors who have played a significant role in South African history, this research focuses on three *Christian* religious traditions in order to establish a comparative framework for analysis. The three religious traditions—the Dutch Reformed Churches (DRC), the Pentecostals, and the South African Council of Churches (SACC)—have responded very differently to various political contexts in modern South African history. These three religious actors provide an ideal comparative framework for analysis. From a comparative perspective, this research addresses the various responses of these three religious traditions in South African politics from 1910-2002.

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[19] John Paul Lederach is generally regarded as one of the leading voices articulating the sustainable reconciliation component in conflict resolution literature. He has gained much of his insights from over twenty years in peacebuilding initiatives around the world. Please see his *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

[20] Lederach, *Building Peace*, 24-31.

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Justification for these three religious traditions is based on the following factors. First and foremost, this research is driven by methodological frameworks from the field of comparative politics. For the three religious actors under consideration, the question quickly arises: Given the reality that the three traditions are Christian or more broadly, espouse a Christian theological worldview, why has their response to given political, economic, and social phenomena varied so greatly? As will be argued in this study, the Dutch Reformed and South African Council of Churches fall along opposite ends of the continuum of church traditions in Christianity, with Pentecostals providing remarkable new insights into the role of religion in South Africa today. This dynamic allows for comparative analysis.

Second, the Dutch Reformed Churches merit special attention in this study because of their intimate involvement with the development of apartheid. Often dubbed the "National Party in prayer," the Dutch Reformed Churches have been linked to the rise and fall of race policy in South Africa. More specifically, this study will focus on the largest "sister" Dutch Reformed tradition, the *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk* (NGK) churches. The NGK is the largest and most influential of the three Afrikaans-reformed churches in

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South Africa with over 1.3 million members and 60 percent of the Afrikaner population.[21]

Many observers argue that the overarching narrative of Afrikanerdom[22] has been a long struggle against, and slow acceptance of, modernity. This narrative would inform every aspect of Afrikaner reality. While political, ideological, and economic perspectives are insightful in understanding how value judgments propelled Afrikaners to mobilize themselves in such a manner so as to draw most South Africans, over the entire span of the twentieth century, into the magnetic field of their politics, these perspectives are not sufficient until one accounts for the significant theological influence of the NGK in Afrikanerdom. Other religious traditions in South Africa have responded to this dynamic during the twentieth century and beyond. Therefore, the NGK's story must be part of any comparative effort to understand the complex interaction of religion and politics in South Africa.

The South African Council of Churches (SACC) is an umbrella faith-based religious organization that is comprised of member churches, associate organizations, and observer churches. Throughout the 1990s, the Council had

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[21] Tracy Kuperus, *State, Civil Society and Apartheid in South Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press), 166.

[22] Afrikanerdom refers to the phenomenon of ethnic unity among Afrikaners encouraged by the consolidation of political, economic, social, and cultural power through organizations like the Afrikaner Broederbond, the Nationalist Party, the press, and the NGK.

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twenty-one member churches, twelve associate organizations, and three observer churches.[23] In other words, the SACC is not a denomination but an ecumenical umbrella organization of churches and denominations. The goal of the Council, as stated in its constitution, is to foster unity among its various member churches by organizing consultations, conferences, and ecumenical studies; to enable the church to more effectively carry out its mission; to undertake joint action and service; and to engage in activities on behalf of its member churches that are integral to its worship, witness, and service.[24] This list of objectives should make it clear that the SACC operates in part as a "supra-organization," existing at a level wholly different than that of an individual church. This organizational difference allows the SACC to engage in and take action on radical and prophetic matters more than any of its member churches and other church traditions in South Africa. Therefore, inclusion of the SACC provides an ideal point of reference for comparative analysis to the Dutch Reformed tradition.

In recent South African history, the SACC provided a direct challenge to apartheid and found itself as one of the only civil society actors able to stand against the apartheid regime as the government became increasingly repressive during the 1980s. The SACC found itself in what many observers have termed a

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[23] SACC, "South African Council of Churches: Ecumenical Co-operation for South Africa Today," undated pamphlet (CCA).

[24] SACC Constitution, June 1991, 6-7.

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"spiral of involvement"[25] which became particularly pronounced under the state of emergency that prevailed in South Africa for the latter part of the 1980s. During the 1990s, the SACC assumed the role of honest broker and mediator during the often violent negotiation process. After the 1994 elections, the SACC, partnering with other revived civil society actors, facilitated the Truth and Reconciliation Commission proceedings. Today, the SACC and other prophetic religious actors are in "critical solidarity" with the majoritarian ANC government and are assuming a prophetic stance vis-à-vis economic policies that appear to please World Bank and Structural Adjustment guidelines rather than addressing the needs of the poor.

Fewer than one hundred years from their origins, Pentecostals, along with their charismatic "sisters," form the largest Christian group in the world after the Catholic branch of Christianity, and the fastest-growing Christian movement, estimated at over 372 million in 1990.[26] Pentecostals, which will also include African Initiated Churches (AICs) with affinities to Pentecostalism,[27] account for more than 40 percent of the South African black

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[25] Tristan Anne Borer, *Challenging the State: Churches as Political Actors in South Africa, 1980-1994* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 44.

[26] Vinsin Synan, *The Spirit Said "Grow"* (Monrovia: MARC, 1992).

[27] For the purpose of this study, *Pentecostal-type* refers to African Initiated Churches with historical, theological, and liturgical affinities with the Pentecostal movement. These churches, which embrace well over one-third of the black population of South Africa, have an emphasis on the Holy Spirit, especially manifested in prophetic (the use of prophetic here is not to be confused in the way it is used in relation to the SACC) healing practices, and other Pentecostal beliefs such as adult baptism by immersion and speaking in tongues. These concepts will be further developed in this study.

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Pentecostals along the political, economic and social fault lines in today's South Africa. Moreover, their unique position as a religious actor places them in a valuable and insightful analytical perspective vis-à-vis the NGK and SACC. Their inclusion as the third religious actor is key to understanding the breadth and depth of religious actors in South African politics.

This study, then, seeks to explain the relationship of these three religious traditions to given political contexts over time. Additionally, these three traditions are compared to one another to offer a rich analysis and to adopt a perspective that incorporates the factors of theology, church type, and institutional dynamics, as well as the intervening variables of race, class, and ethnicity. What emerges is a continuum of civil society-state relations that range from cooperation to conflict, or some mixture of the two. The next chapter will fully explain the theoretical framework for analysis.

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Scope of this Study

In order to gain an understanding of the role of the three religious traditions in modern South African history, this study will highlight several periods in which religion and politics meshed in its history. With 1910 as a starting point, South African politics and religion have experienced five distinct periods of time:

- the development of Afrikaner civil society and eventual solidification of Afrikaner political and economic power with the rise of the Nationalist Party (NP) from 1910-1961;

- the crystallization of apartheid, 1961-1978;

- the legitimacy debates and spiral of involvement, 1978-1989;

- the negotiation phase from 1989-1994; and

- the current economic transformation and social issues confronting the majoritarian African National Congress (ANC) government, 1994-2002.

The development of Afrikaner civil society began to build momentum when South Africa became the Union of South Africa in 1910. What is significant about the establishment of the Union is that Great Britain began passing the reigns of power politically to Afrikaners. Almost immediately, the new government began to implement measures to segregate and disenfranchise non-white members of society. The NGK played a key role during this period as

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the church leadership became distinctly aware of the social, material, and religious needs of Afrikaners and were instrumental in promoting those needs collectively to the government and political parties. By the mid-1930s the NGK would emerge as a civil society institution identifying with the needs of Afrikaners and this relationship provides the backdrop for subsequent NGK-state relations to the present day.

On the other hand, as the ink was drying on the official documents establishing the Union of South Africa, Africans began to protest and resist. Budding African political organizations coalesced to oppose the act and protested to South African authorities and Great Britain.[28] One of the first prophetic political organizations, the South African Native Convention (SANC), was formed and would eventually become the African National Congress (ANC) in 1925. Many of the leadership of the ANC were religious leaders, and these leaders would set the stage for resistance on a national scale in coming decades.

The origins of Pentecostalism in South Africa began in 1904 in Wakkerstroom, located in southeastern Transvaal. Although the first services were racially integrated, very soon this new movement yielded to the pressures of white society to evolve as segregated churches. However, some Pentecostal

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[28] For example, in October 1908 the Transvaal Natives' Union sent a petition with over three thousand signatures to the National Convention demanding a common roll franchise throughout South Africa. Native Congresses were also held in the Orange River Colony, the Cape, the Transvaal, and Natal. At each meeting, representatives passed resolutions against the color bar clauses and the failure to extend a non-European franchise to the north. See Peter Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa* (London: Christopher Hurst and Co., 1979), 20-21.

churches remained racially integrated to a certain degree. Part of the explanation

for this integration was the appeal of Pentecostalism to various disenfranchised

groups in South African society, namely working class Afrikaners, blacks, and

Coloureds. The identification with the poor, marginalized, and disenfranchised

would set the stage for the critical role Pentecostalism plays today in South

Africa's political, economic, and social life.

The second era, the crystallization of apartheid policy, 1961-1978, was

characterized by the successful attainment of Afrikaner nationalist goals, a

relatively stable political-economic environment, and moderate external pressure

that set the context for a situation of collaboration between the NP-dominated

state and the NGK in South Africa. The two entities' perspectives on race policy

became almost indistinguishable.

As the apartheid regime implemented its polices that further entrenched

its people into segregation into virtually every aspect of existence, Albert Lutuli,

a devout Congregationalist and president of the ANC during the 1950s, wrote

the following in response to the Sharpeville massacre and banning of the ANC

and other anti-apartheid organizations in 1960:

> The Churches have simply submitted to the secular state for
> far too long; some have even supported apartheid. While it is
> not too late for white Christians to look at the Gospel and
> redefine their allegiance, I warn those who care for Christianity,
> who care to go into all the world and preach the Gospel, that in
> South Africa the opportunity is three hundred years old. It will
> not last forever. Time is running out.[29]

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[29] Albert Lutuli, *Let My People Go* (London: Collins, 1962), 119.

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During this era, the prophetic expression of Christianity went underground, and significant theological trends were formulated, articulated, and incubated which would come into overt expression after the slaughter of black schoolchildren in Soweto in 1976.

In Pentecostalism, division among race deepened to its lowest point during this era. The trigger event that would entrench division among Pentecostals can be traced back to G.R. Wessels, a senior pastor in the Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM) and its vice president. In 1955, he became a senator in the ruling Nationalist Party and argued that pastors needed to have formal theological training and minimum of twelve years' schooling. This movement toward the "formalization" of the clergy estranged the vast majority of blacks, whose members could not access educational resources.

A wealth of literature exists on the South Africa of the 1980s. During this time, the apartheid regime came under increasing attack, both from within and without. The NGK's role during this period reveals an interesting insight regarding state-civil society relations in times of transition. A civil society institution like the NGK presented a greater obstacle to the realization of democracy than the state because of its close collaboration to the state as a *religious* entity. If one of the major functions of religion is to "capture what was once known," or to establish ultimate meaning for human beings, then religious institutions may have a more difficult time changing and responding to evolving

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political and social contexts. Much of the academic literature argues that while overcentralized, authoritarian states hinder democratic transitions, civil society institutions will successfully help usher in the establishment of democracy. However, the NGK's identification with narrow, ethnic interests resisted the establishment of democracy to a greater extent than the South African state.

During the 1980s, the prophetic voice of Christianity took center stage in South African politics. Along with other liberation movements, the SACC emerged as one of the key actors that overtly confronted the apartheid regime. The intensity of the opposition to the government during the 1980s was "more radical, more violent, more widespread, and more sustained than anything witnessed in modern South African history."[30] The SACC, witnessing the unbridled brutality of the regime, was led to the conclusion that it had to become increasingly more politicized. The politicization of the SACC into the political context set up a church/state conflict—the spiral of involvement. As the state silenced all other aspects of civil society through repression, the prophetic churches became the "voice of the voiceless."

Pentecostalism's theological orientation, which has most of its roots in an *antithetical church tradition*, maintains that political matters should remain squarely out of the realm of religious affairs. Many church leaders rarely made

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[30] Robert M. Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 152.

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socio-political pronouncements and they seldom challenged the status quo. However, the desire for unity within white and black Pentecostal churches encouraged more outspokenness against apartheid. Key leaders drew up a document called the "The Evangelical Witness" and "Document of Intent" that responded to the overly conservative political orientation of Evangelicalism and rejection of the system of apartheid because of its basis in racial discrimination.[31]

During the negotiation phase, 1989-1994, the NGK continued to maintain its position on apartheid. The NGK did offer a qualified rejection of apartheid by suggesting that it was applied inappropriately. However, NGK leaders still maintained that the theological basis of apartheid was sound. This continued position of the NGK has had the effect of rendering the NGK as morally bankrupt in the 1990s and beyond.

In contrast, the SACC, now faced with a contracting spiral of involvement, began to take on the role of mediator. Additionally, the SACC continued to criticize political groups when necessary, while at the same time encouraging the same groups to achieve some sort of political reconciliation. SACC leaders expended the majority of their energies on trying to keep political opponents talking to each other, while at the same time trying to stem the rising tide of violence.

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[31] Allan H. Anderson and Gerald J. Pillay, "The Segregated Spirit: The Pentecostals," *Christianity in South Africa: A Political, Social, and Cultural History*, Richard Elphick and Rodney Davenport, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 234, and J.N. Horn, "The Experience of the Spirit in Apartheid South Africa," *Azusa*, 1, 1(1990): 31.

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Pentecostals continued to work towards unity within their various sister traditions. However, some efforts are still unresolved. And while most observers conclude that the South African Pentecostal movement acquiesced in the social system of apartheid South Africa, its role today is central to South African political and economic life.

In a democratic South Africa that strives for racial and ethnic inclusion, the NGK's role has been far less prominent. Church leaders have decided to focus of the spiritual dimension of their ministry, partly because they want to avoid the detrimental effects that collaboration and engagement brought to the NGK during the apartheid era, most notably the loss of autonomy and loss of respect. An interesting new finding suggests that NGK leaders are beginning to rethink their relationship to other church traditions in South Africa, especially African Initiated Churches. Some NGK leaders are beginning to partner with these churches to foster a more collaborative effort with *other* church traditions as a means to achieve legitimacy and reconciliation.

The SACC's role is also somewhat diminished. Many observers term the SACC's role as having transformed from a "theology of liberation" to a "theology of reconstruction." SACC leaders focus on issues of redistribution, justice, and addressing the needs of the poor. One encouraging trend of the SACC is that it has maintained its autonomy in the new South Africa and as such, has a degree of effectiveness that the NGK does not.

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However, in many aspects, the most insightful findings rest with the Pentecostals. Pentecostalism has its roots in a marginalized and underprivileged society that have struggled to find identity and dignity. It expanded among oppressed African people who were neglected, misunderstood, and deprived of anything but token leadership by their white Pentecostal "masters." And yet the ability of Pentecostalism to adapt and fulfill African religious aspirations has been its principal strength. Of particular note is the unique dimension of the healing tradition in Pentecostalism and its broadened understanding to address all aspects of its people. As will be argued later in this study, Pentecostals have shown the most success of South African churches at encouraging behavior that reduces the likelihood of contracting the HIV/AIDS virus.

This study will proceed as follows. Part I, Religious Change During the Apartheid Era is divided into two chapters. Chapter 1 is entitled "Explaining Religious Change in South Africa." This chapter will paint the theoretical backdrops of religion and politics, civil society and democracy, conflict resolution, and how these backdrops have influenced recent South African politics. Then, the theoretical framework for explaining church change will be articulated. Chapter 2, "The Legacy of Religious Traditions During the Apartheid Era," will chronicle the legacy of churches during apartheid, using the theoretical framework as a tool to explain religious behavior in apartheid's political, economic, and social contexts. Part II is entitled Post-Apartheid South

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Africa and Church Response. Chapter 3 will paint the new political, economic and social realities and trajectories in South Africa in the contemporary era. Chapter 4 will explain and highlight church response in the new political and economic context, with special emphasis on South Africa's process of democratic consolidation and transformation. Finally, Chapter 5, Concluding Analysis, will offer broad implications of the study and avenues for future research.

PART I

RELIGIOUS CHANGE
DURING THE APARTHEID ERA

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Chapter 1

Explaining Religious
Change in South Africa

"The political dimension of our faith varies according to the
requirements of each different context."

—Archbishop Desmond Tutu[32]

When political contexts change, religious organizations may go through

an "identity crisis" in which they are forced to reevaluate their mission and

proper role in society. Concurrently, their level of political involvement is likely

to be affected.[33] When South Africa transitioned from an authoritarian regime to

a government of national unity and to today's partially consolidated liberal

democracy, churches and religious traditions are often unsure about their

purpose. For the NGK, it is no longer as politically prominent as it was for most

of the twentieth century. Church leaders have concentrated on the spiritual and

pastoral dimension of their ministry, in part, because they want to avoid the

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[32]*Challenge* (February 1993): 6.

[33] Mainwaring and Wilde, in *Progressive Church in Latin America,* show that in several
Latin American countries, a retrenchment or muting of progressive Catholicism resulted from
changes in the religious context, with liberation theology coming under increased attack from the
Vatican, and from changes in the political context, with democratization in various countries.
The church experienced a sense of crisis, with the unity of moderates and progressives eroding
in the new political context.

detrimental effects that collaboration and engagement brought to the NGK during the apartheid years. Moreover, ANC leaders who dominate the state do not have a strong affinity with the NGK because of the church's historically strong identification with Afrikaners. Pentecostals, who adhered to theological streams of thought that encourage detachment from politics and cultural debates, find themselves, almost unwittingly, placed more prominently in the mix of political, economic, cultural, and social issues. The legacies of self-expression, spontaneity, and empowerment among Pentecostals are sources of hope and renewal for the many millions of South Africans that were systematically excluded from political and economic life under the apartheid regime. Finally, the South African Council of Churches, which was faced with the choice of silence and a "voice of the voiceless" under the apartheid regime, now has had to ask the question, What kind of voice, for whom, and how expressed?[34]

In the 1980s, religious organizations had to wrestle with the question of whether the state was illegitimate. Some religious traditions continued to argue for the legitimacy of the state, others acquiesced to state structures, while others declared the state illegitimate. Those that declared the state illegitimate still had to take more steps to overtly confront the state.

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[34] Mainwaring and Wilde, 26.

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In the period from February 1990 until the April 1994 elections was overwhelmingly dominated by two political phenomena: negotiations and violence. The first phase of the negotiation process was characterized by "talks about talks."[35] The ANC insisted that the purpose of negotiations should be the creation of a constituent assembly and the formulation of a new constitution that embodied certain principles.[36] The Nationalist Party's (NP) negotiators hoped to maintain a share of political power through what would be veto power over such issues as the loss of economic or personal rights by whites. To achieve this, their goal was to place limits on any sort of blanket majority rule, in favor of group rights.[37] In this context churches had to make decisions about what role they would play among the many political players.

Violence, the other major political dynamic of this period, reached staggering levels during this period. Early in the 1990s, the ANC and its allies

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[35] "Talks about talks" were symbolized primarily by two meetings which took place in the first half of 1990: the Groote Schuur meeting and the Pretoria meeting. The Groote meeting took place between the ANC and the government in May. The bulk of this meeting was devoted to discussing the preconditions for negotiations as outlined in the Harare Declaration, removing the obstacles that stood in the path of negotiations, and the violence in the country. The Pretoria meeting took place a few months later and produced the Pretoria Minute, in which the ANC suspended the armed struggle. Tristan Anne Borer, *Challenging the State*, 168.

[36] These included: that South Africa should become a united democratic nonracial state; all its people should enjoy common and equal citizenship and nationality; a universal suffrage under a common voters' roll; an entrenched Bill of Rights; and a just economic order. Cited from John Lamola, "The Role of Religious Leaders in Peacemaking and Social Change in Africa: The Case of South Africa," unpublished paper, 1993, CCA.

[37] Martin J. Murray, *The Revolution Deferred: The Painful Birth of Post-Apartheid South Africa* (New York: Verso, 1994), 181.

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began accusing the de Klerk regime of embracing a double strategy: supporting

negotiations in public, while privately working towards—or at least turning a

blind eye to—the destabilization of the organizing capacity of its main

negotiating rival, the ANC.

The transitional changes of the 1980s and early 1990s have created an

opening for a full democratic transition. While the elite agreements of the early

1990s led to agreements about the nature of formal political institutions, there

are still profound disjunctions between South Africa's formal political

institutions and their societal foundations. The mixed legacy of the 1980s means

that South Africa's democratic consolidation will depend on the ability of its

elites to address a wide range of issues and continue to build firm supports for

democracy in the "substructure of domination."[38] In addition to the legacies

from the 1980s, five other barriers may be paramount in subverting a democratic

future for South Africa: economic legacies of South Africa and the ongoing

struggle for growth and delivery, the ideology of the nation-state and concurrent

trends in globalization, diversity and ethnicity, democracy and the hegemonic

tendencies of the ANC-dominated government, and the looming HIV/AIDS

pandemic. It is in this mix of complex issues that churches must make new

decisions about their role in political, economic, and social issues. In order to

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[38] Robert M. Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

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address how religious traditions process, implement, and evaluate their response

to political and social contexts, the discussion turns to developing a theoretical

framework to explain religious organizational change. However, this framework

needs to be situated within the academic bodies of literature that were presented

in the Introduction: religion and politics, state-civil society debates, and conflict

resolution.

Theoretical Backdrops: Religion and Politics, State-Civil Society Debates, and Conflict Resolution

South African Religious Contributions to the Subfield of Religion and Politics

As was discussed in the Introduction, scholars in the subfield of religion

and politics are concerned with the changing relationships between religious

organizations and society as a whole. In addition to the enormous intellectual

investment that scholars contributed to the role of prophetic religious

organizational behavior in the political contexts of Latin America,[39] other

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[39] Especially David H. Levine, *Religion and Politics in Latin America: The Catholic Church in Venezuela and Colombia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), and *Popular Voices in Latin American Catholicism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

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studies have asked insightful questions about the role of religious organizations as partners with the South African apartheid state.[40]

The current framework being developed here contributes to the literature on religion and politics in several ways. First, the scope of analysis is widened to explicitly compare different religious traditions in the South African context. Many of the major works in this field have two things in common: they concentrate on one denomination, such as the role of the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America. Second, while there have been significant scholarly contributions on religion and politics in the South African context, the comparative analysis has often been limited to one *type* of religious tradition. This study broadens the analysis further by comparing different religious *theological* traditions and drawing upon the historical context as a point of comparison *before* and *after* the demise of apartheid.

Additionally, a multi-religious organizational approach makes clear that any understanding of how religious organizations, churches, or other faith-based communities come to adopt specific self-identities must take organizational characteristics into account. Studies in organizational theory indicate that different organizations have different capacities for implementing new ideas,

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[40] Tracy Kuperus, *State-Civil Society in South Africa.*

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and this holds true for South African religious organizations. This study assists us in understanding how religious ideas work through and become embedded in ecclesial organizations.

This study also brings to the table the rich academic literature that has been developed by theologians into the field of comparative politics and international relations. As was indicated earlier in this section, some of the most insightful analyses about religion and politics have been developed through the Latin American experience. This study draws upon this debt and acknowledges that the most rigorous theoretical analyses of the interaction of religion and politics in South Africa have been conducted not by political scientists but by theologians.[41]

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[41] Some of the most sophisticated theoretical treatments of the changing relations between churches and the South African state in the 1980s come from theologian Charles Villa-Vicencio, especially his landmark work, *Civil Disobedience and Beyond: Law, Resistance, and Religion in South Africa* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1990). His other major landmark work is *Trapped in Apartheid: A Socio-Theological History of the English-Speaking Churches* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988). Another significant South African theologian who has made vast contributions is John W. de Gruchy, *The Struggle in South Africa* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1979).

State-Civil Society and Democracy Debates

Civil society has become an important factor in understanding regime change related to "democracy's third wave."[42] Civil society has also come into usage among South Africa's politicians. Nelson Mandela and his current successor, Thabo Mbeki, both have suggested that civil society can help usher in development and democracy for South Africa, and political reports consistently reference the government's appreciation of what a vibrant civil society can do to build a stronger society. Additionally, leading observers within South Africa's academic community devote much effort to the future and continued role of civil society in South Africa.[43] Other scholars claim that civil society strengthens already existing democracies and demands democratic change from authoritarian regimes, which fosters building a strong society and an

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[42] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). The literature on democratization is immense, but leading works of scholarship would include Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries*, 3 vols. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988-9), Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1966), and Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

[43] One relatively recent example is Hennie Kotze, ed., *Consolidating Democracy: What Role for Civil Society in South Africa?* Papers presented at a conference organized by the Centre for International and Comparative Politics, Stellenbosch, South Africa, August 1996.

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accountable state.[44] There are generally two broad schools of thought about civil society and its relationship to democracy: the liberal or mainstream tradition and the Marxist and neo-Marxist tradition. Additionally, Africanists have contributed insights that are unique to the African context.

The philosophical and historical context of liberal and Marxist understandings of civil society are deeply rooted in European philosophy, and many scholars today adopt definitions of civil society based in these philosophical contexts.[45] Liberal and mainstream scholars provide the dominant insights concerning the definition, function, origin or historical status, and the Western specificity of civil society.[46]

The liberal approach generally argues that civil society is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to the establishment of democracy. Democracy here

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[44]Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, "The Paradox of Civil Society," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (1996): 38-52.

[45]While there are many voices in the origins of civil society, John Locke, Thomas Paine and Karl Marx stand out as three particularly prominent voices. For additional discussion on the origins of civil society in Europe please see John Keane, ed., *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives* and John Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society: On the Predicaments of European Socialism, the Prospects for Democracy, and the Problem of Controlling Social and Political Power* (London: Versco, 1988).

[46] To explore the ongoing debates about civil society, please see Eboe Hutchful, "The Civil Society Debate in Africa," *International Journal* 51 (1995-96): 54.

is defined as "a system of institutionalized competition for power (with broadly inclusive political participation and effective guarantees for civil and political rights)".[47] Civil society is noted as a sphere of activity or conglomeration of associations that can resist an authoritarian regime, thus creating a conducive environment for political liberalization and abetting a democratic transition. Civil society can also be viewed as a particular mix of associational life that helps strengthen or consolidate democracy by fostering civility

or holding the state accountable. To be effective, civil society must be liberated from the state—it must be relatively autonomous and independent from the state. On the other hand, civil society cannot be "a substitute for state power, as an alternative to effective state democracy, or as a new form of non-state direct democracy".[48]

Scholars Larry Diamond, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Donald Rothchild also grapple with the relational dynamics between state, civil society and

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[47]Larry Diamond, "Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation: Building a Culture of Democracy in a New South Africa",*The Bold Experiment: South Africa's New Democracy*, ed. Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer with Sarita Hauptfleisch (n.p. Southern Book Publishers, 1994), 48.

[48]Daryl Glaser, "South Africa and the Limits of Civil Society," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 23 (1997): 5.

democracy.[49] Dealing with liberal democratic transitions and consolidation, Larry Diamond defines civil society as "the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or shared set of rules".[50] Democratic transitions are based mainly on the strategic choices made by elite actors and the negotiating that follows, but civil society is credited with providing some of the stimulus for democratization. The liberal approach sees the primary function of civil society as restraining the power of the state in the process of consolidation. It is also engaged in fostering tolerance, generating a democratic political culture, enhancing the freedom of association, and providing an outlet for marginalized groups. Some scholars have stated that relations between state and civil society can go beyond conflict to include cooperation or some mix of the two.[51]

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[49] Larry Diamond, "Toward Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (1994): 4-17; John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, eds., *Civil Society and the State in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); and O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 1986.

[50] Diamond, "Toward Democratic Consolidation," 5.

[51] Michael Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa", *World Politics* 41 (1989):407-30.

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However, conceptual clarity on this relationship continues to be a body of scholarship that warrants attention.[52]

Although the third wave of democratization in Africa arose in part due to the vibrancy of civil society, some Africanist scholars are pessimistic about the ability of African civil society to consolidate and sustain democracy. Some leading observers argue that Africa lacks the historical conditions that would foster a vibrant civil society, namely a legitimate state, political inclusion, and political engagement.[53] Even more sharply, some scholars argue that the apartheid era of South Africa hardly modeled a vibrant civil society. Khela Shubane states that a healthy, democratic civil society did not exist in South Africa during the apartheid years. Evidence of civil society involved movements with the liberation struggle that wanted to replace the state and co-opt civil society once apartheid passed away. Shubane argues that South Africa's oligarchical, racist government disenfranchised millions of South Africans. The majority, then, were excluded from forming civil society and instead joined the liberation movement which arose out of force, not volition. According to

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[52] Please see Pierre du Toit, one of the leading observers of democratization efforts in southern Africa, *State Building and Democracy in Southern Africa: A Comparative Study of Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Resource Council (HSRC) Publishers, 1995), 34-5.

[53] Please see E. Gyimah-Boadi, "Civil Society in Africa", *Journal of Democracy* 7 (1996): 118, and Peter M. Lewis, "Political Transitions and the Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa", *Journal of International Affairs* 46 (1992): 31-54.

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Shubane, liberation movements lacked the plurality and autonomy that civil society assumes.

While acknowledging the highly repressive nature of the apartheid state and the development of civil society actors under such extraordinary political and economic circumstances, this study argues against this assumption and asserts that civic activity did thrive within civil society institutions, especially within the prophetic religious tradition and was vibrant during the apartheid era and the subsequent negotiation and transition phase. A major contribution of the role of churches as civil society actors that confront authoritarian state structures was the pioneering work of Jean Francois Bayart. The heart of his research advanced that overt political actions by church actors was casually linked to the level of political repression of civil society.[54] In his work on church-state relations in Cameroon, Bayart observed and concluded that churches assume critical political functions, to include acts of opposition, civil disobedience, and nonviolent protest, when other civil society actors and organizations that would normally play this role have been repressed by an authoritarian state. Bayart's work is important in that it addresses how churches and religious organizations interact with the state at the macro level. In South Africa, churches are

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[54] Jean Francois Bayart, "La Fonction Politique Des Eglises au Cameroon," *Revue Francaise de Science Politique* 3:3 (June 1973): 514.

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responding to issues at macro and micro levels. This work addresses churches as they find themselves in the mix of macro- and micro level issues.

However, Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars counter the claims of liberal scholarship—pointing to its ideological and substantive flaws. They argue that mainstream scholars uphold an undifferentiated, bourgeois notion of civil society, an ethnocentric understanding of liberal democracy, and a limited, non-interventionist conceptualization of the state. Because liberal and mainstream approaches towards civil society have significant analytical and conceptual flaws, Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars argue that concepts of gender and class are more insightful in understanding political change.[55] This response to liberal scholarship is significant because South Africa, while in principle a liberal democracy, has a significant political tradition that is grounded in neo-Marxist assumptions, and those differences continue to be played out in the new South Africa. Given this political reality, religious organizations will have to address these debates in their self-identification process.

New Trends in Conflict Resolution

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that was established by the Constitution in 1994 and convened in 1996 under the leadership of

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[55] Chris Allen, "Who Needs Civil Society?," *Review of African Political Economy* no. 73 (1997): 329-37.

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former secretary general of the SACC and Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu

has been heralded as a model of sustainable reconciliation in building peace in

historically deeply divided societies such as South Africa.[56] Although the TRC

was established and funded by the state, it was free to act without interference

from the state, political parties and organizations. Moreover, the TRC was not

established by foreign powers for the sake of punishing war criminals, but as an

instrument constituted by South Africans for the sake of dealing with the past in

a way which would bring healing and reconciliation. The SACC captured its

motivation in these words:

> The Commission for Truth and Reconciliation is not another
> Nuremberg. It turns its back on any desire for revenge. It re-
> presents an extraordinary act of generosity by a people who
> only insist that the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
> truth be told. The space is thereby created where the deeper
> processes of forgiveness, confession, repentance, reparation,
> and reconciliation can take place.[57]

This new trend in the field of conflict resolution comes on the heels of

significant changes in global affairs to include the following:

➢ The ideological paradigm that was used to consider international conflict
   in the Cold War is increasingly less salient in explaining the nature of
   contemporary conflict.

➢ The vast majority of conflict will take place in the developing world.

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[56] John de Gruchy, James Cochrane and Stephen Martin, "Faith, Struggle and Reconciliation," in *Facing the Truth: South African faith communities and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1999), 2-3.

[57] South African Council of Churches, *The Truth Will Set You Free* (Johannesburg: SACC), 1995.

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> In the vast majority of cases, these conflicts are *intranational* in scope, that is, they are fought between groups who come from within the boundaries of a defined state.[58]

The field of international relations, with a long legacy engaging the complexities of *international* conflict, has been the bastion of political scientists and the theoretical traditions of realism and neorealism. On the other hand, the field of conflict resolution engages the fields of social psychology, theology, and other helping professions. The nature and range of contemporary conflict has demanded realism and innovation of both fields. The subjective, often intractable and unmalleable nature of the roots of conflict is where the most innovation is needed in current scholarship in conflict resolution.

The key concept to enter into conflict resolution literature is the notion of *reconciliation*. The minimalist concept of peace is inadequate because it forfeits the advantages of reconciliation—the repaired and renewed relationships that are essential to the reconstruction of political life, the economy, and a strong civil society.[59] A fundamental question is how to create a catalyst for reconciliation and then sustain it in divided societies. The legacy of the South

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[58] John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, 12-13.

[59] R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 194.

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African Council of Churches before and after the apartheid era as a prophetic

church voice has placed it as a model for self-identifying itself as an agent of

sustainable reconciliation.[60]

Civil Society in Recent South African History

The status of civil society in South Africa today cannot be understood

apart from the nature and purpose of civil society in South Africa before, during,

and after the apartheid years. Civil society under the apartheid regime responded

in many fundamental respects to the race-based nature of the South African

state. The state, according to the oft-cited definition provided by Joel Migdal, is

an entity "composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state's

leadership that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding

rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social

organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way".[61]

The South African state emerged in 1910 and went through a series of

transformations, to include the attainment of full sovereignty in 1933, republican

status in 1961, the establishment of another republic in 1984, a liberal

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[60] Lederach, *Building Peace*, 25.

[61] Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988): 19.

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democracy in 1994, a government of national unity until 1996, and the recent

nationwide elections in 2004.Up until 1994, what undergirded the state was its

racially exclusive form of rule.

South Africa's racial form of rule, also defined as a "white settler" form

of colonialism, entailed European settlers gaining independent control of the

South African state.[62] The added unique feature of South Africa's white settler

state was the highly influential, ethnic political party, the National Party, which

was in power from 1948 through 1994. The National Party forwarded and

implemented an exclusive, nationalistic agenda.[63] Throughout the years of

apartheid, it was difficult to distinguish the party, regime, and state from one

another as they collaborated to form a single hegemonic unit of control favoring

whites, and especially Afrikaners. However, while the South African state was a

hegemonic unit of control, it was *not* a monolithic entity. Despite the

overarching and far-reaching nature of the apartheid state, there were a variety

of institutions and civil society actors divided by opposing interests.

When one accounts for the majority who were excluded from the

political and social process, the nature and type of the South African state would

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[62] Kuperus, *State-Civil Society Relations in South Africa,* 10.

[63] Dan O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994* (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1996): 420-1.

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have to be identified as authoritarian. However, as an authoritarian state it did not resemble a military dictatorship, or one-party state. Instead, it more closely resembled an *oligarchical*, racist democracy. Whites overwhelmingly viewed the state as legitimate and voluntarily supported it. However, the vast majority of South Africans were excluded from participating in South African society. Their rights were denied or reduced through the extensive racial, ethnic, and class stratification that the segregationist and apartheid state propagated.

As a result of white settler colonialism and South Africa's extremely divided societal arrangements, civil society arrangements were markedly limited. This is because South African white civil society institutions often sought to "monopolize a functional or political space in society, crowding out all competitors while claiming that it represents the only legitimate path".[64] Many white civil society institutions thwarted the creation of a democratic political culture that included all South Africans; they represented narrow ethnic interests that excluded others on the basis of racial or ethnic distinctions; and they legitimated a racially exclusive authoritarian state. Civil society institutions that acknowledged the interests of black South Africans were either limited, excluded from participation in society, or banned and forced underground. One organization that experienced serious constraints on its activities was the

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[64]Larry Diamond, "Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation: Building a Culture of Democracy in a New South Africa" in *The Bold Experiment: South Africa's New Democracy,* ed. Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer with Sarita Hauptfleish (n.p.: Southern Book Publishers, 1994), 56.

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Christian Institute. After sustained efforts to restrain the Institute's activities, the government banned the organization in 1977. The major prophetic voice under consideration in this study, the South African Council of Churches (SACC), while never banned, was a constant target of threats that included the detention or house arrest of its leaders. This study contributes to debates among South African scholars today that focus on the origin and health of civil society among black South Africans in the apartheid years. Some believe that South Africa's long liberation struggle helped form vibrant and diverse associational organizations by the 1980s. The state may have disenfranchised the majority of citizens and banned national movements, but civil society was nourished within the struggle. Steven Friedman and Mark Swilling argues that "during the 1980s, resistance activity was led by social movements, professional groups, churches and unions operating within the country, many of whom coalesced in the United Democratic Front".[65] Moreover, Swilling and others suggest that even though these "civil society institutions" were not created in ideal situations, they were

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[65] Steven Friedman, "An Unlikely Utopia: State and Civil Society in South Africa," *Politikon* 19 (1991): 8.

voluntary organizations that were brought into existence to temper and replace state power in an effort to establish full-scale democracy".[66]

Finally, studies of state-civil society relations often contain dichotomous views of those relations. State and civil society often are viewed as conflicting entities engaged in a zero-sum game over scarce resources. A dichotomous perspective of state-civil society relations does not allow for the continuum of relations that can exist between state and civil society institutions.

In the section that follows, I present the theoretical framework that will illuminate our understanding of the three religious organizations in the context of civil society relations in both authoritarian and democratic political contexts and the two major theological traditions that are often the driving engines of determining the role of religious organizations in an authoritarian or democratic political context.

Explaining Church and Religious Change

The NGK, SACC, and the Pentecostals have all changed in modern South African history, but they have adopted different levels of involvement in

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[66]Patrick Fitzgerald, "Democracy and Civil Society in South Africa," *Review of African Political Economy,* no. 49 (1990): 94-110; and Mark Swilling, "Political Transition, Development and the Role of Civil Society," *Africa Insight* 20 (1990): 151-60.

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the South African political and economic sphere. What combination of external

and internal factors was responsible for the different responses of these three

religious traditions? More generally, why are some religious organizations more

able to promote internal change and develop new links to the political system

than others? Why do religious organizations undertake political action in some

cases and not in others? The answer that emerges in South Africa is that four

specific factors interacted to form distinct self-identities: changing sociopolitical

contexts, evolving religious contexts, the extensiveness or intensiveness of

religious behavior among leaders and members, and the institutional contexts in

which debates took place. The interaction of these four factors explains the

relationship of these religious traditions to sociopolitical contexts and the areas

of convergence and divergence *among* the three religious traditions. While many

studies of state-civil society relations contain dichotomous views of state-civil

relations, this perspective does not allow for the complex continuum of relations

that can exist between the state and civil society actors, to include the religious

traditions under analysis in this study. The complexity of the three religious

traditions and the state will be displayed in a continuum that incorporates six

relations that can be generally described as cooperation, conflict, or some mix of

the two.

Religious Theological Traditions

One of the enduring questions that Christianity has had to address is its relationship to the worldly realm. In antiquity, Christianity wrestled with its relationship to the Roman Empire. When Christianity was "recognized" as a legitimate religion with the conversion of Constantine in 313 C.E., Christianity would flourish and establish itself as the overarching worldview in the West for the next 1,000 years. With the dawn of the modern era in 1500, the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the wave of great revolutions in Europe and the United States, and the spread of Enlightenment ideas, Christianity has had to wrestle with its often diminished and less influential relationship to the modern nation-state.

Throughout its history, Christianity has developed four theological paradigmatic ways of relating to the prevailing culture.[67] These four traditions

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[67] The body of literature that addresses the relationship of Christianity's response to culture is immense. The leading observers that engage these questions are theologians Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, *Resident Aliens* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989), and H. Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture* (New York: Harper and Row, 1951). Niebuhr's typology has five categories: Christ against Culture, Christ the Transformer of Culture, Christ and Culture in Paradox, Christ above Culture, and Christ of Culture. Narrative theologian Hauerwas rejects this typology and instead argues for Christ as *counter*-cultural. Christianity is not to position itself as an apologetic to culture, but present itself as an alternative response to given cultural, economic, or political phenomena. Two other major observers in this discussion are Ernest Troeltsch and Mary Jo Weaver. Troeltsch identifies two broad categories, sect-type and Church-type Christianity. "Sect-type Christianity" is characterized as smaller groups of believers whose values differ significantly from that of the culture; hostile and suspicious of the world; don't expect to see their views adopted by society in general nor to attract many followers; don't like to see church as an institution and seek to break down distinction of laity and clergy; often appeal to life and values of the early church; often follow a rigorous lifestyle; stresses radical obedience to Christian ethics; emphasize individual religious experience. "Church-type Christianity" is characterized as a church as an institution whose values contribute

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are the *antithesis, conversionist, transformationist, and accommodationist* theological traditions.

Many Christians have insisted that the lifestyle, values, and even the institutions of a given cultural framework are detrimental to the individual and to the church as a corporate entity. Motivated by the desire to distinguish the values of the Gospel from those of the prevailing culture, they tend to withdraw and separate from certain cultural aspects in order to pursue the virtuous life. This theological expression is characterized as the *antithetical theological*

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to society as a whole; expect to be socially acceptable with many followers and to exert a positive influence on society; expect their views to be sanctioned by the society in which they live. Mary Jo Weaver's framework includes four categories of church-world relationships: withdrawal, nonconformity, adaptation, and domination. *Withdrawal* is characterized by a desire for purity or perfection. Physical retreat from society has resulted in the monastic tradition. Psychological withdrawal from the world results in a focus on apocalyptic thinking. Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses and to some extent fundamentalists and Pentecostals fall into this category. Cultural withdrawal from the world results in a rigorous, simple, and virtuous expression. Anabaptists and the Amish are the two significant examples. *Nonconformists* are motivated by the desire to distinguish the values of the Gospel from the culture to which and against which the church is seeking to witness. Nonconformists refuse to conform to the established order; are willing to criticize the policies and pursuits of the Establishment; don't assume that Christian religious values and beliefs are compatible with those of society or with the policies of the government. However, nonconformists don't totally dismiss culture and are willing to accept that certain aspects of culture are relevant. Nonconformists emphasize the need to advocate and present an alternative to the established order by their "corporate otherness" and communal lifestyle. Finally, nonconformists place little value in social structures and uses nonviolent forms of protest to confront the culture. Sojourner's Fellowship, the Catholic Workers Movement, and the Mennonite Central Committee adhere to this tradition. They are informed by a pacifist lifestyle and live lives of simplicity. *Adaptors* are motivated by a desire to achieve their aims through cooperation with the government. Adaptors work with society by conforming, modifying, compromising, and accommodating itself to the values of society in order to influence as opposed to impose upon it. Usually see no reason to oppose the state and when they do, will use culturally accepted means to lobby against the state than those of dissenters. Adaptors place values in social structures and are tolerant of pluralism. The mainline Protestant traditions adhere to this church tradition. *Domination* is motivated by a desire to impose a Christian framework on all members of society. The dominating paradigm can have a negative perspective of the world, such as the Religious Right in the United States, or an optimistic evaluation of human potential within the world. The majority of mainline Protestant traditions in the nineteenth century held this perspective as they were influenced by late eighteenth century Enlightenment thinking. Additionally, the Calvinist and Reformed traditions adhere to this view, as well as liberation and prophetic theology of the twentieth century.

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orientation towards culture. Withdrawal can assume different forms. The

monastic tradition is a physical separation from culture. The monastic orders

throughout history took up residence in remote and isolated locations because

they felt that the prevailing culture distracted them from obedience to their faith.

Other faith traditions, such as the Amish, not only separate physically, but also

socially from others in the mainstream society. Fundamentalist expressions in

Christianity, while not expressed as physical or social withdrawal, are

characterized as mental separation from culture. Moreover, fundamentalist

expressions are generally found among groups that were formerly the

mainstream expression in culture and find themselves being pushed to the

margins in social, political, or economic aspects. In South Africa, the

Pentecostal and Pentecostal-types of religious communities adhere to some of

the antithetical expressions. However, it would be incorrect to characterize

Pentecostals as fundamentalist in that members in Pentecostal traditions often

come from the most *historically marginalized* and *disenfranchised* of society.

Other Christian traditions believe that the structures of the world are

beyond hope and cannot be rectified until the end of time or what many term the

Second Coming, when the cosmos is recreated. The period between Christ's

departure from the earth until the Second Coming is often referred to as the

church age in which individuals should focus on the issue of the fall or sin, and

the need for reconciliation to both God and neighbors. As a result, the Church's

major mission should be to convert individuals. This can be characterized as the

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conversionist theological orientation. As a result of conversion, individuals will demonstrate the Christian worldview in their thoughts and actions, and these actions will sometimes engage, challenge, and even conflict with the prevailing culture. However, the conversionist lens argues that Christ did not model or articulate a church to directly address political, economic, or social agendas of the day. While the church may debate and engage with culture, its mission is not to change it but to focus on individuals in culture. The evangelical tradition and mainline Protestant traditions fall squarely into this tradition. In South Africa, some Pentecostal groups and *post-apartheid* Dutch Reformed churches fall into this category.

After Constantine became a Christian in 313 C.E., the Empire asked church leaders to structure society based upon Christian tenets and beliefs. As opposed to the conversionist view, some Christians argue that Christ did address issues of politics and culture in his time on earth. The church is here to *transform* society in every aspect. The incredible success of this orientation resulted in the medieval European age of faith or what can be termed *Christendom.*[68] This tradition has come to be known as the

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[68] Christendom is used to describe an overarching unity and a focus of loyalty transcending kingdoms and empires. Kingdoms like Burgundy, Wessex, or Saxony might last for several centuries and then be replaced by new states and dynasties, but Christendom endured throughout. This perception had *political* consequences. While the laws of individual nations lasted as long as the nations themselves, Christendom offered a higher set of standards and norms, which claimed to be universal. Of course, the era of medieval Christendom, which solidified its position by 500 c.e, and reached its height by 1500 c.e, was also characterized by widespread intolerance, symbolized at its very worst by aggressive Crusades, heresy hunts, inquisitions, and defining itself by what it was not, namely, not Muslim. See Philip Jenkins, *Next Christendom,* 10-13.

transformationist theological orientation. In most instances, the

transformationist tradition has attempted to impose Christian values onto

society. In the West, with the freedom of religion and pluralism as grounding

values, a transformationist model is generally unacceptable. Two notable

examples of transformationist expressions are the Religious Right and many

evangelical liberal arts colleges. The Religious Right, which has markings of

fundamentalism as well, attempts to transform society through political and

legal means. Evangelical liberal arts colleges use a more subtle and diffused

approach in their use of media, educational, economic, and social institutions.

However, many astute observers see another tradition within the

transformationist orientation. Charles Villa-Vicencio, a prominent South African

theologian and key leader in the antiapartheid struggle, has argued extensively

that there are two theological traditions. The first tradition he terms as the

dominant tradition.[69] The dominant tradition he dates back to Constantine. He

argues that the early church was legitimated by the empire. Previously,

Christianity was an underground and persecuted community. When Constantine

proclaimed himself a Christian, and subsequently claimed Rome for

Christianity, religious leaders became an increasingly integral part of the empire

and became one of the most important institutions in Roman society. This

"marriage" of the church with political, economic, and social structures

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[69]Charles Villa-Vicencio, *Civil Disobedience and Beyond: Law, Resistance, and Religion in South Africa* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1990).

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gradually had the effect of making the church more conservative, concerned with tradition and doctrine, stability and order. Issues of social justice received short shrift, if any attention at all.

While acknowledging the shift in the church's orientation as it gained increased prominence as the institution that imbued the values of Christendom, this study argues against the Villa-Vicencio thesis on this point: *initially*, the church fathers were asked by the state to *transform* Rome, not accommodate it. Therefore, this study would nuance the analysis by arguing that the rise of the medieval church was initially transformationist, and later, after its power and status in society was established, the church became accommodationist. This distinction is important because it highlights that religious organizations and churches change over time. Much of that change can be tied to the church's ongoing relationship to state structures.

Villa-Vicencio's other major contribution, and certainly his most substantial, is that the *alternative* tradition is grounded in egalitarian and liberationist values. Additionally, this alternative tradition articulates its theology as the *story* of being liberated from oppression and the oppressors. The oppressive structures on the oppressed prevent them from salvation and freedom. Much of this rich legacy is grounded in Exodus and the story of the Israelites being freed from the shackles of the Egyptians. This minority tradition gained momentum in many theological seminaries in the United States in the early twentieth century and found its fruition as liberation theology in Latin

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America and the black social gospel of the American Civil Rights movement. In South Africa, this tradition has come to be known as the *prophetic* tradition. Unlike the dominant transformationist tradition, the prophetic transformationist tradition articulates a theology on behalf of the poor, the voiceless, and the disenfranchised. This tradition wrestles with existing political, economic, and social contexts and ascertaining the appropriate response to systemic injustice in society. In South Africa, the SACC falls squarely into this tradition.

Finally, some Christians have perceived no great tension between their commitment to their faith and being in the world. The world is God's creation and God's sovereignty and will are active in the world. As a result, these Christians work by conforming, modifying, and accommodating themselves to the values of society. Culture's search for what is good, true, and beautiful and its movements for social change and justice throughout history all reflect God's activity. Consequently, the church is to be active in all aspects of culture and should aid the recognition of God's work wherever it is found. The Dutch Reformed churches became accommodationist when the Nationalist Party was able to consolidate and implement grand apartheid in the late 1950s and early 1960s. And to a lesser extent, Pentecostals adhere to this tradition, albeit in a more distanced and nuanced manner. Whereas the NGK often worked closely with the state to bring about the goals of the state, Pentecostals seldom overtly engage the state in this manner.

Church Types: Extensive or Intensive Power

The preceding discussion lays the framework for the *what*. That is, what are the theological traditions of thought that religious traditions draw upon to assist them in the self-identification process as they interact with a given political context? The next part of the theoretical framework addresses the *how*. How do religious organizations transmit their theological traditions of thought to the clergy, lay leaders, and members? This is a two-pronged discussion. The first part of the discussion addresses how religious organizations *extensively* or *intensively* engage their members and the second part of the discussion addresses how ideas become voiced and embedded in religious organizations.

Research indicates that different religious organizations had markedly different ability to affect significant behavior patterns of its members. In particular, four aspects of religious organizations will affect the behavior of members, especially when the ideology promotes behavior that runs counter to perceived self-interest or cultural norms. These four categories are:

a) *Indoctrination*. This term is used, without pejorative overtones, to describe the methods and depth of the religious organization's educational programs. In the context of churches, this is usually dominated by its approach to Biblical teaching and the extent of Bible use among members. This variable is probably the most powerful of the four. The level of indoctrination may vary from issue

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to issue—such as tithing being systematically taught, and sexual norms virtually ignored, for example.

b) *Religious/Subjective Experience.* This category concerns the strength of subjective experience of the religious members, as manifested by the level of participation in meetings, opportunities for self-expression, and emotional involvement. This is manifested in personal prayer, lay activity and spontaneity in public worship, and the prominence given to the hallmarks of dynamic religion, "gifts of the spirit" *(charismata),* and speaking and healing in tongues.

c) *Exclusion.* This measure concerns the discontinuity or boundary the group perceives of itself and society at large. Indicators of the strength of these boundaries can be discerned from the religious tradition's articulation of cosmological and social conversion, salvation and judgment, the nature of spiritual conflict, access to communion, and adult versus infant baptism. Religious organizations that emphasize exclusion in this sense are by no means closed to nonmembers. In fact, they usually devote considerable energy and resources to persuading outsiders to join.

d) *Socialization.* This indicator discerns the ability of religious organizations to maintain boundaries. This is gauged from the involvement of the church in the lives of members. This includes the amount of time that membership entails, the social activities that the

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church organizes and promotes, the level of surveillance and control

of social activities that is exercised (especially the use of time and

money, and the functions of sex and marriage), and the

implementation of church discipline.[70]

While these four categories interrelate, there are especially strong

links between the first pair and the second pair. Indoctrination and Subjective

Expereience are mutually reinforcing, as are Exclusion and Socialization. Such

an analysis evokes comparison with Mann's distinction between two types of

power, which can also be applied to religious organizations.[71] Extensive power

organizes large numbers of people, potentially over large territories and across

borders while intensive power mobilizes a high level of commitment from

participants. Rarely do organizations—including religious ones—wield both

extensive and intensive power simultaneously. Broadly speaking, mainline

Christian traditions manifest extensive power. Other types, especially the

sectarian varieties, manifest intensive power.

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[70] These indicators are developed in further detail from the pioneering work of Robert Garner, who conducted extensive research on AIDS prevention as it relates to church "types" in Erendale, a township in KwaZulu Natal, where HIV rates of infection are among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. Please see his "Religion and AIDS in South Africa", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 38, 1 (2000), 48-49. Further insights are gleaned from an interview with the author, January, 2001.

[71] This is a reference to the landmark work of Michael Mann, *Sources of SoicalPower*, vol. I: *A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760*, 1986, and vol. II: *The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914*, 1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

In light of this framework, mainline Christian traditions, including the Dutch Reformed tradition, are characterized by formal, liturgical ceremony. There is preaching at all services, but few of the laity bring Bibles to church, and scriptural knowledge of the majority is skant. This was particularly more pronounced in the Dutch Reformed tradition since significant portions of the Boer-Afrikaner community was functionally illiterate. However, unlike other mainline Protestant traditions, members in the Dutch Reformed tradition are highly indoctrinated, socialized, and encouraged to think of themselves in an exclusivist manner vis-à-vis other groups. So, while the subjective religious experience is low for members in the Dutch Reformed tradition, the other factors warrant characterizing this church tradition as an intensive church type.

The Pentecostal tradition, in contrast, is characterized by an informal, spontaneous service. There is no "formal" statement of doctrine in the Pentecostal tradition. Membership of these churches is through a profession of faith and adult baptism. More importantly, the costs—both social and economic—of membership are high. Meetings are frequent, long, and energetic, with plenty of lay participation. The romantic and financial aspects of members' lives are monitored. The powerful subjective religious experience of charismatic faith is coupled with a strong desire to engage in Bible study, prayer, and choir meetings. Members are often biblically literate and are able to readily quote many scriptures from memories, especially as they pertain to social and economic issues. Pentecostals place a high emphasis on the need to be "born-

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again." This emphasis, along with the characteristics of exclusion and proselytism, provokes a gentle mocking of society at large.

Considered by many observers to be a part of the larger Pentecostal arm of Christianity, the Zionist-Apostolic traditions offer their adherents a specifically African articulation of Christian doctrine and symbol, as has been discussed. The Apostolic churches tend to be formal, hierarchical, and large. These churches exhibit strong attributes around indoctrination on a variety of issues, high barriers to entry (adult baptism, tithing, almost daily meetings), and a highly exclusive self-perception. The Apostolic tradition is distinguished from "mainline" Pentecostalism in its retention of significant aspects of Zulu culture, to include the veneration of ancestors and a non-charismatic religious experience. The Zionists, which tend to be congregations of the extremely poor, meet in humble settings such a mud huts or houses, and dress in colorful and expressive attire. Services are characterized by a lively synthesis of the charismatic and the ritualistic. However, the Zionist tradition does not maintain high barriers to entry or regulate social behavior. Members do meet frequently, and spend hours in their loud and energetic worship.

The SACC can be characterized as an extensive church type. As one of the largest religious groupings in modern South African history, its values are ecumenical in nature, and it has been more focused on issues of social justice, as opposed to personal moral behavior. The ecumenical outlook discourages exclusivist overtones, and individual churches are autonomous from one

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another. The administrative and leadership portion of the SACC acts independently of any single church, congregation, or denomination, which has allowed the SACC to make more radical stands on issues of public policy, to include apartheid.[72]

Religious Traditions and Institutional Decision-Making Dynamics

A significant number of scholars look to ideas as explanations for policy, suggesting that ideas can be critical in explaining different organizational outcomes.[73] Although these studies focus on different questions in various countries at different times, all conclude and point to the notion that the adoption of new policies cannot be explained solely by changes in objective conditions or material interests. Rather, explanations incorporate a concern with how ideas, institutions, and individuals interact to produce policy outcomes.

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[72] In contrast, the *Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference* (SACBC) can be characterized as a more intensive church actor compared to the SACC, in that clergy leadership are highly indoctrinated, are embedded in hierarchical decision-making structures, and are relatively exclusivist in nature. These characteristics prevented the SACBC from making a more prophetic stand vis-à-vis the state in the 1980s.

[73] There is an abundance of research outside of religion and politics, and especially in the field of international political economy, using ideas as explanatory variables. Examples include John Odell, *U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982); Judith Goldstein, "The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of the U.S. Agricultural and Manufacturing Policies," *International Organization* 43 (Winter 1989); and Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).

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These ideas make up the "universe of political discourse."[74] This universe comprises beliefs about the way politics should be conducted and the kinds of conflicts resolvable through political processes. Whether an issue is regarded as "political" is dependent upon the existing universe of political discourse. If an issue falls outside this discourse, it will not be included in the realm of political debate. The universe of political discourse acts as a filter in inhibiting or forming organizational identity—within any given universe of discourse, an organization will see itself as having a specific self-identity. The same process occurs when the universe of religious discourse is altered, so that issues that were formerly not considered appropriate for religious debate now become so. This was particularly the case for the SACC, where a new religious discourse known as contextual theology formed the basis for new agendas. Various terms have been used to describe this theological movement. It is not usually referred to as "liberation theology" in South Africa, because those involved in the movement wish to distinguish the religious and political situations in South Africa from those in Latin America, the region most associated with the term. Often, the movement is referred to as *prophetic Christianity*, in recognition of the fact that this theology draws heavily from Old Testament prophets, who consistently stressed God's concern for action and

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[74] In one study on the women's movement in France, Jane Jenson argues that the movement was not successful until the universe of political discourse changed. Jane Jenson, "Changing Discourse, Changing Agendas: Political Rights and Reproductive Policies in France," in Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds., *The Women's Movements of the U.S. and Western Europe: Consciousness, Political Opportunity, and Public Policy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 64-88.

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justice. Contextual theology, another key concept, was used because the theological analysis taking place in South Africa was heavily influenced by the social and political contexts in which it occurred. The ideas coming out of this theology challenged the existing religious discourse and ultimately offered a new one. Under this new discourse, churches were obliged to adopt a more explicitly political level of commitment and to act on it. By accepting the values of this new religious discourse, the leadership of the SACC adopted a new self-identity, and this reconstituted self-identity provided the impetus for the declaration of illegitimacy in the 1980s, and its continued self-identified role as being in "critical solidarity" with the majoritarian ANC government.

Moreover, other scholars add that in addition to ideas, different organizations have varying capacities for implementing new ideas.[75] This important insight is also crucial in understanding and explaining different outcomes in religious organizations. G. John Ikenberry, to cite another example, argues that ideas cannot be disengaged from the institutions in which they emerge and that the institutional setting of policy-making is crucial to the influence that ideas are likely to have.[76] If institutions are indeed important for

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[75] In her study of the emergence of developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina, Kathryn Sikkink states, "I suggest that the organizational infrastructure, the operating procedures, and the accumulation of intellectual talent in an insulated portion of the bureaucracy are the principal differences between the institutional structure in Brazil and Argentina, and that they help to explain differences in the implementation of developmentalist policy." Kathryn Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

[76] G. John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy," *International Organization* 42, no. 1 (Winter 1988): 242.

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the implementation of a new discourse, there is no better way to study institutional mediation that to compare them.

State-Civil Society Framework

Theological traditions, extensiveness or intensiveness of church types, and institutional dynamics all serve to explain the continuum of church-state relations. These church-state relations can be expressed in terms of cooperation, conflict, or some mixture of the two in an authoritarian or democratic political context. The continuum that results consists of six state-civil society interactions that include cooptation or collaboration, mutual engagement, balanced pluralism, coexisting conflict, conflictual resistance, and enforced disengagement.[77]

These six state-civil society interactions can be measured by the similarity or difference of the positions taken by state and civil society leaders or factions on policy matters and the official and unofficial interaction among state-civil society leaders. The greater the amount of policy collusion and official interaction, the greater the possibility of mutual engagement,

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[77]Tracy Kuperus, *State, Civil Society and Apartheid in South Africa*, 16.

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cooptation and collaboration of church leaders by the state. Likewise, the greater the amount of policy conflict and the lesser the amount of official collusion, the greater the possibility of disengagement and likelihood of enforced disengagement of church leaders by state structures.

Cooptation or collaboration involves a situation of extensive state-civil society interaction in which policy collusion and official interaction are high. Groups dominating the state and certain sectors of civil society collaborate to pursue nearly identical goals, policies, and political preferences, or state leaders coopt certain key leaders in civil society institutions to follow and implement governmental policies. Because of their similarity in goal attainment and policy preferences, the two entities appear indistinguishable. In situations of collaboration or cooptation, other sectors of the population and civil society are left out of participation in the political and social sector, leading to significant unrest and disengagement among excluded societal sectors.

Mutual engagement is a situation in which policy similarities are commonplace and official interaction moderate to high among groups dominating the state and civil society institutions. Leaders within state and civil society institutions cooperate to pursue similar goals and preferences, but situations arise periodically in which the state and civil society leaders maintain varying preferences that lead to disagreements. Mutual engagement is a situation in which groups dominating state and civil society are more similar in goal

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attainment and policy preferences than dissimilar, but differences between state and civil society occasionally emerge.

Balanced pluralism is a situation of moderate policy collusion and moderate to high official interaction among groups dominating the state and civil society sectors. State and civil society leaders cooperate in ways that allow both state and civil society institutions to hold preferred or independent goals and policy preferences. State and civil society actors often work together to implement the policy preference, and a relatively clear dialogue exists concerning the differentiated spheres of state and civil society institutions.

Coexisting conflict is a situation of moderate policy collusion and low to moderate official interaction among groups dominating the state and civil society institutions. As with balanced pluralism, coexisting conflict allows state and civil society leaders to interact in ways in which both entities maintain a degree of independence regarding the formulation of policy preferences. State and civil society leaders may cooperate over goals and policy preferences, but there are situations of considerable conflict as well. At times, leaders within civil society who feel their goals and policy preferences are not being listened to and enacted by the state will develop mistrust for state institutions or leaders, looking for a time when their policy preferences can dominate the state through the rise to power of a particular group, political party, or government within a state.

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Conflictual resistance is a situation of policy conflict and moderate official interaction among groups dominating the state and civil society sectors. Leaders within the state and civil society hold divergent views concerning the country's goals and policy preferences. In this environment, societal movements will typically arise that actively promote the overthrow or transformation of the state apparatus. The state will attempt to contain this dissatisfied section through a variety of repressive tactics. Both state and civil society have little respect for leaders within the opposing entity. The outcome is civil unrest that may lead to a new political dispensation.

Finally, *enforced disengagement* is a situation of state-civil society separation. It involves policy conflict and low official interaction among the groups dominating state and civil society institutions. It arises in two circumstances. First, groups within civil society may desire to disengage from the state. They may feel that a weak state, lacking resources, is powerless to fulfill their needs. Such groups of civil society look for informal outlets within their own community to meet their needs. Second, the state may refuse to deal with certain elements and leaders of civil society. State leaders may feel threatened by certain civil society institutions and they may repress civil society in a way that does not allow it to voice its preferences.

This continuum of state-civil society relations can begin to explain the different civil society organizations' interactions with the South African state over time, which include the three religious organizations under analysis in this

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study. The six state-civil society positions demonstrate the possibility of characterizing state-civil society relations in a variety of contexts. In this study, the NGK ranged from being in a situation of coexisting conflict in the early to mid-twentieth century to mutual engagement and collaboration/cooptation during apartheid's height, and then back to mutual engagement and coexisting conflict in contemporary South Africa. The SACC found itself in a situation of conflictual resistance in the early to mid-twentieth century and moved to enforced disengagement during apartheid's height. After the watershed events of the Soweto Massacre of 1976, the SACC intensified its enforced disengagement in the form of overtly challenging the NP-dominated state and supporting the mass liberationist movements of the 1980s. From 1990 to the present the SACC is in an evolving situation of coexisting conflict to balanced pluralism. The Pentecostals have remained primarily in a situation of enforced disengagement for the apartheid era. During the apartheid era, Pentecostals formed a vast network of support structures for their congregations and local communities. With the arrival of a democratic regime in the 1990s, Pentecostals now find themselves in a situation of balanced pluralism. Because of the antithetical theological stream in Pentecostalism, they have remained fairly autonomous as a civil society actor in contemporary South Africa, while at the same time directly addressing the economic and social legacies of apartheid, such as poverty and HIV/AIDS.

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Conclusion

Why do religious organizations change in their relationship with the political world? Why do religious organizations change in different ways? What are the consequences of these changes? These are the broad theoretical themes of this research. This research adds to the growing body of scholarship that addresses on how the organizational characteristics of a given church or church association contributes to a changing self-identity. This is especially true in the South African case. What existing studies inadequately address is the crucial intermediary step of how new religious ideas work through and become embedded in church organizations, which are instrumental in forming policies. Any understanding of new church self-identities must take organizational characteristics into account. This study assumes that there is a link between two types of explanations of church change. The first is focused on external factors. In this study, the external factors are evolving political and economic contexts. The second set of explanations is internal. In this analysis, the internal factors are theological traditions and church types.

Interviews which serve as the empirical observations for this study focus on middle leadership religious figures, active laypersons in these traditions, practitioners in various ministerial roles within their respective traditions, theologians, and academic and non-profit professionals in the fields of conflict resolution, political science, and international affairs.

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The next chapter provides the historical legacy of the three religious traditions under the apartheid regime, its demise, the transition period and today's partially consolidated democracy.

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Chapter 2

The Legacy of Religious Traditions
During the Apartheid Era

"History is ahead of the churches."[78]

—Charles Villa-Vicencio

Beginning in 1990, South Africa entered its transition away from authoritarian rule. As has been discussed, since 1994, South Africa has been in the midst of consolidating its democratic gains.[79] As South Africa moves toward democratic consolidation and economic transformation, churches and religious organizations continue to play a role in South Africa's evolving political and economic contexts. Churches and religious organizations as a whole represent a distinctive strand within society. Although conclusions drawn from their role cannot necessarily be generalized to other civil society organizations such as

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[78]Charles Villa-Vicencio, *Civil Disobedience and Beyond: Law, Resistance, and Religion in South Africa*, (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1990), 61.

[79] The stage of a democratic transition features "the drafting of methods or rules for resolving political conflicts peacefully". This stage ends "when a new democracy has promulgated a new constitution and held free elections for political leaders with little barrier to mass participation". Democratic consolidation is a process that involves the maintenance of democratic electoral arrangements and democratic procedures over time without reversal. There are different ways to measure democratic consolidation, ranging from a "two-election" test to the grounding of a civic culture. For South Africa, a key component to democratic consolidation processes will be the ability of political and civic institutions to facilitate the continued economic issues confronting society among the various ethnic and racial groups from the apartheid era.

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professional associations, churches nevertheless provide one of the most

encouraging signs of an invigorated civil society in the developing world.

Christian churches and their national associations have had a dramatic impact in

African countries as diverse as Kenya, Malawi, Madagascar and Nigeria.[80]

Under the new dispensation, some South African religious leaders have

been encouraged by political leaders to be part of the nation-building tasks of

the new democracy. In June 1997, Nelson Mandela said:

> "The transformation of our country requires the greatest possible
> cooperation between religious and political bodies, critically and wisely
> serving our people together. Neither political nor religious objectives
> can be achieved in isolation. They are held in a creative tension with
> common commitments. We are partners in the building of society."[81]

Mandela has further emphasized that "…churches are very powerful

organizations…which are generally committed to high moral values and the

involvement of church in government will help us to raise moral standards in

government…"[82]

However, the type and intensity of involvement of religious traditions in

political and economic life will vary tremendously. The relevance of the

historical review for today is that it defines the overarching social narrative

through which current political, economic, and conflict dynamics are

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[80] P. Gifford, "Introduction: Democratization and the Churches," in P. Gifford, ed., *The Christian Churches and the Democratization of Africa* (London: E.J. Brill, 1995), 1-13, and E. Gyimah-Boadi, "Civil Society in Africa," *Journal of Democracy* 7, 2 (1996): 118-132.

[81] Mayson, 1997, 20.

[82] "Discusses Challenges Ahead," FBIS-AFR-94-082-S, 28 April 1994, 24, in Tracy Kuperus, *State, Civil Society and Apartheid in South Africa*, 156.

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understood, approached, and discussed. Much of this variation can be

understood when religious behavior is explained and analyzed during the

apartheid era utilizing the theoretical framework outlined in the previous

chapter. The following discussion traces the historical legacy of the three

religious traditions under examination in this study through the lens of

theological traditions, church types, and institutional dynamics. This discussion

will lay the foundation for the next chapter, which will analyze the evolving role

of these religious organizations in the new South Africa.

The Dutch Reformed Churches: Intertwined at the Roots to the State

In many respects, the grand narrative of Afrikanerdom in South Africa

has been a long struggle against, and a slow acceptance of, modernity. The white

settlers who arrived in South Africa in 1652 with the Dutch East India Company

were under the command of Jan van Riebeeck, who was trained as a physician.

However, as some have observed, his crewmates consisted of Dutch rabble.

They were, as one astute observer notes, "a mixture of day-laborers, vagrants

and local unemployed...they were social and economic dropouts who...failed to

make it in the competitive society of seventeenth-century Holland."[83]

During much of the nineteenth century South Africa was swept over by

waves of social revolution. The century had begun with the bitter war between

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[83] Allistar Sparks, *The Mind of South Africa* (London: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 27-28.

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the Voortrekker republics and British imperialism. The volatility of social,

political, and economic upheaval intensified with the discovery of diamonds in

1867, and of gold nearly two decades later in 1886. Gold was discovered in the

Transvaal, which up until 1886 was a remote outback, a bastion of

Afrikanerdom. This relatively inhospitable land was suddenly catapulted into the

emerging global market economy, becoming a "blue chip" in the international

politics and economics of industrializing Europe. Overnight, Afrikaner farmers,

rural in lifestyle, feudal in mentality, many of them illiterate, owners of no

books except the Bible, were compelled to face industrialization, modernization,

urbanization, and pluralization, the intrusion of international power politics into

the region, and the clash of competing political and economic ideologies. Out of

this vortex of confusion, conflict, cooperation, and competition arose the

Afrikaner response—one of the world's most organized, politically savvy,

socially engineered, and ultimately, repressive political and economic structures

in modern human history.

These political, ideological, or economic perspectives, although valuable

and certainly necessary, cannot alone fully explain how the Afrikaners

mobilized themselves. Only by including the perspective of religion can the

story of Afrikanerdom become complete that eventually would draw all South

Africans into the spiral of their politics. Afrikaner churches joined other major

institutions at the center of the Afrikaner dynamic, profoundly shaped by the

political context and shaping it in turn. As Afrikaner nationalism developed in

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the years between 1910 and 1933, the Afrikaner churches took an increasingly leading role in providing justification for the Afrikaners' existence and rebuilding Afrikaner morale and social welfare. Indeed, many observers note that the Afrikaner churches became "the major bulwark of the Afrikaners in the struggle to preserve their language, culture and religion.[84] As Afrikaner nationalism grew in strength, preachers became more sensitive to political matters. Moreover, other studies have shown how Afrikaner churches helped develop an Afrikaner civil religion in the 1930s, that is, a "sophisticated theological interpretation of God's acts in Afrikaner history" which denoted the "religious dimension of the state."[85] As John de Gruchy states, "The Afrikaner churches fulfilled a central role not just in this struggle for identity, but also in providing a theological base upon which nationalism could flourish. The ideological underpinnings of ethnicity and race are key to understanding the Afrikaner churches relationship to Afrikaner nationalism and its response to race problems. Along with the Afrikaner churches' concern with racial and ethnic purity, its activities can also be explained by economic concerns that arose when a large section of the Afrikaner people were being threatened by British-dominated capitalism and unskilled black labor, as will be shown in the analysis of the "poor white problem" and racial segregation.

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[84]Susan Rennie Ritner, *Salvation Through Separation* (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1971), 38.

[85] T. Dunbar Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975.

When referring to the Afrikaner churches, this research will directly address the activities of the three elder sisters: the eldest sister are the various groupings of the Dutch Reformed Churches (NGK), which were first established at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 and began spreading to the northern interior from 1836 onwards; the much smaller *Hervormede Kerk* (NHK) which was established in 1855 with its base in the Transvaal; the even smaller *Gereformeerde Kerk* (GK), established in 1857, also in the Transvaal. Two other "younger" sisters include the Dutch Reformed Missionary Church (NGSK), established in 1881 with its base in the Cape; and the Dutch Reformed Church in Africa (NGKA), established in 1963 as the result of uniting various missions that were located in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. By far the most powerful Afrikaner church actor in the political and cultural history of South Africa has been the NGK.

The NGK Churches:
Dominant Transformationist, Intensive, and Hierarchical

Despite cultural, and even to a lesser degree, doctrinal, differences among the Dutch Reformed churches, they share two important features in the political and religious context of South African history and politics. First, their historical roots can be found in continental European traditions of Protestant theology and piety, particularly Dutch and German Calvinism. The Calvinist stream in theological traditions can be most accurately expressed as

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transformationist. Unlike Martin Luther, John Calvin was committed to the view that the church should not only transform its members, but that the church has as its mission to transform culture. This important theological tradition would be a major marker of the NGK for the Afrikaners and for South African political, economic, and social narratives from 1910 until 1961. Second, these traditions are intimately bound up with the history of the Afrikaners, who emerged as the dominant political force in the first seven decades of twentieth century South Africa. While it may have been predictable that the Afrikaner churches would react negatively toward modernization, what was not as predictable was the strength of that resistance and the length to which Afrikanerdom would go in its attempt to ward off modernity.

In addition to the dominant transformationist theological tradition of the NGK, the leadership and members also can be characterized as adhering to an intensive church type. Members are thoroughly indoctrinated in Scripture and attend church regularly. Afrikaners have had a long history of viewing themselves as socially exclusive from all other ethnic and racial groups in South Africa. Of the four aspects of church types, the NGK tradition is weakest in terms of religious or subjective experience. While members attend church regularly, there is not an intense emotional or subjective experience in services or other gatherings. However, as has been discussed, the strongest indicator is indoctrination, with strong reinforcement from exclusion and socialization.

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In terms of institutional dynamics, the NGK is hierarchical, patriarchal, and focused on doctrine and purgative moral narratives. Members are loyal and place intrinsic trust in clergy leadership. Up until the early twentieth century, most lay members were functionally illiterate and thus, relied upon clergy to interpret the Bible on their behalf.

Afrikaner Resistance to Modernity: Beginnings and the NGK Response

One of the first organized expressions of Afrikaner resistance to modernity came early in the century in the Transvaal, led by the newly formed *Gereformeerde Kerk* (GK). This small breakaway group of churches was decidedly more fundamentalist in expression. Again, fundamentalist is used here to describe behavior of religious members that are reactionary to a perceived sense of displacement in cultural, social, and political narratives.[86] Up until the arrival of the British in the early nineteenth century, Afrikaners were able to exist in relative isolation and obscurity. In particular, leaders and members of the GK movement became increasingly concerned with secular ideas flowing into the Cape in the early 1800s with the arrival of British settlers. These new

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[86] Within a historical context, this term came to be associated with a very limited group of religious believers, most Protestant, in the United States. These people were suspicious of modernity and were also skeptical of the goals of rationalistic intellectual thought flowing from Enlightenment ideas in Europe. In order to purify their religious traditions, these Protestant evangelicals focused on doctrine that sharply distinguished between the elect and the unelect, the saved and the unsaved. The other major characteristic of fundamentalism is the notion that members who were in the dominant class in political, social, and cultural narratives now find themselves being displaced by new narratives in society, such as immigration, urbanization, and industrialization. Please see David Little in Timothy Sisk, *Islam and Democracy*, 4-5.

secular ideas embraced humanistic and rationalistic ideals found in the Enlightenment.

The GK churches increasingly found themselves in a position of marginalization as the elder NGK churches embraced some of the features of modernity flowing into the Cape colonies in the early 1800s. Additionally, GK members placed a high premium on self-determination and relied upon highly developed patriarchal authority structures and literal adherence to Reformed confessions of the seventeenth century. All of these characteristics were conducive to the concepts of sovereignty. God was sovereign, and so His sovereignty reigned over all spheres of life. Specifically, with regard to education, the view was that education had to be Christian education or it was regarded as second-rate at best or not education at all. Out of this view arose the development of Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education that would serve as a major intellectual and theological repository for apartheid's political, economic, and social structures.[87] Potchefstroom and other institutions stood against what they perceived as ungodly challenges of humanism to the sovereignty of God, and traced these challenges to the French Revolution, Darwinian evolutionary theory, the promotion of individual and human rights, among other philosophical trends. The Lockean ideas imported by the British into Transvaal schools after the bloody Anglo-Boer Wars were, in the view of

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[87] Johann Kinghorn, "Modernization and Apartheid: The Afrikaner Churches" *Christianity in South Africa: A Political, Social, and Cultural History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 136.

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many Afrikaners, a frontal attack on their way of life and an unacceptable indoctrination into humanism, pluralism, and other ideas of the Enlightenment. As a result, the Afrikaners resisted in earnest.

Moreover, the plight of the Afrikaner continued to worsen under British control. These worsening conditions placed the GK and the NGK at the center of a struggle for Afrikaner identity.[88] The NGK staffed its intellectual leadership with an army of conservative neo-Calvinists and romantic nationalists and as a consequence, the NGK and the GK churches found themselves as the intellectual bastion of resistance against modernization from the 1930s onwards.

One lasting legacy of their role was the publication of three monumental volumes spearheaded by this intellectual cadre. All the editors argued for so-called "Calvinist" solutions to society's ills, which were threatening the Afrikaner value system. The threat had three distinct and related facets: the entrenched poverty of the Afrikaners, the pluralization of society, and a breakdown of what were deemed Afrikaner social values.[89]

A 1932 report, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, on the so-called "poor white" problem, documented the depth of social transformation underway in South Africa.[90] After the Anglo-Boer War, the Afrikaner community became increasingly impoverished, particularly after 1929 and the

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[88]Kinghorn, "Modernization and Apartheid," 138.

[89]Kinghorn, 138-139.

[90]Kinghorn, 139.

onset of the Great Depression. Additionally, a severe drought ensued in the Transvaal during the time of the Depression. Afrikaners were compelled to migrate to the cities in search of work, abandoning their rural way of life as well as their land. Within one generation, Afrikaners lost much of their land and the freedom that went with ownership of the land, along with their self-image and independence. Moreover, they suffered a drastic decline in class status, from landowners to laborers in the most unskilled of jobs. The Carnegie Commission officially classified 300,000—one out of every three—South Africans as "poor-whites."[91]

The NGK churches responded with practical steps to support and develop the Afrikaner community. Equally important, the churches became increasingly more involved in the formation of public policy. The NGK churches argued that the source of the poor white problem rested with urbanization, the British control of economic resources and the *swart gevaar,* or black peril.[92] One report issued by the NGK romantically contrasted rural and city life, God-centered and human-centered reality, identity and plurality, thrift and waste, and integrity and recklessness.

The intellectual foundations set into place by the NGK would greatly facilitate the establishment of the Nationalist Party's rise to power in 1948 and the implementation of what would be come to be known as Grand Apartheid, the

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[91]Kinghorn, 139.

[92]Kinghorn, 139.

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world's first and only political system overtly based upon racial separation, bolstered by apartheid policies of so-called "separate development."

The entrenchment of segregation, the strengthening of capitalism, the emergence of nationalistic parties, and the growth of African and Afrikaner nationalism all affected NGK-state relations between 1910 and 1933. Through the interwar years, the NGK rose to become a prominent civil society institution among Afrikaners, and from the 1920s, the NGK formulated its first extensive statements on race policy. As Afrikaner nationalism matured from 1934 to 1948, the NGK's pronouncements on race policy became more strident and ideological. The church was an important and respected institution within Afrikaner society as it continued to identify with the interests of the Afrikaner people. During this period, the NGK manifested a dominant transformationist theological tradition, especially with regard to its connection with Calvinist traditions in Europe. As a church type, the NGK exhibited strong intensive influence on members, especially in terms of indoctrination, exclusion, and socialization. Finally, members were compliant with the hierarchal and patriarchal dynamics of church structures. As South Africa would move forward, the NGK would increasingly position itself as one of the major pillars of the apartheid regime.

The Period of Coexisting Conflict, 1934-1947

The year 1934 marked a turning point for South Africa. In 1929 South
Africa experienced economic hardship because of the worldwide Great
Depression. The value of its exports dropped, commercial and manufacturing
activity decreased, and wages fell. Economic hardship intensified when Great
Britain abandoned the gold standard in 1931. J.B.M. Hertzog, the Nationalist
Party (NP) leader, resisted devaluing South Africa's currency to demonstrate the
country's independence. However, this resistance led to capital flight and falling
exports. By December 1932, South Africa finally made the decision to abandon
the gold standard as well.[93]

During this economic crisis, a government of national unity was
considered by the National Party (NP) and the South African Party (SAP) to
alleviate some of the distress the country was facing. The resulting coalition
government that was formed in 1933 was established as the United Party (UP).
This *Fusion* government attempted to address the rising discontent felt by its
constituents.

At the same time, the gold price began to rise and doubled by 1934. This
change in the gold price made it possible for the mining industry to finance
industrial diversification. Additionally, the impact of continued urbanization and
the demands of urban capitalists led the government to relax its implementation

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[93]John Pampallis, *Foundations of the New South Africa* (Cape Town: Maskew Miller
Longman, 1991), 139-40.

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of race policy. By 1934, some of the animosities between Afrikaners and English-speaking South Africans had been assuaged. Some Afrikaners were beginning to reconsider their attitudes toward the British.[94] Moreover, Hertzog, who had appealed to Afrikaner interests in the early twentieth century, was committed to broad-based Afrikaner and English interests by the late 1920s. Hertzog softened his earlier "two-stream policy" because he saw Afrikaners standing on equal footing with English-speaking South Africans, and he felt many English-speaking South Africans were dedicated to South Africa's interests first and foremost. Hertzog believed that Afrikaner and English interests should receive equal attention, with neither dominant over the other. This relaxation fanned the flames of Afrikaner nationalism again and tensions mounted. The NGK increasingly expressed its solidarity with the Afrikaner community. The NGK's position on race policy supported *strict* segregation, or apartheid, while the state, dominated by ideas formulated by and promoted under Jans Smuts, supported partial segregation. Partial segregationist policies were largely driven by the need for cheap labor in urban centers as industrialization intensified in the mid-1930s.

Soon after the Fusion of 1934 between Hertzog's National Party and Smuts' South African Party, minorities from both parties broke away. Colonel Stallard, a strong supporter of British imperialism, formed the Dominion Party

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[94]Newell M. Stultz, *Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, 1934-1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 24.

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in 1934, while D.F. Malan, a leader within Hertzog's National Party, formed the *Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party* (Purified National Party or PNP).[95] Malan's party represented the more extreme Afrikaner nationalists who felt that fusion with a British sympathizer like Smuts was a betrayal of the republican ideal for South Africa. For this reason, among others, Afrikaners nationalists joined Malan's "orthodox" National Party.[96]

Another significant development during this period was the rapid expansion of the economy and its restructuring from pre-capitalist economic activity toward full-scale capitalism. The pre-capitalist mode was dominated by subsistence farming and the full-scale capitalist mode was mainly reliant on mining and industrial labor in urban cores. By the 1930s, laws were put into place that facilitated the movement of Africans from farms to the urban areas to be a source of cheap labor for mining activities. By the late 1930s it was becoming more difficult to maintain pre-capitalist economic activity as the country was entering full-scale capitalism.

Additionally, South Africa's expanding economy attracted overseas investment on a large scale. In particular, private capital and state investment from Great Britain and the United States increased during this period.[97]

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[95] Nigel Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation, and Apartheid* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 18-25.

[96] Worden, 25-33.

[97] U.S. companies that invested in South Africa included Mobil, Ford, Goodyear, General Motors, and Firestone. Tracy Kuperus, *State, Civil Society and Apartheid in South Africa,* 52.

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As these developments moved South Africa into the processes of full-scale capitalism, increased urbanization, and modernity, the UP increasingly believed that the two segments of white society should be unified for South Africa's long-term welfare and prosperity. Conversely, the PNP became deeply concerned about cultural issues. The PNP believed that assimilation would mean the domination of English-speakers over the Afrikaners.

With the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the Fusion government splintered. Hertzog and his supporters adopted a neutral position on involvement in the war, while Smuts and his supporters rallied behind Great Britain and the Allies. Hertzog and Smuts reacted differently to the rise of German aggression, with Smuts seeing German actions as an international danger and Hertzog viewing the German actions as understandable due to the humiliation Germany experienced after the First World War. Hertzog also believed that South Africa's right to neutrality needed to be upheld in the Commonwealth due, in large part, to the negative events that followed South Africa's participation in the First World War.[98]

Meanwhile, the period of the Second World War coincided with an economic boom. The need to supply troops with large quantities of manufactured goods diversified South Africa's economy even further. Although South Africa welcomed the industrial revolution, the economic boom increased

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[98] T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 4th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 297.

the demand for a large pool of cheap labor, causing an even greater influx of black laborers into urban areas. Social problems of overcrowding, poor housing, and deteriorating health developed. Racial tensions increased as black South Africans began to interact with whites in residential areas and as blacks began to fill semi-skilled positions in industrial posts that had been previously reserved for whites.[99]

The Smuts government responded to the rising racial tension by making adjustments to segregation laws that accommodated industrial needs. Some of the changes softened stringent segregation rules. Color bars were relaxed, which allowed blacks to assume positions previously reserved for whites; pass laws were also relaxed to accommodate the growing influx of black labor; and laws relating to African trade unions were eased to allow for increased membership.

Malan exploited these political and economic developments to make the case that the existing government did not have the interests of Afrikaners as their first priority. Up to the 1948 elections, the HNP appealed to and consolidated Afrikaner classes across different regions through the efforts of the Broederbond, which advocated and successfully achieved its goal of an Afrikaner "people's economy." The support of four groups—farmers, workers, the petty-bourgeoisie, and financiers—greatly aided the HNP. Additionally, the differences between regional or provincial parties and groups that had splintered nationalism in previous years, namely, the Orange Free State/Transvaal HNP

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[99] J.D. Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa* (London: James Currey, 1987), 182-3.

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versus the Cape HNP, were diminished by the election of 1948. The HNP was able to win the 1948 election by consolidating white voters under two main planks. First, its anti-British, monopolistic rhetoric appealed to Afrikaners with economic ambitions. Second, its apartheid slogan drew various classes together by promising that white culture would be protected and that black labor would be channeled where it was needed for purposes of economic prosperity.[100]

The UP-Dominated State's Position on Race Policy, 1934-1947

The UP-dominated state promoted a guardian-segregationist view with regard to race relations. This view was based on the merged ideas of J.C. Smuts, J.H. Hofmeyr, and G.N. Heaton Nicholls. The UP government represented the interests of pragmatic industrialists who were committed to full-scale capitalism that was discussed earlier.

One of the more moderate or liberal aspects of the guardian-segregationist view was the effort by key leaders in the UP government to transform debates on "native" legislation that focused on the long-term welfare of Africans.[101] J.H. Hofmeyr, who also was an advocate of the benevolent segregationist position among whites, believed that the starting point of race policy needed to be about differences among races, not discussions about racial

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[100] In addition to these political issues, the HNP was highly organized and took advantage of the UP's poor organizational skills, the constitutional weighting of rural constituencies, and higher birth rates among Afrikaners. Please see Kuperus, *State, Civil Society and Apartheid in South Africa,* 57.

[101] T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History,* 4th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 307.

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superiority or inferiority. Hofmeyr believed that segregation was necessary, but he also believed that the economic dependence of whites on blacks was undeniable. He supported measures that improved the welfare of black South Africans and denounced fears of race mixing as illogical, and he refused to vote for Hertzog's Representation Bill because it denied Africans their constitutional rights.[102]

J.C. Smuts also supported an accommodationist form of segregation. He often termed his policies "trusteeship" with regard to race problems. Trusteeship was a harmonious, cooperative race policy based on two positions—guardian and ward. The guardians (whites), who had more political and economic security, were able to help the wards (blacks), who had little. This was promoted as an ethical, religious policy, one that built trust between the races.

Afrikaner nationalists developed the concept of apartheid[103] in the 1930s in response to the UP's seemingly indifferent and ambiguous position on race policy. The nationalists advocated a more stringent, vertical form of separation. Apartheid would spell the end of the Natives Representation Council, the abolition of African representatives in parliament, the recognition of "racial" homelands, strict control of Africans in urban areas, labor quotas to restrict the

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[102] Ibid, 46, 169-71.

[103] "Apartheid" was used in 1936 for the first time within the *Suid-Afrikaanse Bond vir Rassestudie*—an Afrikaner think tank.

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numbers of African workers, and the separation of races in all areas whenever possible.[104]

The NGK's General Position on Race Policy, 1934-1947

As the transformationist theological tradition of the NGK intensified, that is, as the leadership of the NGK came to believe that it had a moral obligation to transform the state to place the Afrikaners into a better political, economic, social, and cultural position, a situation of coexisting conflict between factions dominating the NGK and the state meant that the two entities pursued different agendas and held different opinions on key issues, in this case, the formulation and implementation of race policy. In general, the NGK, dominated by leaders influenced by neo-Kuyperianism and other similar worldviews, supported strict separation, or apartheid, while the state supported partial segregation.

The ideological basis of the UP-dominated state's accommodationist segregation policy was the notion of cultural relativism within contemporary anthropology, while the ideological basis of the *volkskerk* NGK apartheid policy was Christian Nationalism.

The NGK developed a deep distrust of the UP-dominated state during the 1930s and 1940s over three main watershed trends—1) the increasingly

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[104] Thompson, *History of South Africa,* 185-6.

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uncertain political and economic environment spawned by rapid urbanization, 2) industrialization and modernization, and 3) rising Afrikaner nationalism as they felt increasingly displaced and threatened by these events. These trends led many of the leaders within the NGK to formulate the "theology of apartheid" which stood in direct contrast to the UP-dominated state's accommodationist segregation.

During this period, Afrikaners became more conscious of their ethnic identity and the threats to the privileges they experienced as one of the dominant white groups.[105] Afrikaners were still keenly aware of their humiliation in the wake of the Anglo-Boer War and their people's internment in British concentration camps. They were also aware of the brief exhilaration related to the Afrikaner Rebellion of 1914 and the Hertzog victory of 1924. Finally, they were dealing with the disorienting effects of the Great Depression, expanding industrialization, and rapid urbanization.

Industrialization and urbanization caused the migration of poor Afrikaners and black Africans into urban areas. As was discussed earlier, Afrikaners found themselves in competition with cheap African labor. In the midst of black encroachment and in order to maintain Afrikaner cultural purity and economic privileges, Afrikaner nationalists realized that the "poor white" problem needed to be addressed. Afrikaners also felt threatened in the 1930s by

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[105] Hermann Giliomee, "The Growth of Afrikaner Identity," in *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century South Africa,* ed. William Beinart and Saul Dubow (London: Routledge, 1995), 190.

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the fact that they could not seem to "catch up" with English speakers

economically. Afrikaners who moved to the urban areas not only competed with

unskilled or semi-skilled black laborers, but they entered the job market far

behind the skilled English-speaking workers.[106] Nationalists viewed this

widening economic inequality as disturbing. From the perspective of

nationalists, the Fusion government of 1934 would result in further economic

losses. Followers of Malan's NP assumed that imperial capital would dominate

South Africa, with English-speaking mining and industrial capitalists preferring

unskilled black labor to semi-skilled Afrikaner workers.

Additionally, Afrikaners were anxious and alienated in the urban,

industrial environment that seemed to diminish their ethnic homogeneity.

Nationalists were concerned that Afrikaner culture would be crushed under the

weight of British culture. Moreover, Afrikaner nationalists were not ready to

reconcile with English-speaking South Africans until they had "proven

themselves" in cultural and economic terms.

The NGK's role within this political context emerged as it responded to

the "poor white" problem and provided theological and biblical justification for

the policy of apartheid.[107] Its specific actions and its theological discoveries

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[106] Ibid, 195-7.

[107] Some of the original discussions between the NGK churches and the state about the "poor white" problem can be found in P.J. Perold, "Samewerking Tussen Kerk en Staat Insake Armeblankedom," *De Kerkbode* 26 (1930): 412-13.

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offered solace to Afrikaners feeling threatened by the loss of their cultural distinctiveness and their uncertain economic situation.

The NGK's promotion of a stricter application of segregation emerged after an important event within the church. Johan du Plessis, a Stellenbosch theologian, was suspended by a high-level synodical committee in 1930 after a heresy trial. Du Plessis advocated a moderate stance on segregation policy, and while his racial views were not the basis of the charges, his expulsion did strengthen the neo-Kuyperian group within the NGK, and this promoted the elaboration of the "theology of apartheid."[108] The two major schools of thought within the NGK were spearheaded by the more pragmatic missionary-minded evangelists who had been influenced by Andrew Murray's work, and the more conservative, *volkskerk* Calvinists who were influenced by Abraham Kuyper's ideas.

The pietist strain within the NGK, associated with the work and thinking of Andrew Murray, emphasized righteous lifestyles, personal redemption, and the hope of salvation for all who could be saved through hearing the message of the Gospel. Pietist NGK clergy were increasingly alarmed in the 1930s and 1940s by certain NGK leaders who became more ideologically dogmatic over the years on race policy and who cooperated with Afrikaner nationalist leaders to develop a singular ethnic consciousness in the 1940s. Pietist NGK leaders

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[108] J.A. Loubser, *The Apartheid Bible: A Critical Review of Racial Theology in South Africa* (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, 1987), 27-9.

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saw the church's responsibility, first and foremost, as ministering to everyone's, not just Afrikaners' spiritual, and not necessarily social, needs. NGK leaders du Plessis and Murray tried to remind others within the NGK that race policy needed to be applied with the "native's" needs in mind. Segregation could never solve South Africa's race problems if the policy meant maintaining white superiority. A healthy public regard for Africans, benevolent guardianship, and the just application of laws were necessary for race policy to be carried out properly.[109]

Neo-Kuyperian Calvinists such as J.C. Rooy, H.G. Stoker, and J.D. du Toit, based mainly within the *Gereformeerde Kerk,* differed from the pragmatic pietist and missionary-minded evangelicals by emphasizing divine election, God-willed diversity, and sphere sovereignty, derived from the ideas of Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper.[110] Kuyper believed, first and foremost, that all of creation was under God's sovereignty and that God created different spheres such as the family, associations, and churches. Each sphere was created for a specific purpose with a biblical norm that directed its activities. In addition, each sphere had its own authority or sovereignty that could not be encroached upon by the others. Society was seen as an organic whole of spheres, not as an

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[109] See Jaap Durand, "Afrikaner Piety and Dissent" in *Resistance and Hope,* ed. Charles Villa-Vicencio and John W. de Gruchy (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1985), 42-5.

[110] The GK's influence on the development of apartheid theology is substantial. For a fuller summary, see Irving Hexham, *The Irony of Apartheid: The Struggle for National Independence of Afrikaner Calvinism against British Imperialism* (New York: Edwin Mellon Press, 1931). Abraham Kuyper's ideas can be summarized in his *Lectures on Calvinism* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1931).

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aggregate of individuals. Kuyper also advocated the notion of diversity. For Kuyper, diversity was a response to the uniformity that was being imposed through the processes of industrialization and commercialization. Within the Netherlands, he upheld diversity through the implementation of policy that established separate schools and churches for distinct communities.

Neo-Kuyperian Calvinists within the NGK and GK adopted Kuyper's ideas of diversity and separate structural spheres in their explanation of racial and ethnic separation. According to these churchmen, diversity was the norm for the world, and different nations and peoples were willed by God and needed to maintain their separateness. Modernity, liberalism, and "equality" were an affront to the spiritual realities of human beings. In other words, the modernization project could not achieve its goals of liberty and equality without a deep understanding of God's will for this world. These Kuyperian ideas resonated deeply with the Afrikaners who were feeling some of the negative effects of modernization and urbanization.

It should be noted that another ideological influence on the NGK's development of a "theology of apartheid" in the 1940s, working parallel to but sometimes clashing with Kuyperianism, was the secular, Germanic, neo-Fichtean ideas of romantic nationalism. The writings of J.G. Herder and J.G. Fichte glorified authoritarian nationalism and presented an idealized notion of

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the *volk* as an organic entity that was God-willed with a unique historical destiny.[111]

In addition to neo-Kuyperian Calvinism and neo-Fichtean ideologies that formed the basis of the theology of apartheid, there was one more major tradition within the NGK that bolstered the theology of apartheid. This tradition consisted of the *volkskerk* adherents who believed that the church needed to respond to the economic and social needs of the Afrikaners. The leadership of this tradition was trained in the *revivalist* strain of Scottish Calvinism. The revivalist strain emphasized the need of the church to respond to not only spiritual needs, but to the social and material needs of the Afrikaners, and more specifically, the "poor whites" within their midst.

These developments urged the NGK to abandon its pragmatic evangelical position on race policy by the 1940s. Instead, the "purist" position gained majority strength that included the total segregation of the races in economic, political, and social realms which appealed to Afrikaners who were experiencing the threat of black encroachment and the continued domination of British culture.

The central tenets of the theology of apartheid included the following: 1) Although the Bible upholds the unity of humanity in a spiritual sense, God purposefully divided humanity as a consequence of the fall. God allows for the

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[111] For a succinct explanation of how neo-Fichtean ideas were used within the church's *justification of apartheid, see Dubow, "Afrikaner Nationalism", 209-37.*

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diversity of peoples, languages, and races (Genesis 11, Deuteronomy 32:8, Acts 27:26). 2) Because God willed diversity, humans must facilitate the continuation of separate nations. 3) The nation has a God-given structure and character, along with a divine mission that should be fulfilled.[112]

Borrowing from Kuyperianism and romantic-nationalist ideology, the typical defense of strict separation was expressed in the following words by J.G. Strijdom:

> Assimilation means the two races will become one, one in language, one in social areas and one in every way...We speak of a Christian-national perspective and we believe that God willed separate nations and languages, and that the destruction of the welfare of these concerned nations does not serve well. Assimilation then is a superficial and also dangerous view...[Differentiation] is not oppressive. It recognizes the separate races and offers to each rights and privileges in the future but the differentation and the segregation are in the actual interests of both races.[113]

Additionally, J.D. du Toit, an Afrikaner poet and theologian, offered a speech that justified apartheid on scientific, scriptural, and historical grounds. Du Toit began by arguing that the whole Bible demonstrated the biblical proof of apartheid. Numerous passages were cited as proof texts, including Genesis 11, the Tower of Babel story, which established God as the great Divine Separator.

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[112] Charles Bloomberg, *Christian-Nationalism and the Rise of the Afrikaner Broederbond in South Africa, 1918-48*, ed. Saul Dubow (London: MacMillan, 1990), 13-23.

[113] For the original Afrikaans text, see J.G. Strydom. "Ons Sendingbeleid Nogeens", *Die Basuin* 8, no. 4 (1937): 1-3.

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By 1943, the NGK approved the biblical basis of apartheid. At the

Council of Dutch Reformed Churches in that year, the following statement was

made:

> This meeting took note of the increasing agitation for equality of colour and race in our country, but wants to point out that according to the Bible God actually called nations into existence (Genesis 11:1-9; Acts 2:6, 8, 11) each with its own language, history, Bible and Church, and that the salvation also for the native tribes in our country has to be sought in a sanctified self-respect and in a God-given national pride.[114]

In summary, this section argues that a situation of coexisting conflict

defined NGK-state relations between 1934 and 1947. The NGK, which

gradually embraced a purist position regarding race policy, gradually grew more

intolerant of the UP-dominated state because the accommodationist form of

segregation promoted political and economic goals that did not directly

incorporate the interests of nationalist Afrikaners to the degree that it desired.

In the next major era, from 1948 to 1961, the NGK and the state were

defined by a situation of mutual engagement. And increasingly, the NGK came

to become *accommodationist* in its theological expression as it became on of the

principal voices to legitimate the apartheid regime.

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[114] Again, for the original text, see E.P. Groenewald, "Die Apartheid van die Nasie" *Die Gereformeerde Vaandel* 16 (1948): 9-10.

The Period of Mutual Engagement, 1948-1961

The election of 1948 marked the beginning of National Party rule. From the late 1940s to the 1980s, the NP steadily increased its control over the state and developed and implemented the policy of apartheid.[115] The NGK was an important civil society institution that justified the development and consolidation of apartheid. NGK-state relations during the early years of apartheid were those of mutual engagement.

From 1948 to 1961 leaders dominating the NGK and the state held similar opinions on the majority of policy issues. Most of the time, the NGK leaders gave their unequivocal support to the state; however, situations arose periodically where the groups dominating the state and the NGK arrived at different opinions concerning strategies related to race policy. More specifically, church and state officials interacted closely and even held the same goal of Afrikaner supremacy in political and economic spheres, but they formulated independent policies on how to achieve this goal. The reasons for discrepancies between NGK and state strategies lie in the factions that existed within Afrikanerdom that developed in relation to the political-economic environment.

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[115] Of course, there were oppositional forces within the state, such as the UP, the PFP, and the most fervent oppositional forces of the ANC. However, the extensive control of the NP over the rule-making and implementation of policy warrants the state being primarily identified with the NP.

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In the first decade of the NP's rule, South Africa experienced considerable economic growth. The introduction of import controls allowed for the expansion of local manufacturing, decreased the trade deficit, and led to increased profits for domestic industry. "Under the governance of this anti-capitalist regime, the South African economy grew more quickly than any other capitalist economy except Japan during the 1950s and 1960. Between 1948 and 1957, real GNP increased at an annual average of over 5 percent."[116] The NP government's immediate concern during this time of rapid economic growth was the supply of cheap labor to different economic sectors without relaxing segregation measures, the perceived error of the UP and the Fusion government in the 1940s. However, with this continued growth and demand for cheap labor, Africans left farms and moved into urban areas. In the urban centers of Johannesburg, Durban, and Cape Town, Africans found themselves competing for many of the same jobs as working-class Afrikaners. This trend threatened the security of Afrikaners. The NP responded by tightening pass controls and residential requirements.

In 1952, the state required everyone to carry reference books. Control over migrant and permanent laborers was tightened as the state forced Africans to acquire work permits in urban areas. The enforced pass system appeased

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[116] Dan O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994* (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1996), 81-82.

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some white farmers because it halted the flow of laborers into the cities. Farmers' interests were also met through the establishment of labor bureaus in 1951 that allocated labor according to the needs of the different economic sectors. Commercial farmers were not the only beneficiaries of tightened labor controls. White workers were also appeased by the prohibitions placed on African strikes, such as the Native Labour Act of 1953 and the extension of job color bars, such as the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956.

African workers were also controlled through residential requirements. The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952 placed restrictions on African residence in urban areas. Section 10 of the Native Laws Act, for example, limited residence to Africans born and raised in a town to fifteen years. Moreover, African workers could only be employed in a given city for fifteen years and employed by a single employer for ten years. The most serious implication of this law was the distinction between migrant labor and permanent urban residents. The NP's goal was the gradual flow of Africans into manufacturing sectors, with migrant labor supplying the labor for mining activities. Over time, the so-called "homelands" were expected to produce enough jobs so that Africans would start moving away from the cities back to the reserves after the fifteen and ten year limitation cycles. Through the

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implementation of these labor controls[117], the state went out of its way to help meet the needs of entrepreneurs, white workers, and commercial farmers.

Additionally, the Nationalist government committed itself to the compartmentalization of the races. The Population Registration Act of 1950 classified each South African into a specified race group, namely "native", "Coloured", Asian or white. Racial divisions were also pursued through the Mixed Marriages (1949) and Immorality (1950) Acts which prohibited interracial marriages and sexual intercourse between the races. One of the most far-reaching communal acts of apartheid was the Group Areas Act of 1950, which codified residential segregation. Residential segregation occurred long before 1950, but the Group Areas Act extended residential segregation to Coloureds and Indians, and it also carried with it forced removals.

The final set of apartheid laws dealt with political affairs. The NP was committed to the monopoly of political power by whites. Blacks could not be permitted common citizenship rights because they were "uncivilized". Even if they were "civilized", African concerns were of a distinct nature from white concerns. The different ethnic groups, the NP argued, should experience

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[117] Scholars have debated the significance of apartheid laws that restricted labor movement. Liberals have argued that influx control laws constrained African employment opportunities and were incompatible with economic growth in the long term because they encouraged labor turnover, low productivity, and high costs. Revisionist scholarship challenged liberals and the "cheap labour power thesis" and argued instead that labor controls were designed to secure the economic and political conditions for capitalist expansion. Two works that explore this debate in detail are Doug Hindson, *Pass Controls and the Urban African Proletariat in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1987) and Deborah Posel, *The Making of Apartheid 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

political rule according to their unique development. One legislative implication of this view was the abolishment of the Natives Representatives Council and the creation of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, which was based on the idea that African interests would be represented by local authorities in the designated reserves.

While these laws were harsh, the first decade of NP was characterized by an *ad hoc* implementation of "total" apartheid. Apartheid during this era of NP rule was more practically motivated due in part to prevailing economic realities. The implementation of "full-scale" or total apartheid was attempted in full force in the 1960s by H.F. Verwoerd.

Diversity of Perspectives on Race Policy within the
NGK and the State, 1948-1961

A relationship of mutual engagement between the state and a civil society institution assumes that the leaders or groups dominating each entity hold similar opinions on the majority of policy issues. However, situations arose periodically where the leaders or groups dominating the state and the civil society institution arrived at different opinions concerning policy directions and strategies. The reason for discrepancies between NGK and state strategies on race policy lies in the presence of different factions that dominated the NGK and the political establishment.

The political establishment contained a variety of factions concerning the conception of apartheid policy including accommodationist segregationists, ideological purists, *baasskap* adherents, and purist sympathizers.[118] Ideological or visionary purists promoted the idea of total apartheid or "vertical" separation in political, economic, and social spheres. Purists were particularly concerned about the dangers of "economic integration." Economic integration was dangerous because it led to the "detribalization" of Africans, eroding their ethnic or tribal culture and it caused white dependence on African labor, which endangered economic prosperity in the long run if Africans withdrew from the labor force. The goal for purists was national self-sufficiency in all areas so that white supremacy in political and economic sectors could be achieved. To that end, purists called for the development of "native" reserves, the establishment of separate political institutions for Africans and whites, and the development of "Bantu education".

White *baasskap* adherents were a dominant group within the NP and state institutions. Like ideological purists, they believed that segregation had to be applied in a more coherent, systematic manner than during the previous Fusion government. Moreover, the Afrikaners' political and economic control had to be consolidated within a racially segregated society, but for *baasskap* this

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[118] It should be noted that political leaders were not locked into these positions. Of particular note is that H.F. Verwoerd moved between the *baasskap* adherents and purist sympathizers on the spectrum. Ultimately, he would fully embrace the purist position when he assumed leadership of the apartheid state in the 1960s. The purist position contained within it the elements that would come to characterize "Total Apartheid."

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meant privileging Afrikaners in the civil service and the business arenas,

protecting Afrikaner culture, and controlling African labor so that the economic

gains of Afrikaners could be maintained without encouraging racial mixture.

However, it did not entail the promotion of economic segregation.

The third significant group within the NP-dominated state consisted of

the purist sympathizers, such as H.F. Verwoerd. Verwoerd intended to

systematically implement apartheid policy, and while he served as Minister of

Native Affairs (1950-8) and Prime Minister of South Africa (1958-66), he

committed himself to the construction of "Grand Apartheid". That is, the state

would increase its control over all areas of life concerning racial segregation,

including the organization of urban and rural areas, the regulation of labor, and

restrictions on social integration. Verwoerd sympathized with the ideas behind

"vertical" separation because he believed they represented the long-term hope

for South Africa. However, when it came to the practical implementation of

apartheid in areas such as influx control, Verwoerd allowed for economic

interdependence to satisfy industrial and manufacturing interests.

The NGK also contained a variety of groups regarding the conception

and implementation of race policy in the early years of apartheid. The two that

most stand out are the ideological purists and the moderate pragmatists. NGK

leaders who were inclined toward a purist perspective advocated a "positive"

notion of the separation in all areas of life based on scriptural norms and

theological principles. They sought "equitable" separation, that is, differences in

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race and culture had to be respected to the point where development could be pursued to its ultimate end by all cultures. The purists were *volkskerk* or neo-Kuyperian inspired adherents who felt that the diversity of nations and peoples was willed by God and needed to be maintained.

Moderate pragmatists in the NGK resisted the "vertical" separation espoused by purists because they were not convinced of its biblical and theological foundations. The Bible did not endorse apartheid nor did the Christian church at any time in its history subscribe to the specific principles of apartheid, they argued. Pragmatists agreed that social and political apartheid needed to be implemented, but they disagreed on the reasons behind such policies. Purists insisted that total apartheid was willed by God and it led to the national elevation of all races. Pragmatists argued that political and social apartheid was the best solution for South Africa *for the time* because of South Africa's multinational status; however, apartheid could be removed in the future if circumstances allowed for it.[119] However, theologians such as B.B. Keets did seriously try to account for the interests of all South Africans, not just Afrikaners. They were drawn to the need to promote healthy race relations between and among all South Africans rather than the need for maintaining Afrikaner racial domination. From 1948 to 1958, during the early years of

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[119] One of the leading voices in the moderate pragmatist camp was B.B. Keet. In actuality, he was more of a conservative churchman who *was* committed to the Afrikaner's survival but was concerned that the NGK establishment was abusing biblical and church authority to sanction a questionable political policy. Tracy Kuperus, *State, Civil Society, and Apartheid in South Africa*, 84.

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mutual engagement, the NGK's official position entailed an adherence to a more purist position on race policy than that of the leaders dominating the political establishment. From 1958 to 1961, the NGK's pragmatic faction arose which challenged state leaders' adoption of a more purist race policy.

The NGK-state era of mutual engagement between 1948 and 1961 was characterized by two distinct phases. During the years of apartheid's early implementation, Prime Ministers D.F. Malan and J.G. Strijdom embraced a form of white *baasskap*. The attempt to implement total, or "vertical", apartheid was embraced under H.F. Verwoerd's administration in the late 1950s into the mid 1960s.

D.F. Malan's views on race policy were not as thorough or coherent as those of other leaders within the NP because he did not see himself as an expert on race issues. Although Malan exploited the UP's divisions over race policy in the 1940s by promoting the policy of apartheid as a more coherent, systematic implementation of segregation, he did not believe that apartheid was substantially different than traditional segregation. It did not entail the total separation of the races into political, economic, and social arenas; instead, Malan "envisaged local segregation in which inequality would be firmly maintained in all interracial dealings."[120] Malan believed that if total apartheid were implemented, South Africa's economy would suffer.

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[120] David Welsh, "The Executive and the African Population: 1948 to the Present," in *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State*, ed. Robert Schrire (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 137-46. For a more detailed examination of D.F. Malan's views on race

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The second Prime Minister of the Nationalist Party, J.G. Strijdom (1954-8), also rejected any possibility of "total" apartheid being implemented.[121] Like Malan, he held the view that government measures could not apply a policy of territorial apartheid. But "horizontal" apartheid polices were strengthened under Strijdom, especially with regard to the implementation of stronger color bars and labor policies so that the numbers of urban Africans were tightly controlled and "poor whites" privileged.

One of Strijdom's closest allies was H.F. Verwoerd, the Minister of Native Affairs. Verwoerd was in essence a purist sympathizer but under Strijdom's administration he implemented a stricter form of horizontal segregation.

In sum, the three leaders dominating the South African state during the 1950s—Malan, Strijdom, and Verwoerd—dedicated themselves to tightening the segregation measures that had been relaxed in the 1940s. They supported the implementation of white *baasskap*, although they were cognizant of a visionary perspective concerning race policy's direction in their midst. They specifically responded to the interests of Afrikaner farmers and white workers by implementing stricter influx controls that limited the number of urban Africans and kept African laborers on the farms. Africans residing in the cities

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policy, see B.M. Schoeman, *Van Malan tot Verwoerd* (Cape Town: Human en Rousseau, 1973). See also O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, xxxii.

[121] Welsh, 147-52.

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were viewed as temporary laborers who would eventually move back to the reserves where opportunities would attract them. At the same time, the government gave special preference to "detribalized" Africans in urban areas who provided industrialists with a stable workforce. Influx controls were relaxed in those years if industry owners demanded a steady supply of labor.

During the first decade of NP rule, NGK-state relations were those of mutual engagement. The leadership in both institutions believed that apartheid represented the most just and effective solution to South Africa's racial problems. However, they did not present identical ideas on race policy because different factions dominated the state and the church. In the state, purist sympathizers existed, but *baasskap* adherents determined the actual implementation of apartheid policy. In the NGK, most official reports supported "vertical" apartheid or separate development.

However, as the 1950s moved to closure, the NP adopted a more thorough, purist position on apartheid while the NGK briefly experimented with a more moderate, pragmatic position on apartheid. How did this switching occur?

By the end of the 1950s, apartheid was thoroughly entrenched into South African life. As has been discussed, influx control was shaped by the 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act and the 1955 Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Act, and the adoption of the Bantu Education Act in 1953 produced a cheap black labor force serving the economic security of whites while instilling in

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Africans a docile spirit through "citizenship" training. During this time, many white South Africans began to express concern that apartheid policy lacked a moral basis. And Afrikaners, who witnessed increased demands of African nationalists and the growing movement toward decolonization on other parts of the African continent, realized that apartheid, which could easily be viewed as an openly racist policy, would not ease racial tensions.

Verwoerd responded in part to these concerns by adopting a new approach to apartheid a few months after assuming the position of Prime Minister. In May 1959 he announced the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill that promoted a more "purist" vision of territorial and economic racial separation. The bill promised the elimination of African political influence in white areas, whether it was in Parliament or local councils. The bill also created a framework for eight (later enlarged to ten) territorial homelands, which would represent African ethnic groups. These homelands would be self-governing, but eventually they could achieve national independence.[122]

Through this bill, Verwoerd advocated the development of a long-term, comprehensive race policy, often referred to as separate development, to deal with race problems in South Africa. Instead of the piecemeal segregation policy based on the paternalistic idea of guardian-ward relations, separate development was a thorough extension of apartheid that accommodated the different national

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[122] O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, p. 73.

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groups fairly.[123] The South African state attempted to argue that this policy was not based upon racial or biological differences, but national, cultural or ethnic differences, as in other countries around the world.[124]

Verwoerd used this bill to argue that apartheid had a moral basis in that it recognized the independence and self-determination of "Bantu" ethnic groups. This new apartheid "vision" emphasized ethnic identity, not race, and the possibility of each group realizing its potential through separation. Verwoerd made this move toward a more "purist" position based upon the rise of an economically and politically powerful group of Afrikaner intellectuals and professionals who believed that practical concessions to urban Africans were not necessary for South Africa's continued economic development.[125] Additionally, the "homelands" policy was developed, in part, to contain the rise of African nationalism within South Africa, which was growing in strength because of the anti-colonial movement in Africa. Finally, Verwoerd was able to make more dramatic, "vertical" changes to apartheid policy because the NP had firmly

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[123] Verwoerd relied on the work of N.J. Rhoodie and H.J. Venter in his explanation of separate development. See Rhoodie and Venter's *Apartheid: A Socio-Historical Exposition of the Origin and Development of the Apartheid Idea* (Cape Town: Human en Rousseau, 1959).

[124] The inconsistency of separate development policy is that it only applied to Africans. Africans were subdivided into different national groupings, but English-speaking whites and Afrikaners remained politically one "nation," even though they were culturally distinct. Only Africans were relegated to separate homelands. Coloureds, Indians, and whites were exempt from homeland designation. See Tracy Kuperus, *State, Civil Society and Apartheid in South Africa*, 94.

[125] Much of this discussion can be found in John Lazar, "Verwoerd versus the 'Visionaries': The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and Apartheid, 1948-1961," in *Apartheid's Genesis 1935-1962*, ed. Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, and Deborah Posel (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1993), 384.

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secured its power position by the early 1960s, alleviating the need for the NP to make cautious, short-term policies.

The NGK, while remaining firmly committed to the South African state, wavered somewhat in 1959, just as the NP government was making moves toward a more purist policy perspective on apartheid. Two events occurred in the liberationist movement that caused a wavering within NGK ranks. The first was the founding of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the subsequent anti-pass campaign that resulted in the Sharpeville massacre. The second was the Cottesloe Conference in 1960.

In 1959, the Pan African Congress (PAC) was formed as an alternative liberation movement to the ANC because it objected to the ANC's policy of multiracial alliances. The PAC also was convinced that the NP government was not prepared to make any concessions to multiracial rule and reconciliation. On March 31, 1960, the PAC launched a massive anti-pass campaign. At Sharpeville a large crowd gathered near a police station to surrender their passbooks. The police panicked as the crowd swelled, opening fire on the unarmed protesters and killing 69 people. The Sharpeville massacre led to an international outcry against the South African government and widespread unrest within South Africa. General strikes, large-scale marches, stayaways, and boycotts became commonplace. The government responded with a ferocity unparalleled in its earlier years, arresting and detaining more than 18,000

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people. The government also announced a state of emergency and declared the ANC and the PAC illegal organizations on April 8, 1960.

These events prompted the NGK to qualify separate development policy by saying it was acceptable if it were implemented in a "just" and "fair" manner. The voices arguing for justness and fairness came from the pragmatic leadership within the NGK. The accommodation between pragmatists and purists in the NGK came to the fore at the December 1960 interdenominational conference convened by the World Council of Churches (WCC) in Cottesloe, outside Johannesburg.

The Cottesloe conference was aimed at resolving denominational disputes over race policy following the Sharpeville massacre. The resolutions presented at Cottesloe advocated a more moderate direction for South African society, owing in part to the fact that the document represented a broader ecumenical direction than just the Dutch Reformed perspective. Among the resolutions, the document made no reference to a scriptural or theological justification for apartheid, it stressed the unity (not diversity) of believers, it condemned the government's refusal to grant Africans the right to participate politically or own lands where they settled, and it urged the government to take more care at equalizing wages and improving living conditions concerning blacks.[126]

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[126] World Council of Churches Consultation, *South African Outlook* 91, no. 1078 (1961): 23.

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The NGK delegates' general support for the Cottesloe resolutions was astonishing because many of the resolutions dealing with political rights, land rights, and labor controls for Africans were in direct conflict with Verwoerd's policy of separate development and previous NGK documents. The Cape and Transvaal NGK delegates' position at the Cottesloe conference also represented most clearly the rising influence of the moderate, pragmatic faction within the church.

The Cottesloe resolutions and the NGK delegates' involvement with them were roundly denounced by the state and conservative churchmen. Verwoerd's denunciation of the Cottesloe resolutions was followed by similar criticisms made by purist NGK leaders who questioned the integrity and actions of the NGK Cottesloe delegates. Finally, the Afrikaner Broederbond actively resisted the Cottesloe resolutions because they were seen as a threat to Afrikaner interests. Based on these negative reactions within the Afrikaner establishment, all the NGK synods rejected the Cottesloe resolutions within the next year. The Cape and Transvaal synods also withdrew their membership from the WCC.

The Cottesloe resolutions were well ahead of their time. The particular makeup of the NGK delegations, the socio-political tensions following Sharpeville, and the independence of the Cottesloe conference explain well the "moderate" nature of the NGK delegates' resolutions. One of the NGK delegates from the Transvaal synod, Beyers Naude, confirmed the fact that the members of the NGK delegation were some of the most progressive in the denomination:

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There were a number of then progressive theologians who were very much aware of what was coming in South Africa compared to the general church people…We all felt the serious crisis in which South Africa found itself and we couldn't come up with half-baked solutions. We had to state very clearly what our deepest convictions were in order to save the country from a racial war *or* we had to keep silent.[127]

Whatever the reasons explaining the so-called "progressive" nature of the Cottesloe resolutions, they were rejected by the Afrikaner establishment because they represented a rejection of the moral foundations of the state's separate development policy, which was to achieve the goals of white supremacy and economic security. In fact, Verwoerd was concerned that a church-state confrontation was looming in South Africa, and in his mind, if that happened, the state would lose.[128]

The engagement between the state and church could not be broken, according to Afrikaner nationalists such as Verwoerd and conservative clergy members, otherwise the goals of white supremacy and economic security would be lost in the long run. With the successful denunciation and rejection of the Cottesloe resolutions, these goals were maintained.

Rejecting the Cottesloe resolutions meant that the identity of Afrikaners in their pursuit of Afrikaners interests around apartheid policy could be maintained for a while longer. The NGK would continue to uphold the interests

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[127] Beyers Naude, as interviewed by Tracy Kuperus, Johannesburg, South Africa, April 8, 1993.

[128] Kuperus, *State, Civil Society*, and Apartheid, 101.

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of the Afrikaner people, and it would continue to provide the moral support for

the state's apartheid policy, which would usher in the pinnacle of apartheid's

hold on South Africa from 1962 to 1978.

The Period of Collaboration/Cooptation, 1962-1978

The successful attainment of Afrikaner nationalist goals, a relatively

stable political-economic environment, and moderate external pressure set the

stage for a situation of collaboration between the NP-dominated state and the

NGK in South Africa from 1962 to 1978. As leaders within the NGK and the

state collaborated with one another, the two entities' perspectives on race policy

became almost indistinguishable.[129]

From 1962 to 1978, the two Prime Ministers of South Africa—H.F.

Verwoerd (1958-66) and B.J. Vorster (1966-78)—promoted distinct racial

policies. Verwoerd, a purist sympathizer, continued to be associated with

separate development, while Vorster, although committed to the ideals of

separate development, ushered in the beginning of reform concerning race

policy.

Verwoerd refused to relax apartheid measures after the Sharpeville

massacre. In fact, he was more convinced than ever that the policy of separate

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[129] Because of the state's power over the NGK, an element of cooptation existed within the relationship. Cooptation refers to a more powerful body or group taking over an independent group and forcing or urging it to cooperate with or follow the dictates of the more powerful group.

development needed to be applied extensively in South Africa. The rise of black nationalism increased international condemnation of the apartheid system, and the security of the NP's rein on power led Verwoerd to advocate separate development. Separate development appeared to be a more rational, non-racist policy than *baasskap* apartheid or segregation because it was based on the ultimate "equality" of nations once they reached the status of full development. In other words, Verwoerd promoted the policy of separate development because it softened some of the moral objections to South Africa's racial policies.

The implementation of separate development became evident with the government's homelands policy—the creation of self-governing or independent "Bantu territories" out of the existing reserves for the different African ethnic groups. Economically, the homelands contained surplus black labor from white and urban and rural areas. Industrial decentralization was intended to provide jobs for those living in the homelands and to attract Africans back to the homelands. While Verwoerd appeared to be committed to the political independence of the homelands, he never intended to make the homelands economically viable. There were no additional grants of lands to the homelands, and he discouraged the establishment of industries inside the homelands for fear of a radical African proletariat developing.[130] Only a small proportion of

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[130] Instead, border industries—that is, industries that would be located just outside of homelands—were encouraged which could take advantage of a cheap labor force. See Nigel Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 109-11.

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government resources were directed toward the genuine development of the Bantustans.

The homelands policy had a negative impact on South Africa's social and political foundations. First, the government forcibly removed Africans to homelands using the argument that industry and economic growth existed in the homelands. Approximately 3.5 million people were moved out of white areas to the homelands between 1960 and 1980, causing major hardships for families.[131] Second, the government created ethnic divisions along "tribal" lines in an effort to persuade Africans that political independence was attainable for their ethnic groups.

Moreover, a major effect of the homeland policy was the increased stratification by race and class in occupational structures, income distribution, and population distribution. More pointedly, Verwoerd, who verbally committed himself to the goal of "fair" separate development, in reality encouraged governmental policies that imposed a rigid hierarchical race system that oppressed blacks under white control. Apartheid was thoroughly institutionalized in all areas of South African life, and to enforce it, the state became increasingly authoritarian. Most observers and scholarly work characterize the 1960s as the darkest days of apartheid. The state increased the power of its military forces in response to internal confrontations originating

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[131] Worden, *Making of Modern South Africa*, 111.

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from the two major black liberationist movements of the ANC and the PAC.[132]

And the state arrested, tried, and imprisoned Nelson Mandela at Robben Island,

the symbol of the black liberationist movement.

Additionally, South Africa's efforts to build white unity as a bulwark

against black nationalism were aided by South Africa's economic boom. From

1963 to 1971, South Africa experienced economic prosperity as a result of state-

led development and domestic and foreign investments.[133] The apartheid state

channeled cheap labor sources to white economic strongholds, and it protected

and encouraged industries by allowing monopolies in all sectors and between

international companies. More significantly, Afrikaners, who especially

benefited during this period, were now economically "on par" with English-

speaking whites. By the 1960s, Afrikaner males had moved into the higher

income occupational sectors of the economy, such as professional and

managerial positions, and the income gap between English-speaking whites and

Afrikaners was closed considerably.[134]

However, economic prosperity also had the effect of causing serious

divisions among classes. The Afrikaner financiers, industrialists, and

commercial capitalists, particularly in the Cape, benefited the most from

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[132] Additionally, both the military and the police forces saw dramatic increases in their budgets. O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years,* 109.

[133] For further elaboration of South Africa's economic boom in the 1960s, see Stephen Lewis, *The Economics of Apartheid* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990).

[134] O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years,* 136-44.

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economic growth and state-led development. Over time, these groups were less and less reliant on the savings and investments from Afrikaner farmers and the working class. By the late 1960s, one no longer could speak of the Afrikaner *volk's* economic interests. Afrikaner industrial and commercial capitalists began to align themselves with English-speaking industrial and commercial capitalists. Afrikaner workers and small farmers, on the other hand, felt ostracized by the policies promoted by these groups and turned to more *verkrampte* causes. Economic growth and Afrikaner favoritism benefited Afrikaners economically, and it helped to forward white unity *within* classes, but economic growth also undermined the ethnic cohesion of Afrikaner nationalism and led to serious ideological differences among Afrikaners. As the mantle of leadership passed from Verwoerd to B.J. Vorster, these differences became more noticeable.

Vorster adopted a more haphazard, pragmatic, and decentralized leadership style than Verwoerd.[135] He did not promote a singular vision of Afrikaner nationalism or race policy. One of his primary goals was to keep the *verkrampte/verligte* wings of the party together.[136] *Verkramptes* were traditionalists who wanted to return to a more glorified past concerning the Afrikaner people. They were wary of attempts by Afrikaner leaders in the NP who wanted to build a more inclusive white nationalism as a way to thwart the dominance of black South Africans. *Verligtes*, by contrast, were more

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[135] O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 151-155.

[136] O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 149-67.

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comfortable with transforming nationalist ideology and politics to suit the changing social composition and material needs of Afrikaners.

However, two major developments caused a split in the NP. The first was a series of decisions by Vorster to allow international sports teams with black players to compete with South African teams, allowing black diplomats to South Africa, and increasing money for African education. As a result of these decisions, an ultra-*verkrampte*, right-wing *Herstige Nasionale Party* (Reconstituted Nationalist Party) or HNP, was formed.[137] The second, and more devastating, development was the oil shocks of 1973. South Africa's economy was structurally linked to the international economy. Some of the major aspects of this linkage included the country's shortage of skilled labor, weaknesses related to reliance on import-substitution industrialization, overreliance on exporting strategic minerals, and a domestic market geared toward the demands of a small white minority.[138] Like the rest of the western industrialized economies, South Africa's deficits increased between 1974 and 1976, inflation and unemployment rose, and the rand devalued.[139]

Moreover, the English press, the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), and the Christian Institute (CI) were all involved in protests against the state in the 1970s. The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) was

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[137] David Dalcanton, "Vorster and the Politics of Confidence", *African Affairs* 75 (1976): 163-81.

[138] Kuperus, *State, Civil Society, and Apartheid,* 109.

[139] O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years,* 169-189.

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also gaining momentum, and as the prophetic church mobilized the black masses, strikes began to break out all over the country. They would intensify until the regime entered into negotiations in 1990.

Finally, external pressure from Western governments and international organizations placed the apartheid apparatus at a crossroads. In 1969-70 the World Council of Churches adopted the Program to Combat Racism which offered financial support to liberation movements in southern Africa. Two years later, the WCC encouraged divestment from companies that did business with South Africa.

Vorster stood at this crossroads. Throughout his term, he defended separate development as a moral and just policy, and he furthered the aims of separate development by increasing forced removals, encouraging homeland "independence," and tightening pass controls. However, Vorster was less of an ideologue than was Verwoerd. He admitted that separate development was more a method than a dogma, and if it did not work as intended, then it could be replaced with something else.[140] As class divisions arose among whites, and as managers in all economic sectors demanded an easing of apartheid laws for the purpose of economic growth, Vorster responded with small reforms such as the relaxation of social and sports segregation and the granting of permits that allowed Africans to own more than one business in urban areas. Concurrently,

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[140] David Welsh, "The Executive and the African Population: 1948 to the Present," *Malan to De Clerk*, ed. Robert Schrire (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 165.

these reforms threatened *verkramptes*, who desired a more stringent application of apartheid and the continued dominance of Afrikaners.

These reforms did not convince the liberation movement that real change was occurring to abolish apartheid. The liberation movement recognized that these reforms were cosmetic and intended to preserve white supremacy. This became even more clear during the watershed events of the Soweto uprising of 1976. The initial protest was sparked by the imposed requirement of Afrikaans as the language of instruction, but it evolved into a broad-based protest against the oppressive apartheid state and the institutions that perpetuated economic inequality.

The Soweto uprising propelled South Africa onto the international stage. In its aftermath, the United Nations and the European Community condemned the South African state.[141]

The political leadership's immediate reaction to the growing international, internal, and economic pressure was support for increased repression and a massive military buildup to stifle unrest. The apartheid regime banned 17 liberation organizations in the wake of the Soweto uprisings, suppressed leading anti-apartheid newspapers, and escalated its military activity. The regime also adopted an isolationist, "laager" mentality to combat

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[141] For more information on the international pressures on South Africa during the era of apartheid, see Robert Kinloch Massie, *Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years* (New York: Doubleday, 1997) and *The United Nations and Apartheid, 1948-1994* (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1994).

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international pressure. During the 1977 campaign, Vorster attacked foreign pressure on South Africa as biased toward blacks. Whites rallied around this reasoning giving the NP a huge victory.

The NGK's Religious Context, 1962-1978

The NGK continued to be one of the prominent civil society actors that supported the regime from 1962 to 1978. The church's position on apartheid rarely deviated from the state's policy directives. The NGK became very dependent on and even dominated by the state, whose leaders had effectively silenced the limited autonomy or independence the NGK displayed regarding policy matters in the early 1960s.

In fact, meetings between leaders of the NGK and the state often were held behind closed doors. Details of these meetings were not available to the public. The NGK was sharply criticized by English-speaking churches for the lack of transparency when it met with government officials. English-speaking churches, in contrast, often notified the press when they sent delegations to meet with government officials. The NGK responded to these criticisms by saying that their method of governmental interaction was more productive because it did not embarrass the state.[142] The NGK preferred to "approach the authorities directly and in a responsible manner" rather than take "alleged grievances to the

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[142] Kuperus, *State, Civil Society, and Apartheid,* 113.

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public press,"[143] saying the former method aligned itself with scriptural norms, such as respect for authorities.[144]

State leaders felt very comfortable with delegations from the NGK. The NGK was one of the most legitimating actors during the 1960s and 1970s. The church supported the government in its policies and actions. It continued to offer a moral basis for apartheid policy, and it went out of its way to avoid confrontations with the NP. For these reasons, the NGK often was referred to as the "National Party in prayer."

High policy collusion cemented the relationship of collaboration during the Verwoerd and Vorster years. Once Verwoerd promoted the ideal of separate development, and after he had effectively silenced the minority pragmatic faction of the NGK at Cottesloe, the NGK's purist faction was able to support in an unhindered way separate development and the specific legislation underpinning it.

By the 1960s, the National Party had become the dominant institution formulating the goals and values of the Afrikaners. The NGK as a civil society institution had helped formulate Afrikaner values in the 1930s and 1940s within the political context of an Afrikaner alliance competing with state leaders who

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[143] *Human Relations and the South African Scene in the Light of Scripture* (Cape Town: DRC Publishers, 1976), 74.

[144] The scriptural reference that is often cited is Romans 13. However, these passages do not necessarily imply that governments fulfill God's desires. To see an interpretation of Romans 13 from the perspective of the NGK, please see J.H.P. Serfontein, *Apartheid, Change, and the NG Kerk* (Emmarentia: Taurus, 1982), 77.

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represented general white interests; during the 1950s the NGK leaders crafted the ideas of separate development that appealed to particular segments within Afrikanerdom. By the 1960s and 1970s, the NGK carefully followed the *lead* of the NP's stance on race policy. The NGK had been so successful at providing the moral basis for apartheid, at promoting Afrikaner cultural unity, and supporting the NP, that its independence and autonomy as an institution and civil society were stifled significantly.

The NP continued to rely upon the NGK to provide the basis for its legitimation. Of particular note during this era was the Landman Report of 1968, a response by W.A. Landman to the Reformed Church of America's (RCA) criticism of the NGK's "theology of apartheid."[145] Landman, Information Director of the NGK at the time, replied in depth to the Reformed Church of America's accusations that apartheid was an oppressive, racist policy. The centerpiece of his argument rested upon the notion that apartheid set out to bring development to all peoples of South Africa. The Homelands policies, once they were fully realized, would allow all of the racial groups within South Africa to develop without the governance of whites, uplifting of the peoples concerned and their attainment of self-determination.[146] Two of the glaring omissions from Landman's response and another report entitled *Human Relations and the South*

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[145] Kuperus, *State, Civil Society, and Apartheid*, 115-16.

[146] W.A. Landman, *A Plea for Understanding, A Reply to the Reformed Church in America* (Cape Town: DRC Publishers, 1968), 29.

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African Scene in the Light of Scripture (HR) was the lack of attention given to the injustices associated with apartheid and the opposition to apartheid by the majority of South African citizens. The majority of South African citizens were never consulted or asked to be participating partners in their "emancipation."

In conclusion, the era of collaboration between the state and the NGK ushered in strong authoritarian rule by an Afrikaner-dominated state that engaged heavily with civil society institutions such as the NGK that voluntarily gave their loyalty to the state and Afrikaner interests.

The relationship of collaboration achieved its economic and political goals for Afrikaners in South Africa. Afrikaners, and whites more broadly, remained dominant in the social and political realm, and their economic security was maintained. Indeed, the power of Afrikaners in economic and political realms appeared insurmountable. Although external pressure on the country increased, and black protest gained in strength during these years, it was not enough to challenge white minority rule. Only towards the mid-1970s did serious cracks appear in the Afrikaner nationalist edifice. Ironically, the source of these cracks was due in large part to the success of Afrikaner nationalism's economic movement.

The Second Period of Mutual Engagement, 1978-1990

As external pressures continued to mount on the apartheid regime, and the growing momentum of the black liberationist movement began to mobilize and organize at the grassroots level throughout the country, the NP and the NGK exhibited a relationship of mutual engagement. As during the first three decades of apartheid rule, the NGK continued to give its unequivocal support to the state. During this period, state leaders began to widen their scope to promote the attainment of white survival and economic prosperity through political reform, while leaders within the NGK lagged behind, supporting the goals of white, but more specifically Afrikaner, survival and economic prosperity through a slower implementation of reform.

Sociological upheaval among Afrikaners helps to explain the differences between the NGK and the state during this period. After 1979 the dominant faction within the NP-dominated state represented more pragmatic political directives and middle-class economic interests, while the NGK's leadership identified with the spiritual and cultural needs of Afrikaner moderates and conservatives.

This period of NGK-state relations reveals an interesting finding regarding state-civil society relations in times of transition. A civil society such as the NGK presented a greater obstacle to the realization of democracy than did the state. Mainstream accounts of state-civil society relations often assume that

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while overcentralized, authoritarian states hinder democratic transitions, civil society institutions will successfully help usher in the establishment of democracy. This era demonstrates that the NGK, because of its identification with narrow, ethnic interests, resisted the establishment of democracy to a *greater* extent than did the South African state.

The NP-Dominated State's General Position on Race Policy, 1978-1990

P.W. Botha became Prime Minister of South Africa in 1978. His leadership represented a significant shift within the National Party and the government because he promoted *verligte* political change within a military-dominated state that contained strong, centralized rule.[147] Although Botha's domineering personality and his support for the military made him an unlikely reformer, his proclivities toward pragmatism and flexibility led to the unraveling of Verwoerdian apartheid and laid the foundation for further reform under F.W. de Clerk in 1989. More specifically, the goals of an Afrikaner economy and ethnic purity through separate development were replaced with the goals of white economic prosperity and survival through neo-apartheid. Neo-apartheid accepted black urbanization and economic integration in the attempt to maintain economic interests and ensure white survival.

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[147] O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 224-8 and 254-9.

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One of the main reasons Botha initiated neo-apartheid reforms in the 1980s was the economic recession affecting the country. From 1980 to 1985, South Africa's growth rate was 1.1 percent annually and inflation ran at 10 percent. The slight increase in gross domestic product could not equal the population growth rate of 2.3 percent annually, so real incomes for all South Africans lowered.[148]

As was mentioned in the earlier section, South Africa's capital-intensive manufacturing industries increasingly demanded a semi-skilled or highly skilled workforce that could manage the technological and structural change needed for capitalist accumulation. However, a decreasing white labor force and apartheid policies that restricted blacks to unskilled labor led to a labor skills shortage. Moreover, the international antiapartheid movement led to economic sanctions and disinvestment that deprived South Africa of foreign money and technology.[149] These events led NP leaders to realize that apartheid needed to change if the demands of a capital-intensive economy were to be met.

South Africa's anemic economy corresponded with the second major factor leading to NP policy change, namely, Afrikaner socio-economic upheaval. Afrikaner solidarity across class lines from the 1940s to the 1960s declined in the 1970s and 1980s because of the achievement of economic

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[148] J.B. Knight, "A Comparative Analysis of South Africa as a Semi-Industrialized Developing Country", *Journal of Modern African Studies* 26 (1988): 475.

[149] Knight, "Comparative Analysis of South Africa," 475-81.

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prosperity by some Afrikaners.[150] Specifically, Afrikaner businesspeople,

wealthy professionals, and large-scale commercial farmers aligned themselves

with English-speaking capitalists who encouraged reform for purposes of

economic profit and the softening of international criticism.

Finally, political reasons, in addition to the economic slowdown and

class cleavage, explain why Botha embarked on a new strategy of implementing

apartheid. Beginning in the 1970s, membership in trade unions grew, and anti-

apartheid awareness and politicization on a mass level began to sweep the

country. South Africa became a pariah state after Soweto in 1976, and this

reputation intensified throughout the 1980s. The government also faced a

changing regional political landscape as many of its neighbors gained

independence. This presented a direct challenge to South African leaders, who

were accustomed to European colonialism and white control.

In response to the external pressure and internal change, Botha

implemented a set of policies from 1979 to 1985 known as "total strategy."

"Total strategy" was a comprehensive political plan put into effect that

coordinated South Africa's white power bases against internal and external

threats.[151] The regime argued that a "total strategy" of political reform and

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[150] Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 223.

[151] O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 259-69. The twelve-point plan or principles of total strategy were revealed at the Natal National Party Congress in August 1979. For an extended discussion of the twelve-point plan, see Robert M. Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 79-189.

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military might was needed to face the onslaught from communist revolutionaries inside and outside the country.[152] Total strategy sought support from business and the black middle class through domestic reforms that included the relaxation of petty apartheid, the initiation of labor reform and the implementation of constitutional change, while it suppressed domestic dissidents and destabilized what it viewed as radical frontline states.

These political reforms, which included a new legislative arrangement that provided for three uniracial parliamentary chambers, were designed to co-opt certain sectors of the population. The state provided chambers for Indians and Coloureds but excluded black South Africans. Africans were supposed to seek their political rights in designated homelands or township councils, both of which were regarded as illegitimate by the vast majority of blacks.[153] Botha's reforms also caused a serious rift within the Afrikaner alliance. Botha's reforms appeased middle-class Afrikaner and English-speaking whites, but they contradicted the social and economic interests of small Afrikaner farmers and Afrikaner workers based in the Transvaal. These differences led to a major schism in 1982 with the formation of the Conservative Party (CP), led by

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This is a direct reference to what the NP perceived as the radical, communist-inspired, leadership of the ANC and SACP.

[153] The Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 gave "local autonomy" to residents of local areas. This act was discredited by most black South Africans.

Andries Treurnicht. This party replaced the more liberal Progressive Federal Party as the official opposition party in the white assembly in 1987.[154]

Additionally, South Africa felt increasingly threatened by its neighbors. "Communist sympathizers" existed in Zimbabwe's new independent government and Marxist leanings existed in the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Botha responded by increasing its military capacities and attempted to destabilize these surrounding states.

With regard to internal threats, the state became increasingly draconian in its measures. Detentions, arrests, and bannings became commonplace. The regime used its military superiority to thwart pro-liberation guerilla activity in frontline states, and it organized counter-revolutionary groups that wrecked the economies of these states.

Finally, and most importantly, resistance to apartheid continued to mount through the efforts of mass labor and the prophetic church, which will be explored in detail later. The masses refused to believe that the government was engaged in sincere reform. Some actions that strengthened the resolve of liberation movements included *Umkhonto we Sizwe's* (Spear of the Nation—the military wing of the liberation struggle) attacks on a number of military and power stations in the early 1980s and the boycott of tricameral parliamentary

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[154] Timothy D. Sisk, "White Politics in South Africa: Polarization under Pressure", *Africa Today* 36 (1989): 32-4.

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elections by Indian and Coloured voters in 1984. The liberation movement grew

larger and more organized during the 1980s. The United Democratic Front

(UDF) was formed in 1983, and it consolidated more than 400 national,

regional, and local organizations that resisted apartheid. The state, out of

desperation, declared a state of emergency in 1985. A full nationwide state of

emergency was imposed in 1986, during which thousands of activists were

detained and tortured, meetings and organizations were banned, and the media

were regulated heavily.[155]

By 1985, South Africa had reached a political stalemate. Botha refused

to implement any more reforms and increasingly drew upon force to stabilize the

country. Western governments could no longer stifle the intensity of activity

against the regime. Economic sanctions escalated, which resulted in the loss of

international capital, rising interest rates, increased foreign debt, flattened

incomes, and deepening poverty.

NGK Relations from 1978-1990: Lagging Behind the State

The NGK continued to legitimate the state and lend it consistent support.

While the state and the NGK held similar views on the majority of policy issues,

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[155] On February 22, 1988, the government prohibited seventeen organizations from engaging in politically related activities. The UDF and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) were singled out as promoting a "revolutionary climate" and encouraging civil disobedience and revolt. The state of emergency was finally lifted by F.W. de Klerk in 1990. Kuperus, *State, Civil Society, and Apartheid*, 127.

there were situations where the NGK held a more conservative opinion than the state or NP leaders.

The predicament of the NGK "lagging behind the state" has been observed by other scholars.[156] It has been suggested that the NP leaders dominating the state promoted reform in the 1980s because of an altered political environment that forced the party to moderate its policy directives in contrast to the NGK which could not easily distance itself from the moral and biblical underpinnings of apartheid that it helped to construct. Although political and ideological differences explain part of the divergence on political reform, additional factors caused by sociological upheaval round out the reasons for the differences between the NGK and the state.

By the mid-1970s, many Afrikaners had achieved a large measure of wealth and power. A sizable majority of Afrikaners had reached middle-class status. As has been discussed, this dramatic increase in the status of Afrikaners can be attributed to the NP's use of state resources to aid the Afrikaner business community, workers, and farmers ever since the National Party came to power in 1948.

Botha's domestic policies sided with bourgeois interests, and in doing so, they contributed to the breakdown of ethnic unity that previous regimes, especially under Verwoerd, created among the different classes. The cracks in

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[156] Johann Kinghorn, "Theology of Separate Equality," 69-73 and J.H.P. Serfontein, *Apartheid, Change and the NGK* (Emmarentia: Taurus, 1982).

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Verwoerdian separate development, namely, the removal of petty apartheid and the power-sharing arrangements with blacks, also indicated political integration and the loss of political control for many lower-class whites.[157]

The first group within the NGK, composed of conservative hard-liners, resisted any form of socio-political change away from vertical apartheid. These individuals were committed to the goals of Afrikaner ethnic preservation and a "people's economy" that could be achieved through separate development. Many of these conservatives were the "purist" advocates during the first era of mutual engagement and during the era of collaboration. Conservatives represented a significant portion (between 15 and 30 percent) of the NGK laity who still believed that apartheid could be justified on various grounds, seen in their support for right-wing parties, such as the CP.[158] These leaders no longer occupied the top echelon of the NGK's administrative structure by the 1980s but they still wielded considerable influence.

The second faction found in the NGK consisted of the *verligte* moderates who were committed to serving the spiritual and cultural needs of their Afrikaner membership by respecting past decisions of the church concerning the biblical and theological foundations of separate development, but also prodded the church laity to consider micro-changes. NGK *verligtes* had been trained in

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[157] Craig Charney, "Class Conflict and the National Party Split", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 10 (1984): 269-82.

[158] Charney, "Class Conflict," 277.

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the Reformed tradition and reflected a Calvinist commitment to doctrinal purity and scriptural authority, but they did not embrace neo-Kuyperian Calvinism. While the top echelons of the NGK were dominated by moderates, they could not be as outspoken concerning socio-political issues because of their responsibility toward the full composition of NGK membership. In essence, the institutional dynamics of the NGK inhibited the development of new ideas.

The third faction in the NGK consisted of liberals who promoted significant reform away from apartheid policy because this would alleviate oppression against black South Africans and lead to the spiritual and cultural uplifting of all South Africans.

The NGK found itself in a very difficult situation because of the diversity of its membership regarding ideological, political, and class backgrounds. Although the NP was officially separated from the *verkrampte* faction, the NGK continued to be influenced by laity and leaders who were still influenced by this worldview. Thus, the NGK took cautious stands on state policy issues to avoid a split. A split within the NGK would be more devastating than a similar division within the state because a significant portion of the NGK rank and file were conservatives and still held onto the notion of Verwoerdian apartheid.

The NGK faced increased pressure from liberal and moderate theologians. In the early 1980s, a number of challenging pronouncements

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emerged, including *Stormkompas* (1981) and the Open Letter (1982).[159] These

documents dealt with reconciliation, race relations, and structural church unity.

The Open Letter stated that the NGK and the government had ignored the

injustices of apartheid. These documents also rejected the scriptural defense of

apartheid laws such as the Mixed Marriages and Group Areas Acts, denounced

apartheid in its application, and called on the NGK to seek structural church

unity with black Reformed churches.

The NGK's official response was dismissal. The NGK first argued that

these reports were in conflict with the standard practice of dealing with

grievances in a private manner. The NGK also argued that the documents

hurtfully exposed Afrikaner disunity.

The NGK's handling of internal dissent demonstrated its main desire to

maintain the unity of the church. The NGK remained remarkably silent or

opposed reform efforts in order to promote the symbolic unity of Afrikaner

people.

Finally, in 1985, the official NGK position on South Africa's socio-

political context was published in a document called *Church and Society*

(CS).[160] In some ways, the CS was a dramatic break from previous church

statements on social and racial policy. CS rejected biblical justifications for

apartheid, it declared racism a sin, it allowed for multiracial church services, it

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[159] Kuperus, *State, Civil Society, and Apartheid,* 134.

[160] Kuperus, 137.

admitted that strong church-state ties had hindered the confessional nature of the church, and it downplayed the emphases on race and nation embodied in earlier reports. But, in the end, the CS report was very ambiguous in that it reflected the need of the NGK to accommodate the various ideological, social, and political aspects of its members. For example, on the issue of apartheid, the CS report rejected the *practice* of apartheid, but still maintained that the *theory* of apartheid was valid.[161] It stated that social and political systems which protected minority and ethnic groups could be justified if they were applied justly and according to biblical principles.

The CS was crafted ambiguously in an attempt to meet the needs of the majority of its members who were not ready to embrace dramatic political change. The church did not take a lead anywhere in the document supporting specific government reforms, nor did it push for socio-political change.

In the end, it was the NP-dominated state, not a civil society institution like the NGK, which took the initial steps to implement reform. In this sense, history was ahead of the NGK.

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[161] *Church and Society: A Testimony of the Dutch Reformed Church* (Bloemfontein: Pro Christo Publishers, 1986), 47.

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> One night while I was driving an old ANC leader to his home far
> out to the west of Johannesburg, I propounded to him the well-known
> theory that if you separate races, you diminish the point at which
> friction between them may occur and hence ensure good relations.
> His answer was the essence of simplicity: if you place the races of
> one country in two camps, and cut off contact between them, those
> in each camp begin to forget that those in the other camp are ordinary
> human beings... that each experiences joy or sorrow, pride or
> humiliation for the same reason. Thereby each becomes suspicious of
> the other and each eventually fears the other, which is the basis of all
> racialism.[162]

The relationship of NGK-state relations from 1934 to 1994 reveals

important changes in NGK-state relations to the various factions dominating

both entities. It also points to the possibility of civil society posing a greater

obstacle to the realization of widespread democracy than does the state where

civil society institutions are associated with exclusive, ethnic interests.

From 1934 to 1947, state-NGK relations were described as coexisting

conflict, a situation characterized by moderate policy collusion and moderate to

low official interaction. The NGK increasingly assumed the role of providing

the justification for Afrikaner cultural, social, political, and economic narratives.

When the NP assumed the reins of political power in 1948, the party leadership

began to implement and institutionalize the goals of vertical apartheid.

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[162]   Bram Fischer, as quoted in Wilhelm Verwoerd Jr.'s letter and journal entries from his
memoir, *My Winds of Change* (Johannesburg and Athens, OH: Raven Press, 1997). The laager
is hugely symbolic in Afrikaner history. Used primarily as wagons, they became a protective
shield for the Boers when they found themselves in battle or protecting their families. To protect
themselves, the men would encircle themselves with these wagons. For a fuller discussion,
please see David Goodman, *Fault Lines: Journeys into the New South Africa* (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1999), 173-205.

Meanwhile, the transformationist theological stream of the NGK evolved into an accommodationist theological stream as the NGK assumed the role of legitimating the goals of grand apartheid policies. The NGK was characterized as being in a situation of collaboration, even collusion, on most matters of race policy during this period.

After the oil shocks of 1973 and markedly slower growth in Western economies, combined with the watershed events surrounding the Soweto massacre of 1976, South Africa's legitimacy as a state was increasingly under attack from within and without. Beginning with the Botha regime, the political leadership attempted reforms in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. However, the NGK lagged behind, retaining its purist and vertical apartheid visions for South Africa. The NGK's unwillingness to allow new ideas to enter the "universe of discourse" greatly inhibited its ability to respond to a changing political context. In many respects, this inability to respond effectively to the serious shortcomings of apartheid theology has compromised the NGK tradition. Consequently, in the new South Africa, its status as a viable Christian tradition is under question in new political and economic realities.

The Segregated and Silent Branches: The Pentecostals

Pentecostals: Antithetical/Accommodationist, Intensive, and Autonomous

One of the main reasons indigenous churches appeared in Africa, and
most particularly in South Africa, is that almost from the very beginning, the
Pentecostal churches initiated by Americans and Europeans accepted the tenets
of apartheid with remarkably little hesitation. The Pentecostal tradition, which
has deep roots in the antithetical church tradition, stayed out of politics and
accepted the reality that apartheid was the "way things were done."[163]
Additionally, racial separation had a carefully constructed theological basis in
the theology of the Dutch Reformed church, with its teaching on the orders of
creation that defined the separation of racial communities as the will of God.
The failure of white Pentecostals to "exorcise" the evil of racism would lay the
groundwork for the genuine Pentecostal impetus to leave the Western-sponsored
denominations behind and form what are broadly recognized as the indigenous
Christian churches in South Africa.

These churches, also often referred to as Pentecostals or Charismatics,
form the largest Christian group in the world after Roman Catholics, and the
fastest-growing Christian movement, estimated at more than 372 million in

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[163] Harvey Cox, *Fire From Heaven: The Rise of Pentecostal Spirituality and the
Reshaping of Religion in the Twenty-first Century* (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1995), 259.

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1990.[164] According to reputable observers, Pentecostal numbers worldwide are increasing at the rate of about 19 million each year.[165]

Historically, the chief religious division in the Western world was between Roman Catholics and Protestants, the latter term including all those groups that descended from the great ideological and theological split of the Reformation. The key difference is that Protestants rely upon the Bible alone as the source of religious authority, rather than on tradition or the institutional church. In this broad division, the Pentecostal movement should logically be considered Protestant, because it grew out of other Protestant churches, namely Methodism and the Holiness tradition, and the emphasis on a fundamentalist reliance on scriptural authority. Increasingly, though, observers differentiate Pentecostals from Protestants because of growing divergences between the two in matters of faith and practice. One central division is that Pentecostal believers rely on direct spiritual revelations that supplement or even replace biblical authority. Moreover, while Protestants serve a largely middle-class audience, Pentecostals derive their support mainly from the historically marginalized and poor.[166] The importance of this distinction is important, for in the mainline

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[164] Vinson Synan, *The Spirit Said "Grow"* (Monrovia: MARC, 1992).

[165] Karla Poewe, ed., *Charismatic Christianity as a Global Culture* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994); Harvey Cox, *Fire From Heaven* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1995), 161-84; "Pentecostals: World Growth at 19 Million a Year," *Christianity Today*, November 16, 1998; Allan H. Anderson and Walter J. Hollenweger, eds., *Pentecostals after a Century* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1999).

[166] Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 63.

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tradition, the major theological stream is accommodationist and conversionist, while for the Pentecostals, the major informing theological strain is antithetical.

Another key factor that explains the dramatic growth of Pentecostal churches is their response to economic circumstances. Their success can be seen as a by-product of modernization and urbanization. As predominately rural societies have become more urban over the past century, millions of migrants are attracted to ever larger urban complexes, which generally lack the resources or infrastructure to meet the needs of these "post-industrial wanderers."[167] As these wanderers seek out work, they find themselves suffering a sense of estrangement. In these settings, the most devoted and Pentecostalist-oriented religious communities emerge to provide functional alternative arrangements for health, welfare, and education.[168] This sort of alternative social system has been a potent factor in winning mass support for the most committed religious groups, and is likely to become more important as the gap between popular needs and the official capacities to fill them becomes ever wider.

In the South African context, the early membership of the Pentecostal movement was made up of indigent urbanized Afrikaners and displaced blacks, and was drawn "almost exclusively from these ethnically heterogeneous,

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[167] Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom*, 73.

[168] The phrase "post-industrial wanderers" is from Cox, *Fire from Heaven*, 107. For the heavy Pentecostal involvement in social ministries, see Teresa Watanabe, "Global Convention Testifies to Pentecostalism's Revival," *Los Angeles Times*, May 31, 2001.

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struggling working classes and impoverished unemployed...in the urban areas of the nation."[169]

In 1991 Pentecostals and members of the African Independent Churches (AICs) with affinities to Pentecostalism, often referred to here as Pentecostal-type Independent Churches,[170] accounted for more than 40 percent of the population. In South Africa, as well as in other parts of the continent, these churches are expanding faster than Islam, is at about twice the rate of Roman Catholics, and at roughly three times that of other non-Catholic groups. This amazing growth is the result partly of its ability to address core problems that have plagued black South Africans in history: ill health, poverty, unemployment, loneliness, sorcery, and spirit possession. In the new South Africa after 1994, Pentecostalism responds to the deeply felt needs of the lack of self-esteem and the psychological chains of apartheid. In the words of a leader in the Pentecostal movement in South Africa, apartheid has left millions "under

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[169] R.M. Anderson, as quoted in Harvey Cox, *Fire From Heaven*, 261-262.

[170]The term "Pentecostal-type" refers to those African Independent Churches with historical, theological, and liturgical affinities with the Pentecostal movement. These churches, which embrace one third of the black population of South Africa, have an emphasis on the Holy Spirit, especially manifested in prophetic healing practices, and other Pentecostal beliefs such as adult baptism by immersion and speaking in tongues. Additionally, African Independent Churches sometimes are referred to as African *Initiated* Churches. The term is meant to capture the movement of these churches from the mainline Christian churches, such as the Methodists, Lutherans, and other mainline Christian traditions that took root in South Africa in the nineteenth century, and the subsequent development of churches started by black South Africans themselves. Moreover, these churches incorporated and blended traditional African beliefs, such as praying to the elders and employing the use of the *sangoma* (witch doctor) in religious practice with Christian beliefs. African *Indigenous* Churches are distinct from African Independents in that they were never part of mainline Christian traditions and maintained their own traditions apart from the development of imported religious traditions from Europe and elsewhere.

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the age of 50 psychologically crippled."[171] The growth of these churches is

much more rapid than, and often at the expense of, the older churches.[172]

In addition to these factors that assist in explaining the phenomenal

growth of Pentecostals worldwide and in South Africa, Pentecostalism should be

understood not as a denomination or a creed, but a movement, a cluster of

religious practices and attitudes that transcend ecclesiastical boundaries.

At least 6,000 churches in South Africa, comprising some ten million

people, can be identified with some form of Pentecostalism, especially in the

emphasis on the Holy Spirit and on practices such as divine healing, exorcism,

prophecy, revelation, and speaking in tongues. These churches also follow the

Pentecostal tradition for adult believers', not infant, baptism.

Pentecostalism is aptly characterized as the "segregated spirit" due to the

historical legacy that Pentecostalism developed spontaneously among blacks in

South Africa, and often without assistance from white Pentecostal churches, in

spite of what has been written on the history of the Pentecostal movement. This

is especially the case with regard to the African Independent Churches.

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[171] Colin la Foy, Secretary General, Assembly of God Churches in southern Africa, interview, Durban, South Africa, September 26, 2001.

[172] A.H. Anderson, *African Pentecostalism in a South African Urban Environment: A Missiological Evaluation* (D. Th. Thesis: University of South Africa, 1992), 23-4. Empirical data comes from the 1991 South African census report.

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Zion City, Topeka, and Azusa Street: The North American Legacy

The roots of twentieth-century Pentecostalism can be traced to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Methodist and Holiness movements, especially to John Wesley's concept of "Christian perfection" or "entire sanctification,"[173] imparted to the believer in a "second blessing" subsequent to, and separate from, an initial conversion or justification.[174] But there was a significant shift in the emphasis on the nature of the second blessing, from seeing it as an imparting of "perfection" or "holiness" to a "baptism of the Holy Ghost," which would give the believer "power for service."[175] At the end of the nineteenth century at least twenty separate Holiness denominations seceded from the American Methodist Church, all claiming to be true followers of Wesleyan teaching. Additionally, by the turn of the nineteenth century, a large section of the Holiness movement was also beginning to embrace divine healing as a central tenet.[176]

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[173]D.W. Dayton, *Theological Roots of Pentecostalism* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1987), 35-54.

[174] Allan H. Anderson and Gerald J. Pillay, "The Segregated Spirit: The Pentecostals," in *Christianity in South Africa: A Political, Social, and Cultural History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 227.

[175]Anderson and Pillay, 228.

[176]M.E. Dieter, "Wesleyan-Holiness Aspects of Pentecostal Origins: As Mediated through the Nineteenth-Century Holiness Revival," in *Aspects of Pentecostal-Charismatic Origins*, ed. Vinson Synan (Plainfield, NJ: Logos Press, 1975), 57-76.

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John Alexander Dowie, the healing preacher in Illinois, had considerable

influence on South African Pentecostalism, far greater than his influence on

American Pentecostalism. Dowie advocated that divine healing was a

manifestation of Pentecostal power.[177] In Zion City, Illinois, Dowie was

regarded as the "First Apostle" and had assumed the role of "Elijah the prophet"

over a movement he founded and called the Christian Catholic Apostolic Church

in Zion (CCACZ). This church, which claimed to have more than 20,000

members by 1905, emphasized divine healing, threefold baptism of adult

believers by immersion in water, and the active pursuit of holiness.[178] Several of

the early leaders of the Pentecostal movement in North America were associated

with Dowie, and both pioneer Pentecostal leaders Charles Parham and William

Seymour visited Zion City. Moreover, John G. Lake, a Pentecostal missionary to

South Africa, was an elder in Zion City.

"Speaking in tongues" was a widespread phenomenon in several

Holiness churches, but Charles Parham was among the first to focus on tongues

as an external sign of the baptism of the Spirit. The first recorded incidence of

tongues speaking as "initial evidence" was in Parham's Bible school in Topeka,

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[177] D.W. Dayton, *Theological Roots of Pentecostalism* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1987), 35-54.

[178] Edith L. Blumhofer, "The Christian Catholic Apostolic Church and the Apostolic Faith: A Study in the 1906 Pentecostal Revival," in *Charismatic Experiences in History*, ed. Cecil M. Robeck (Peabody: Hendrickson Press, 1985), 131.

Kansas, in January 1901. Just as the disciples had "spoken in tongues" after their "conversion," so these Christians claimed it as their "second blessing."[179]

William Seymour, an African-American, became a student at Parham's Bible College in Houston, Texas, in 1905. In 1906, Seymour went to Los Angeles, invited by a Holiness church, where he preached a new message in a former African Methodist Episcopal church building turned livery stable. It was here that the worldwide Pentecostal revival began. People flocked to his mostly black church on Azusa Street, received the Spirit, and carried the message of Pentecost to fifty nations in two years.[180] At Azusa Street, people of all races and social backgrounds "achieved a new sense of dignity and community in fully integrated Pentecostal services."[181] Leading observers state that "directly or indirectly, practically all of the Pentecostal groups in existence can trace their lineage to the Azusa Mission."[182] John G. Lake, one of South Africa's Pentecostal pioneers, was deeply influenced by the Azusa Street revival. After 1910, however, North American Pentecostalism would have no further direct

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[179] Allan H. Anderson and Gerald Pillay, "The Segregated Spirit: The Pentecostals," in *Christianity in South Africa,* 228.

[180] I. MacRobert, *The Black Roots and White Racism of Early Pentecostalism in the USA* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 56, 81.

[181] R.M. Anderson, *Vision of the Disinherited: The Making of American Pentecostalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 122.

[182] V. Synan, *The Holiness-Pentecostal Movement in the United States* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1971), 114.

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influence on the progress of South African Pentecostalism until the latter part of the twentieth century.[183]

Wakkerstroom: The South African Azusa Street

Many Pentecostal and indigenous Pentecostal-type churches in South Africa have their roots in events in Wakkerstroom in the southeastern Transvaal, events that were influenced initially by Zion City and Azusa Street. Pieter L. le Roux, a Dutch Reformed missionary working in Wakkerstroom, joined the Zion movement in 1902-03, together with some 400 African coworkers and converts. Le Roux had been a student of Andrew Murray and was especially interested in Murray's views on divine healing. Le Roux and his followers had become aware of the Zionist movement through Dowie's magazine *Leaves of Healing*. Le Roux invited Dowie to send a representative to South Africa. In 1904, Daniel Bryant was sent by Dowie to South Africa[184] and soon thereafter, Bryant baptized 141 converts at Wakkerstroom, including Le Roux. From the Wakkerstroom group of "Zionists," which grew to 5,000 members by 1905,[185] a whole series of Zionist and similar Pentecostal-type churches eventually

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[183] Anderson and Pillay, "The Segregated Spirit," *Christianity in South Africa*, 229.

[184] B.G.M. Sundkler, *Zulu Zion and Some Swazi Zionists* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 18.

[185] Sundkler, 30.

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emerged.[186] Wakkerstroom was to South African Pentecostal-type churches what the Azusa Street revival was to the worldwide Pentecostal movement.[187]

The theology of the early Pentecostal churches, which include what would become the Apostolic Faith Mission, the Assemblies of God, and the Full Gospel Church of God, was largely determined by white Pentecostal missionaries to South Africa.[188] Their positions remained compatible with the theology of Dowie's Zion church in its principal features of faith healing, exorcism, personal piety, and spiritual revival. The quest for direct spiritual experience and a sense of revival made these early congregations vibrant communities of worship, prayer, and evangelism. By comparison to more staid Christians in the traditional churches, these Christians were ebullient, and their churches grew rapidly.

The Pentecostals, in addition to their Holiness theology, emphasized the baptism of the Spirit as a second experience, the proof of which was the gift of "speaking in tongues." The evidence of being filled with the Spirit was, in

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[186] B.G.M. Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 48.

[187] The continuity between the early Zionist movement and the Pentecostal movement in South Africa is crucial to our understanding of subsequent developments, and it places indigenous Pentecostal-type churches within their historical and theological context. See Sundkler, *Zulu Zion*, 52.

[188] Some of the major players in the early days of Pentecostalism include Thomas Hezmalhalch from the United States, Charles Chawner, Henry and Anna Turney, and Hannah James, who would be instrumental in the formation of the Assemblies of God (AOG) in South Africa. George Bowie and Archibald Cooper, along with Le Roux joined Lake's new Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM) in 1910. Please see Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets*, 48, and *Zulu Zion*, 51-52, and C.P. Watt, *From Africa's Soul: The Story of the Assemblies of God in Southern Africa* (Cape Town: Struik, 1992), 20-1.

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Holiness theology, the sanctified life. In Pentecostalism the evidences were more dramatic.

The Pentecostal movement in South Africa initially grew among the disenfranchised blacks and displaced and marginalized poor white Afrikaners reeling from the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War.[189] The first Pentecostal services in Johannesburg, held in the Zion church in Doornfontein,[190] were racially integrated. The white Pentecostals, however, decided soon after the missionaries arrived to separate the races in baptisms[191], and, like other churches in South Africa at this time, yielded to the pressures of white society to develop segregated churches.

The Pentecostal churches consisting solely of Africans, including the Zion Apostolic Church, initially worked with the white Pentecostals.[192] Although it appears that one of the Zulu Zion leaders, Daniel Nkonyane, may have broken with Le Roux and the Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM) as early as 1910,[193] the earliest clearly recorded secession took place in 1917, when Elias

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[189] C.R. de Wet, "The Apostolic Faith Mission in Africa: 1908-1980: A Case Study in Church Growth in a Segregated Society," (Ph.D. thesis: University of Cape Town, 1989), 39.

[190] Anderson and Pillay, "The Segregated Spirit," *Christianity in South Africa*, 230.

[191] Anderson and Pillay, 230.

[192] Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets*, 48.

[193] Sundkler, *Zulu Zion*, 50-1.

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Mahlangu, who was one of the Wakkerstroom group, broke away from the white-controlled Pentecostals to found the Zion Apostolic Church of South Africa (ZACSA). Out of the Zion Apostolic Church, Edward Motaung's Zion Apostolic Faith Mission (ZAFM) seceded in 1920, and Engenas Lekganyane's Zion Christian Church (ZCC), in turn, seceded from the ZAFM in 1925 and is now one of the largest churches in South Africa.[194]

These African Initiated Churches, particularly of the Pentecostal type, mushroomed from some 30 churches in 1913 to 3,000 in 1970, and to more than 6,000 in 1990.[195] The proportion of the African population who are members of these churches dramatically increased, from 21 percent in 1960 to 30 percent in 1980, and to 46 percent in 1991. Some ten million black Africans are now members of AICs, the majority of those being in the Pentecostal tradition.[196]

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[194]The ZCC puts its official beginning at 1910, which appears to be the year that Lekganyane received his divine call. Anderson and Pillay, "The Segregated Spirit," 231.

[195] Anderson and Pillay, "The Segregated Spirit," 233.

[196] Statistics from Martin West, *Bishops and Prophets in a Black City* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1975), 2; Central Statistical Services, "Summarized Results before Adjustment for Undercount," *Population Census* (Pretoria, 1992), 121-3; A.H. Anderson, *Bazalwane: African Pentecostals in South Africa* (Pretoria Government Printer: Unisa, 1992), 58-9.

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Pentecostals and Racial Segregation:
Acquiescence and Enforced Disengagement, 1904-1955

While most Pentecostals are members of Pentecostal-type AICs, a large

number remain in the interracial Pentecostal mission churches, especially the

Assemblies of God (AOG), the Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM), each with about

a quarter of a million members, and the somewhat smaller Full Gospel Church

of God (FGC).[197] Pentecostal churches have continued to grow in South Africa,

having overcome their pariah image in the white community by successful

evangelistic and healing campaigns.

The Apostolic Faith Mission prospered especially among Africans and

Afrikaans-speaking whites. Among blacks it grew in the early years through the

work and healing of Elias Letwaba.[198] For Afrikaners, much of the growth was

given impetus by the "Central Tabernacle" in Johannesburg, regarded as the

"mother church" of the movement. Le Roux was made president in 1913, when

the AFM was officially registered with the government.

In 1955 G.R. Wessels, a senior pastor in the AFM and its vice president,

became a senator in the Nationalist Party, contributing to a serious schism in the

white church, with liturgical disputes and the academic qualifications for

ministers playing a part. The white AFM, eager to improve its image with the

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[197] Anderson and Pillay, *Segregated Spirit,* 233.

[198] Anderson and Pillay, *Segregated Spirit,* 233.

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Nationalist Party government and the dominant Dutch Reformed Church, dispensed with liturgical practices such as exuberant services with hand-clapping and "dancing in the Spirit," that tended to estrange them from the established white community. They also agreed that pastors were to have formal theological training and a minimum of twelve formal years of schooling. Finally, when Nationalist prime minister J. Strijdom succeeded in removing all Coloured voters from the electoral roll, Wessels firmly upheld government policy. These developments resulted in the white AFM to be identified with and subservient to the apartheid policies of the government.

From the founding of the AFM in 1908, white members determined the constitution, and power was vested in an all-white executive council. One key clause of the policy read that "the baptism of natives shall in future take place after the baptism of white people." A year later, in 1909, the policy was revised again to read, "the baptism of whites, colored, and natives shall be separate."[199] This white council decreed that the nonracial policy with which it began should be changed. The African, Coloured, and Indian sections of the AFM were controlled by a missions department and a missions director appointed by the white church. None of these three sections had any legal standing, and it wasn't until 1991 that all members could become "legal" members of the AFM.

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[199]Harvey Cox, *Fire From Heaven*, 260.

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At this point, the early history of the Pentecostal movement became a severe source of embarrassment for the white South African Pentecostal churches. The more overtly segregationist they became, the more embarrassed they were about their origins in a revival that occurred in a black church in Los Angeles. Revisionist historical accounts were constructed, with F.P. Moller arguing that Charles Parham, and not William Seymour, was the founder of the Pentecostal movement in the United States.

As the apartheid regime came under increased pressure to reform in the 1980s during the spiral of involvement and the changing political context, the AFM also had to reevaluate its theological orientation in a changing religious context. In 1985 the white Executive Council called the three other sections together to discuss the future of the AFM. A proposed Document of Intent declared that the AFM "accepts the Biblical principles of unity...rejects the system of apartheid based on racial discrimination as a principle in the Kingdom of God and within the structure of the Church [and]...accepts the principle that the Church should operate as a single structural unit..."[200] By June 1986 the Declaration had been approved by the four racially distinct Workers' Councils and a committee was appointed to work toward unity. But soon it became apparent that the majority of white AFM members interpreted "unity" to mean "equality" before God in separate Church structures. After a series of

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[200] Anderson and Pillay, *Segregated Spirit,* 234.

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negotiations the three black sections combined to form the Apostolic Faith Mission, Composite Division. In 1991 the Workers' Council of the white church accepted the new umbrella constitution, with the two sections of the AFM. So while the white churches remained separate, it was the first time in history that blacks were viewed as legal members. There are two presidents of the AFM. In 1993, Frank Chikane was elected by the Composite Division of the church, and Isak Burger by the all-white section or Single Division. Finally, in 1995, the Single Division accepted the constitution for a united AFM, and unity was finally achieved within the AFM.

The second of the major Pentecostal mission churches, the Full Gospel Church of God, has more English-speaking members than the AFM and a large Indian constituency.[201] It began with the arrival, in 1910, of the North American missionary George Bowie, sent by the Bethel Pentecostal Mission of Newark, New Jersey, and soon joined other missionaries, most notably Archibald Cooper, who immigrated to South Africa from England in 1902.

The FGC's work among the black population was largely dependent upon financial assistance from the Bethel Pentecostal Assembly in the United States, but by 1936, due to devastating effects of the Depression, financial support dried up, and the mission to the black population suffered greatly.

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[201] Anderson relies on an unpublished document by I.G.Lemmer du Plessis on historical data about the FGC, 235.

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Several unsuccessful attempts have been made by the white sections to unite the FGC and the AFM. However, union has floundered around several issues, including the mode of baptism (the AFM practices a threefold immersion and the FGC a single immersion), and language, in which the English-speakers in the FGC feared that a united church would be dominated by the Afrikaner majority among the whites.

Another attempt at unity was initiated in 1975. However, the AFM leadership did not consult nonwhite ethnic and racial groups. In the case of the FGC, the two major groups excluded from the process of unification were the Indian and black constituents, who form more than 80 percent of the FGC's members. Moreover, blacks were inadequately represented due to academic and theological qualifications required for membership and leadership and the concurrent denial of access to education to blacks. At present, the FGC and AFM remain as separate church bodies.

The Assemblies of God, the third major Pentecostal mission church, originally was a church of blacks only, though, as usual, under white control. In 1925, various missionaries from North America and Europe were organized into the South African District of the Assemblies of God in America.[202] The AOG is unique among Pentecostal churches in South Africa in that provisions were made for black leadership and complete autonomy. In 1938, Nicholas Bhengu,

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[202]Anderson and Pillay, *Segregated Spirit,* 237. Additional information about the history of the Assembly of God churches is the result of an interview with the General Secretary of the Assembly of God churches in southern Africa, Colin la Foy, October 2001.

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a local religious leader, joined the movement with his associates Alfred Gumede and Gideon Buthelezi. The leadership provided by these men set the stage for future participation of black leaders in the AOG.

A leading figure in the church, James Mullan, a white, moved to Port Elizabeth in 1944, followed a year later by Bhengu. The revival that followed Bhengu's ministry, first in Port Elizabeth, but especially in East London, lasted until the late 1950s and resulted in the AOG becoming the fastest-growing Pentecostal church at that time, particularly among black South Africans. In 1950, Bhengu launched the "Back to God Crusade," an evangelistic and church planting body that developed independently of white missionary efforts. The black churches that sprang up from this movement soon constituted the majority in the AOG. Additionally, they were autonomous, self-governing, self-supporting, and especially self-propagating. Inevitably, conflicts arose, especially with regard to what many perceived as Bhengu's autocratic leadership style. James Mullan supported Bhengu's efforts and his leadership within the AOG against the white missionaries. Finally, in 1964, a group of black leaders and missionaries associated with the AOG in the United States withdrew from the AOG in South Africa to form the International Assemblies of God (IAG).

The AOG withdrew from the Fellowship of Pentecostal churches to which the AFM and FGC belonged because of dissatisfaction with the

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conservative stance of the other Pentecostal churches.[203] The AOG was not

divided into "mother" (white) and "daughter" (black) churches. It was a black

church before any white congregations were formed.[204]

The various AOG groups are mostly divided along racial lines, reflecting

the divisions in South African society. The Coloured and Indian churches make

up the overwhelming majority of the group commonly referred to as the

Assemblies of God Association.[205] The white churches, generally known as

"the Group" are led by John Bond.

The New Pentecostals: From Enforced Disengagement to Activism

In the 1950s, two prominent North American Pentecostal evangelists

visited South Africa. First came William Branham, who stunned many whites

with his revelations and miracles. Next came Oral Roberts, whose large tent

meetings set a standard for evangelists of all races for years to come. Tent

crusades have since been an integral part of South African Pentecostalism,

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[203] Anderson, p. 237. As indicated above, information here was verified in an interview with La Foy, October, 2001.

[204] C.P. Watt, *From Africa's Soil: The Story of the Assemblies of God in South Africa* (Cape Town: Struik, 1992), 22.

[205] Watt, 57. Since 1991, the Assemblies of God Association is also known as the Assembly of God Churches in Southern Africa, as obtained from a series of interviews with Colin la Foy, General Secretary, October 2001.

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Nicholas Bhengu and Richard Ngidi (of the AFM) using them with particular effectiveness in black communities.

Many others joined new Charismatic or "Neo-Pentecostal" churches, especially those in the International Fellowship of Christian Churches (IFCC), founded in 1985 and led by Edmund Roebert of the Hatfield Christian Church in Pretoria and Ray McCauley of the Rhema Bible Church in Johannesburg. These churches, which grew rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly among whites, are strongly influenced by megachurches in the United States. The Hatfield church, originally a Baptist church, has some five thousand members, and the Rhema church, modeled after an independent Pentecostal church of the same name in Tulsa, Oklahoma, has more than ten thousand members. These IFCC churches are now among the largest churches in South Africa. In 1992, a controversy erupted over the decision within the IFCC leadership to become observer members at the South African Council of Churches. White conservatives in the group blasted the decision as an "unholy alliance" with liberals. Some left the IFCC as a result.[206]

As has been discussed above, Pentecostals quickly acquiesced to apartheid structures, even as early as the founding of the Pentecostal movement in 1908. However, some Africans within the Pentecostal mission churches did struggle against apartheid, most notably former secretary of the SACC and

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[206] Anderson, *Segregated Spirit*, 237.

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President of the AFM's Composite Division, Frank Chikane. Despite his activism, Chikane considered himself a Pentecostal in every sense of the word.[207] As a young man, he was very active in the AFM church and at university, he followed Cyril Ramaphosa's steps as chairman of the radical Student Christian Movement. During his training to become an AFM pastor, he became involved in a community project to alleviate the suffering of black people in Kagiso. Between 1977 and 1982 he was detained four times by the police. While never convicted of a crime, he was tortured, and on one occasion, a white deacon of the AFM participated in this activity with police.[208] In 1980 was ordained an AFM pastor, on the condition that he not participate in politics. His continued involvement in the freedom struggle and community projects got him into trouble with the AFM leadership. In 1981 he was suspended by the West Rand district council, on the grounds that he had broken conditions of his ordination. His suspension was finally lifted in 1990. Almost immediately thereafter he was appointed an adviser to the new AFM Composite Division and helped oversee the unification of the African, Coloured and Indian sections of the AFM. Finally, he was elected president of this new division in 1993.

The South African Pentecostal tradition acquiesced in the social system of apartheid. However, part of the roots of acquiescence can be found in the

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[207] Frank Chikane, *No Life of My Own* (Braamfontein: Skotaville, 1988), 49.

[208] Anderson. *Segregated Spirit*, p. 237. For one recounting of Chikane's torture, please see David Goodman, *Fault Lines in the New South Africa*, 3-5.

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roots of an antithetical church tradition stemming from the Methodist and, particularly, Holiness movements. As blacks were denied basic human rights in the very churches where they had found "freedom" in the spirit, many African Pentecostals withdrew to African Independent Churches and retained their intense subjective religious experience. As a church type, they remained otherworldly, and instead identified themselves as excluded from mainsteam structures, forming highly interactive social networks with frequent meetings and gatherings. As an institution, Pentecostals are autonomous, leadership is decentralized, and decision-making is often by consensus marked by spontaneity and responding to pressing life issues such as health, safety, and shelter. The Pentecostals' ability to walk with the least, last, and lost has now placed the Pentecostals in South Africa, and arguably, worldwide, as the next major Christian family in the history of Christendom.

The South African Council of Churches: Branches Speaking for the Voiceless

The SACC: Alternative Transformationist, Extensive, and Consensual/Autonomous

When the South African Council of Churches entered the legitimacy debates of the 1980s, resulting in the SACC's declaration that the South African state was illegitimate, many observers considered this to be a "radical" church statement with no historical precedent. However, the decision of the churches to take up this debate did not occur in a vacuum. There were several periods in

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modern South African history, beginning with the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, in which the government was challenged by liberationist organizations. Many of these organizations were faith-based in their origins and were led by religious leaders. The struggle against apartheid has maintained a theological and political dimension. The fusion of an *alternative transformationist* theological tradition combined with a strong sense of social and political justice has been expressed as the *prophetic* voice in South Africa.

Many of the early leaders of the African National Congress were also leaders and ministers in their churches. The first president of the African National Congress, John Dube, was also a clergyman, as were four members of the executive committee. The ANC based much of its political demands on contextual theology and values. After decades of struggle, the SACC in the 1980s was in a position to be the voice of the voiceless in the escalating spiral of involvement as the legitimacy of the state eroded from within and without.

Early Signs of Prophetic Christianity

Signs of prophetic Christianity emerged in the early twentieth century as South Africa's black political culture began to articulate a vision of a just, non-racial society. Several ideological influences converged in the early decades of the twentieth century to support this evolving political culture.[209] Traditions among the Bantu-speaking peoples emphasized communal values and equality, particularly a commitment to an equitable distribution of rights and land usage. As the Reverend Malusi Mpumlwana wrote: "A human being is a human being because others are."[210] Additionally, the efforts of civil rights efforts in the United States were sources of inspiration, as many black South Africans came to deeply respect African-American leaders such as Frederick Douglass, Booker T. Washington, and W.E.B. DuBois. A handful of South African blacks attended historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) in the United States and some of them returned home to assume key leadership positions in the ANC. Marxist political thought, with its explicit emphasis on class analysis, further bolstered Africans and their growing case against apartheid.

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[209]Peter Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).

[210] Malusi Mpumlwana, "The Contextualization of Rights in South Africa: Is there a Unique Local Character to Rights?" in *Monitor* (Port Elizabeth), Special Edition, "Human Rights in South Africa, 1988," 1989: 91.

The NGK was one of the key actors in developing the ideology and theology of apartheid. The English-speaking, mainline Protestant churches failed to offer a prophetic, alternative voice. While they came to increasingly condemn apartheid at annual conferences and in pastoral letters, in practice, these churches were part of the racially oppressive system. In this regard, they were accommodationist in their theological orientation. Many church leaders tried to work with the NP and other political, social, and cultural structures to encourage reform from within. In 1957, for instance, the Roman Catholic bishops told their flocks that apartheid was "a blasphemy to attribute to God the sins against charity and justice which are the necessary accompaniment of apartheid." While this was a ringing declaration, it wasn't until 1979 that Catholic seminaries were integrated, and that only happened when the white majority bishops were confronted by black seminarians and priests, who were a small minority in a church membership that was overwhelmingly (80 percent) black.[211]

Among African political leaders there was a strong reactive response to racist measures such as the colour-bar clause of the South Africa Act (1909), and the territorial segregation of the Natives Land Act (1913).[212] Protest efforts focused on the color bar clauses of the constitution and the failure to extend a nonwhite franchise to the other three provinces. Africans tried to influence the

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[211]Peter Walshe, *Church versus State in South Africa: The Case of the Christian Institute* (London: Hurst and Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1983), 76-8 and 210-11.

[212] Peter Walshe, "Christianity and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle: The Prophetic Voice within Divided Churches," *Christianity in South Africa*, 383.

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delegates through letters and petitions, all to no avail. These failures were the

impetus for leaders to gather and form a union-wide South African Native

Convention (SANC) in Bloemfontein in March, 1909, comprised of sixty

elected delegates from the four colonies. The formation of the SANC was a

seminal event in the emergence of black resistance politics, because it was the

first occasion on which African political leaders and their newly formed political

associations in the four colonies formally cooperated.[213] This first step was the

movement towards the formation of a permanent national African political

organization. In 1912, the South African Native National Congress (SANNC),

which in 1925 became the African National Congress (ANC), was formed,

which set the stage for resistance on a national scale.[214]

The Hertzog Bills: 1932-1936 and the Evolving
Situation of Conflictual Resistance

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the privileged position of whites was

further entrenched with the passage of the Hertzog Bills. The legislation was

two-pronged, covering both political rights and land issues. Politically, the

Representation of Natives Act abolished the Cape common voters roll, creating

instead a separate roll on which Africans could elect three whites to represent

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[213] Andre Odendaal, *Black Resistance Politics in South Africa to 1912* (Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1984), 168.

[214] Francis Meli, *A History of the ANC: South Africa Belongs to Us* (London: James Curry, 1988), 34.

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them in the House of Assembly and four whites in the Senate. The second

statute, the Native Trust and Land Act, marginally increased the amount of land

allocated for Africans in their so-called "Native Reserves," while prohibiting

them from purchasing land outside these areas. It also included a repressive

labor section, which resulted in forcing African squatters from white-owned

land and driving them into the cities, where they became cheap labor for the

white-owned economy.[215]

In response to these draconian measures, in 1936, the All African

Convention (AAC), a united-front organization, which included the ANC,

protested against the Representation of Natives Act and its destruction of the

Cape common voters roll. The government soundly opposed any reforms

offered by the Convention.

The Birth of the SACC

Another organization that began as a response to the Hertzog Bills was

the formation of the Christian Council of South Africa (CCSA). This

organization was formed to unify the various missionary societies working in

the region. This organization would eventually include a wide range of

denominations and faith traditions. The result of this collaboration would result

in this organization becoming the South African Council of Churches.

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[215] Borer, *Challenging the State*, 27.

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Even after this resounding rejection of African political representation, the emerging protest movement continued using peaceful tactics, including consultations with white authorities and cooperation with the new system of representation. However, there were indications that Africans were becoming increasingly frustrated and disillusioned about the possibility of any meaningful change. This resulted in a reevaluation of tactics by the ANC, which eventually led to accepting the futility of relying exclusively on appeals to the morality of whites and traditional pressure group politics, and a "determination...to prepare a position of strength from which non-racial justice could be wrung from the white power structure."[216] The subtle shift from challenging specific statutes to contesting the legitimacy of the state had begun. This shift marked a more overt alternative transformationist platform for new ideas to emerge and take root in the ANC and other prophetic movements.

Although restricted to noncombatant roles, thousands of blacks served South Africa in World War II. Having taken part in freeing Europe from the clutches of Nazi Germany, blacks increasingly demanded the same liberation for themselves. They became more adamant in their demands for representation in all governing bodies, recognition of their trade unions, abolition of passes, better educational opportunities, and the repeal of discriminatory legislation.[217]

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[216] Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism*, 129.

[217] Borer, *Challenging the State*, 28.

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Moreover, the ANC continued to press the increasing widespread human rights abuses and overall legitimacy of the state.

Specifically, the ANC drew upon claims and clauses from the Atlantic Charter of 1941 to make the case the "self determination clause" stated that "They (the United States and the United Kingdom) respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."[218] The result was a 1943 document entitled *African Claims in South Africa* and an accompanying Bill of Rights.

Prime Minister Smuts, upon reading the document, declared it propagandist and refused to discuss it with any ANC member. He declared that it had totally misinterpreted the Atlantic Charter and had stretched its meaning. With this pronouncement, and after three decades of fruitless working within the system, a frustrated and humiliated ANC moved toward a tactical position that would lead to acts of civil disobedience.

Apartheid: The Transition from Conflictual Resistance to Enforced Disengagement for the SACC

Playing on Afrikaner fears of the looming "black peril," and displacing the more accomodationist measures of earlier prime ministers, the National

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[218] The Committee on Africa, the War, and Peace Aims, *The Atlantic Charter and Africa from an American Standpoint* (New York: Phelps-Stokes Fund, 1942), 35.

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Party came to power in 1948. The theology of apartheid began to be implemented at the highest levels of government and called for a systematic program of social engineering in every aspect of life: physical, political, cultural, social, economic, and religious separation.[219]

An example of the implementation of vertical apartheid was the removal of the Hertzog legislation. That legislation, while token in its function, at least allowed for minor representation. The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 abolished this legislation. Instead, only African-friendly representatives would be chosen, by the government, to represent their respective homelands. The ANC resoundingly denounced this legislation and called it a divide-and-conquer strategy meant to pit different ethnic groups against one another.

The Branches Spread: The Growth of the Liberation Movement and the SACC

Following the National Party victory and the advent of apartheid, all hope for reform through traditional legal tactics steadily evaporated. Indeed, the ANC responded immediately with the adoption of committing itself to acts of civil disobedience. Some Congress Youth Leaguers were prepared to go even further, talking of "creating a revolutionary national front."[220] The *African Claims* document included a statement of long-term goals, which were national

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[219] Thompson, *History of South Africa,* 189.

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freedom, political independence, and self-determination. Short-term goals

included the abolition of all differential political institutions, and the means for

achieving these ends included boycotting these institutions, strikes, and "a

national stoppage of work in protest of the reactionary policy of the

government."[221]

The Defiance Campaign of 1952 marked the ANC's first attempt, in

alliance with the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) to implement and build

a mass movement.[222] The ANC and its allies offered non-violent resistance to

apartheid's deepening public policy measures. On the economic front, the

resistance movement also strove against the economic interests that sustained

apartheid's political structures, which included rejecting migratory labor, calling

for the recognition of black trade unions. Most significantly, however, was the

gradual buildup of organized strikes and boycotts that would come to cripple

South Africa's economic structures by the mid-1980s, at the height of the state

of emergency.

In the face of an increasingly repressive regime, religious elites in the

SACC were becoming more aware that some response on their part, for the sake

of interpreting the situation theologically for their constituency, was necessary.

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[220] The *African Claims* document challenged the "qualified" claims of rights articulated in the 1920s and insisted for full rights. See KCII: 103.

[221] "Programme of Action," Statement of Policy adopted at the ANC Annual Conference, December 1949, KCII: 337-338.

[222] Borer, *Challenging the State*, 33.

The reaction of the leaders in the SACC was conditioned by their theology, which came to be known as the alternative transformationist theological tradition, or prophetic Christianity. Moreover, the extensive nature of the SACC organizationally, that is, the broad and inclusive nature of inviting a wide range of churches, church denominations, and faith communities deepened the broad-based support for the liberationist movement. Finally, the SACC is unique amongst the three religious traditions in that the SACC has a semi-autonomous administrative leadership that is not held as accountable to any given denomination, church, or doctrinal guidelines. This characteristic enabled the SACC leadership to take more radical stands on the legitimacy question than any given member in the SACC.

In the Wilderness:
The Origins of Contextual Theology, 1960-1980

The leadership of the SACC did not suddenly begin discussing the need to actively work for a more just society in South Africa, which reached center stage in the 1980s. Certain elements within the SACC were nurtured and embedded in the decades prior to the 1980s. At least four sources of early influences found their way into the SACC.

The SACC, along with many other clergy around the world, were profoundly influenced by the teachings emanating from the Second Vatican Council, as well as other, post-conciliar, Vatican statements issued in the 1960s.[223] Several important concepts were espoused in the documents from Vatican II. One was the insistence of an obligation of international social justice, as well as of national social justice, and that social justice could not be achieved until the gap between the developed and the undeveloped was narrowed.[224] Another important concept, which came from Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, held that Catholics had a Christian responsibility to learn from the world, involve themselves in the problems of society, and work to overcome them.[225] These documents were watershed documents for the Catholic church, for they contained in them the seeds from which grew a new class of theology known as liberation theology, of which South African prophetic, or contextual, theology came to be the South African expression of this alternative transformationist theological expression.

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[223] George P. Schner, ed., *The Church Renewed: The Documents of Vatican II Reconsidered* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), 85.

[224] Specifically, parts of the *Vatican II* document treated the issue of equality by stating that "every civil authority must strive to promote the common good in the interest of all, without favoring any individual citizen or category of citizen." See Christopher Hollis, *The Achievements of Vatican II* (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1967), 91 and John de Gruchy, "Democracy and the Church," IDASA Occasional Paper No. 5, 1987, 4.

[225] Borer, *Challenging the State,* 1998, 85.

Two themes emerged that are often identified as watershed markers were the "preferential option for the poor" and the ecclesial idea of a "pilgrim people of God."[226] According to these documents, wherever fundamental rights of humanity were at stake, the church had the right and the duty "of passing moral judgment even in matters relating to politics."[227]

The Christian Institute

The second landmark in the development of a grassroots prophetic theology in South Africa was the creation of the Christian Institute[228] in 1963 by the Reverend Beyers Naude, a minister of the NGK. Naude was later to be barred from membership in the NGK because of his religious and political convictions. The Institute was founded in the aftermath of the Cottesloe Consultation, convened by the World Council of Churches and its South African members in Johannesburg, 1960. One result of the Consultation, formed to examine the responsibility of the churches in the post-Sharpeville context of mounting unrest and repression, was a division within the NGK and between the

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[226] Michael Stogre, "Commentary on the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World: Gaudium et Spes," in Schner, *The Church Renewed*, 20. The church's commitment to working for social justice was further developed in the document's third chapter, "Economic and Social Life." It contained the recognition that world social, economic, and political structures, rather than affirming the dignity of the person, denied it. Thus, the document stressed that the church as the People of God had the duty to transform these structures.

[227] Stogre, "Commentary on the Pastoral Constitution," 27-29.

[228] Walshe, *Church versus State in South Africa,* and de Gruchy, *The Church Struggle in South Africa*, 89.

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NGK and the other churches, prompting the withdrawal of the NGK from the SACC and the WCC. The conflict was sparked by the final statement of the Consultation, which was critical of apartheid.

Because of the failure of the NGK to stand by the Cottesloe resolutions, Naude took a prophetic stance, establishing the Christian Institute as a nonracial ecumenical organization dedicated at first to converting the Afrikaner establishment. Proving unsuccessful at this goal, the Institute moved in a new direction in the 1970s, towards a deeper relation with black political leaders and black theologians. The new ideas endorsed by the Institute included the belief that Christians should identify with the poor, seeking a redistribution of power in society through supporting widespread participation in decision-making structures. Moreover, the Institute had also grasped the crucial difference between working *for* the oppressed to working *with* them, and concluded that liberation had to be a black initiative, with assistance from whites.

Black Theology

A third influence was the development of Black theology. Black theology, according to one of its most prominent observers, is the theological reflection of black Christians on the situation in which they live and their struggle for liberation.[229] The ideas propagated by black theologians matured

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[229] Allan Boesak, *Farewell to Innocence: A Socio-Ethical Study on Black Theology and Power* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1977), 1.

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throughout the 1970s and continued to evolve within the larger movement of contextual theology of the 1980s. The first phase can be traced to the early days of the South African black consciousness movement that was primarily concerned with bringing an *awareness* of the black situation to black people.[230] However, at the beginning, the BCM embraced a strategy of exclusivism, and the multiracial approach of English-speaking churches was viewed as superficial. Moreover, black consciousness leaders such as Steve Biko lambasted the Christianity practiced by most whites as being hypocritical and irrelevant to the lives of most blacks.

After the tragedy of Soweto in 1976, the preparatory stage to action—awareness and consciousness—was over, and it was replaced by a more radical theology of power. Whereas the first phase was mute of theological reflections on such topics as action, violence, change, and revolution, this second phase confronted these issues head-on by focusing on issues of black power and political liberation.

The Institute for Contextual Theology

The Institute for Contextual Theology (ICT) was formed in 1981, from veterans of the Christian Institute and black theologians. The Christian Institute, although banned in 1977 by the South African government, found refuge within

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[230] Borer, *Challenging the State*, 91.

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institutional structures of the SACC. The Institute was formed with the specific

goal of "contributing towards a theological base for the realization of a new

society for South Africa" as well as the political goal of preparing for a

participatory democracy in a liberated South Africa.[231] What were the

theological ideas underpinning contextual theology? According to its own

definition, contextual theology is the conscious attempt to "do theology from

within the context of real life in the world."[232] Although the definition is broad,

the key point is that theology must evolve out of particular context, or life

situation. Two specific themes are drawn from the bible: liberation and the

teachings of the prophets, which are the components of prophetic theology.[233]

Hence, contextual theology is often referred to as prophetic theology. The task

of contextual theology is to read and interpret the signs of the current time in

light of gospel teachings. The signs themselves are human events, and the

process of reading these signs is that of discovering the religious significance of

public events, by "discerning and relating them to God."[234]

Contextualizing the gospel in South Africa meant to take up the theme of

liberation, and several liberation themes in the bible are stressed. Social and

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[231] ICT Annual Report, 1983, 1.

[232] ICT Annual Report, 1983, 1.

[233] Albert Nolan, *God in South Africa: The Challenge of the Gospel* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1988), 1.

[234] ICT Annual Report, 1.

political oppression is interpreted in light of the bible, the most quoted being that of Exodus, which can be described as one of political liberation. Additionally, Jesus' liberating mission is seen as towards the oppressed, the blind, the downtrodden. When read from the perspective of the poor and voiceless, the bible is read as a book *of* the oppressed *for* the oppressed.

With all these influences operating in the religious landscape in the 1960s and 1970s, the SACC increasingly acted as a prophetic catalyst and provided the moral fuel and staying power for a non-violent resistance effort in the 1980s, even in the face of increased political repression and persecution. These resistance efforts had their most effective punch with the mobilization and organization of a large black labor force, upon which the apartheid regime was dependent. Additionally, non-violent resistant efforts had learned from the past, and the SACC was able to instill discipline and curb armed resistance[235], which had most likely led to the demise of non-violent resistance like the Defiance Campaign in the 1950s.

An important concurrent dynamic on the South African landscape was the development of embedded, grassroots black labor resistance movements that came to bring the apartheid regime to crisis point in the 1980s. A key integral component of the prophetic voice is walking with the poor, the voiceless, the

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[235] D. Smuts and S. Westcott, eds., *The Purple Shall Govern: A South African A to Z of Nonviolent Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 68.

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least, last, and lost. As the black labor resistance movement gained momentum, their voice was "heard" in the 1980s.

Black Labor Resistance Efforts, 1960-1990

Non-violent resistance can be defined as a conflict behavior consisting of unconventional acts implemented for purposive change without intentional damage to persons or property.[236] Non-violent resistance includes boycotts, sit-ins, occupations, demonstrations, refusal to pay taxes, creation of alternative and parallel institutions, and other forms of civil disobedience.

Evidence suggests that the armed struggle may have actually harmed the anti-apartheid movement.[237] The bombing campaign by the ANC's armed wing, Umkonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), in the early 1960s seriously affected simultaneous non-violent campaigns, as the government linked the two and used this propaganda to justify their increased repression.[238] Additionally, although the ANC explicitly directed their campaign towards property, a number of trained attackers used explosives on the homes of pro-government blacks, killing several people, including children. These acts fueled "justified"

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[236] Stephen Zunes, "The Role of Non-Violent Action in the Downfall of Apartheid," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37, 1 (1999): 138.

[237] Zunes, 139.

[238] Zunes, 150.

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governmental repression, and even caused waning of support from black Aficans as well.[239]

In addition to failed armed resistance efforts by the ANC in the 1960s and further solidification of apartheid's structures of control in the 1960s and early 1970s, the ANC and other resistance organizations began in the early 1980s to seriously question whether armed struggle would be successful. Many South Africans also questioned whether they were willing to subject their country to the mass murder, ecocide and rampant devastation that had occurred in Vietnam. Unlike the Vietnamese, the South African revolutionaries did not have terrain favorable to guerilla warfare, nor would their opponent have been in unfamiliar territory, far from supply lines.[240] Even had the blacks won, they would have suffered potentially millions dead and a ravaged country. Finally, white South Africans would have fought, not to protect colonial interests, but to protect their own livelihood, since their ancestors had lived there for generations. Most Afrikaners, considered by many observers unique in Africa as a "white settler colony" could trace their ancestry back at least two and a half centuries—and would have no place to go.[241] The logic in the decision to move from armed resistance to unarmed, non-violent resistance became evident by the

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[239] Zunes, 140.

[240] Richard Leonard, "Mobilizing for Total War," *Southern Africa* (1981): 20.

[241] Zunes, 143.

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1980s, and was born, to a large extent, out of necessity.[242] That necessity, supported by the legacy of non-violent resistant challenges from the SACC, would form the prophetic voice to sustain the movement to bring on apartheid's demise.

A major factor in the revitalization of the South African resistance was the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), which was launched in the early 1970s. As has been noted, the BCM stressed self-reliance and non-violent resistance.[243] The late BCM leader Steve Biko and others stressed the need for non-violence, and criticized the PAC's "reckless rush to confrontation when circumstance did not favor a black victory."[244]

The rise of labor strikes in the early 1970s was one of the important trends towards successful utilization of non-violent resistance. The 1973 strikes in the Durban area demonstrated just how vulnerable crucial sectors of the South African economy was to resistance by black workers. The strike spread throughout Natal and beyond and by March 1973, 150 firms were on strike. The strikes paved the way to empowering the black population by demonstrating that massive political strikes could succeed.[245]

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[242] Walter Wink, *Violence and Nonviolence in South Africa: Jesus' Third Way* (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1987), 80-1.

[243] Gail Gerhart, *Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 285-6.

[244] Gerhart, *Black Power*, 285.

[245] Thomas Karis, "Black Politics: The Road to Revolution," in Mark A. Uhlig, ed., *Apartheid in Crisis* (New York: Vantage Books, 1986), 128.

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A steady increase in strikes ensued in the 1970s, and by 1982, over 1,000 black workers were striking every day, a number that continued to climb in subsequent years. Yet another significant development was the increasing community support for striking workers, which first became apparent during the 1979-80 strike in the Western Cape. Consumer boycotts forced major concessions by employers during that period. Boycotts continued with increasing frequency in the 1980s. These strikes and boycotts mobilized large numbers of blacks, upon which the apartheid economy was dependent.[246] They evolved into long-term, mass-based structures of change across the country, not just in the workplace but in the community as well. A particularly good example of this phenomenon was the Sarmcol strike in Natal in 1985, where, following the firing of striking rubber factory workers, the entire region mobilized to raise funds, to protest, and to engage in a one-day stayaway and boycott white businesses.[247]

The nationwide two-day general strike in 1984, the largest of its kind in South African history up to that point, terrified the government, and many observers see it, along with the government crackdown that followed, as the final push that brought the apartheid regime to the negotiating table.[248] However, before this point was reached, the South African government

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[246] Julie Frederickse, *South Africa: A Different Kind of War, From Soweto to Pretoria* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), 186.

[247] Smuts and Westcott, *The Purple Shall Govern*, 128-9.

[248] Zunes, "The Downfall of Apartheid, 155.

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increased political repression and treated non-violent resistance as the equivalent

of violence.[249] Initially, the comprehensiveness and severity of the restrictions

hampered non-violent resistance efforts. For example, merely stating opposition

to military conscription, participating in a non-violent demonstration, criticizing

the government or any government official or advocating a boycott, could land

someone in prison for up to ten years.[250]

The SACC Enters the Spiral of Involvement, 1980-1989:
Confrontational Enforced Disengagement

Three characteristics of the political context set the 1980s apart from any

preceding time. The first was the intensity of non-violent resistance to the

government, with the diffusion of protest throughout all aspects of black South

African society. The uprisings of the 1980s were "more radical, more

widespread, and more sustained than anything witnessed in modern South

African history."[251] Second, the 1980s were marked by an organizational

sophistication of non-violent resistance that was unprecedented. The explosion

of grass-roots organizations and their embrace of "alliance politics"[252] laid the

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[249] Wink, *Violence and Nonviolence in South Africa*, 79.

[250] Wink, 79-80.

[251] Robert M. Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 152.

[252] Borer, *Challenging the State*, 51.

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foundation for a nationwide liberation movement that the government could not fully control nor extinguish. And third, the 1980s were characterized by extreme repressive measures by the South African government.

The SACC responded to these characteristics and were drawn into a "spiral of involvement." Broken down into three interrelated processes, the spiral included three components: The first was being jarred into action. The sheer level of repression shocked the SACC into examining the roles they needed to play in ending this brutality. Seeing that the state intended to continue in its repression, the SACC concluded that it had to move into an overtly political stance. Second, the SACC found itself in a growing church/state conflict, in the form of state reaction against church leaders and counter-reaction by the SACC. The final component is church leaders increasingly became the "voice of the voiceless." As civil society was all but stamped out, the SACC asserted itself as the leading prophetic voice of liberation.

Therefore, alongside the developments of the black labor movement, it was in the 1980s that the churches became increasingly outspoken, not just in speaking out against apartheid as a sin, but in organizing protests in open defiance of apartheid and engaging in non-violent resistance. Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu, who won the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize for his anti-apartheid activism, led the SACC, which represented twenty-two of the nation's leading denominations, in ongoing resistance. The SACC adopted the "Lusaka Statement" in July 1987 that openly questioned the legitimacy of the white

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minority government, and called on member churches and their congregations to question their moral obligation to obey apartheid laws.[253] The SACC openly supported the rent boycott, tax resistance, conscientious objection to military service and registering births outside of the official race-based system. In addition, individual churches became sanctuaries for squatters whose homes had been demolished and for those sought by the authorities; churches also became centers for meetings and offices for anti-apartheid groups.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the government under P.W. Botha was beginning to realize that the system of apartheid, as it had been pragmatically assembled after 1948, was no longer viable. Apartheid's structures were coming under increasing pressure and continued producing repressive and reformative responses. This Reform/Repression approach, also known as "Winning the Hearts and Minds" or WHAM, was designed to implement managed change while keeping political expectations within reasonable limits.[254] As this strategy proved unsuccessful, the government increasingly abandoned the pretense of the rule of law and relied more heavily on force. By the mid-1980s, the apartheid regime escalated its attempts to crush the non-violent resistance effort.

Several incidents are worth mentioning to substantiate this argument. In the first few years of the 1980s, the primary target of the state was Bishop

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[253] Smuts and Westcott, 35-6.

[254] Borer, *Challenging the State*, 45.

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Desmond Tutu, then the Secretary General of the SACC, and the Reverend Allan Boesak. Both were longstanding and vocal opponents of apartheid. Bishop Tutu angered the government by issuing cautious statements calling for "economic pressures" (the word "sanctions" was far from being used at this point) to promote political change in South Africa.[255] A second event that served to politicize the SACC was its 1982 conference resolution, which declared that apartheid was not simply a sociopolitical order but must also be seen as a theological issue that was in complete contradiction of the gospel, and was therefore a heresy.[256] This had immediate political ramifications for the SACC, which resulted in an "investigation" into SACC finances, which evolved into a four-year campaign against the Council. Known as the Eloff Commission, this diversionary tactic by the government drew worldwide attention.

The political situation took a turn for the worse when the apartheid regime imposed a state of emergency in 1985, which was renewed and widened in June 1986 and yet again in 1987. As a result of these highly repressive measures, the SACC now fully mobilized to confront the state head on. The SACC sanctioned and planned acts of civil disobedience.[257]

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[255] Borer, 52.

[256] Borer, 54.

[257] Borer, 61.

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On February 24, 1988, the South African political situation took another dramatic turn for the worse when the Minister of Law and Order banned seventeen anti-apartheid organizations and eighteen individuals. These measures represented the largest clampdown on legal protests and civil rights movements in the history of South Africa. With this final attempt at crushing opposition and civil society, the SACC, along with other church actors, emerged as the only viable organizations able to generate further resistance.

After a series of emergency meetings, on February 29, 1988, twenty-five church leaders, accompanied by more than a hundred clergy and several hundred lay Christians, held a short service in the Anglican Cathedral, which adjoined Parliament. As the protesters left the cathedral, they were confronted by the police. The three hundred marchers kneeled, and the church leaders were arrested and forcibly removed to a police station and detained. This police action shocked the country and garnered international attention. In a press conference held after their release, the SACC and other church leaders fully acknowledged that they were now the "voice of the voiceless."

The South African government continued to attempt crackdowns. One week after the February bannings, the government implemented and passed the Promotion of Orderly Internal Politics in an attempt to restrict foreign funding to any anti-apartheid organization. As a result of these actions, the SACC led the effort to launch the Standing for Truth Campaign. The state responded again, this time with armed violence. The SACC headquarters, Khotso ("Peace")

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House was bombed. No arrests were made. The government responded by claiming that the SACC headquarters had been blown up "in error" by "ANC terrorists."[258]

In the final set of events, the SACC launched the Mass Democratic Defiance Campaign on August 2, 1989, a struggle directed at the upcoming September elections for the tricameral parliament. The Standing for the Truth Campaign (SFT) declared that the role of the church is to create peace, but on the road to negotiations, reconciliation and peace, it will be necessary to confront, pressurize, and defy."[259]

The police continued to detain, arrest and persecute church leaders and lay Christians. However, the force of non-violent resistance proved too great for the state. On September 13, church leaders led a "Peace March" in Cape Town. It was the largest march since the one led by the ANC and the PAC in 1960. Within weeks, similar protests were held nationwide, with ANC flags being openly displayed. Three weeks after the "Peace March" over 350,000 people had participated in marches. Organizations and repressed civil society structures "unbanned"[260] themselves. Finally, a month later, eight top ANC leaders were released from prison with the quintessential symbol of the resistance movement released about four months later—Nelson Mandela. The state finally came to the negotiating table in 1990, which culminated in the elections of 1994.

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[258] Borer, 76.

[259] Borer, 77; ICT Annual Report, 10.

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Conclusion

The three religious traditions—the NGK, Pentecostals, and the SACC—responded in a different manner to the state. For the NGK, its association with the state has been one of collaboration and cooperation during the apartheid era. For the Pentecostals, civil society-state relations have been most broadly characterized as antithetical, accommodationist, and conversionist. For the SACC, relations have been conflictual and confrontational. This legacy sets the backdrop as the discussion moves to a democratic South Africa. In these new contexts, this study will explore why and how these religious traditions change in a new political and economic context.

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[260] Borer, 78.

PART II

POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA AND CHURCH RESPONSE

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Chapter 3

Post-Apartheid South Africa:
New Realities, New Trajectories, 1990-2002

The foundation upon which the formal political order rests can be
thought of as a "substructure" of domination—social interactions,
cultural norms, economic activities, and informal power relationships
that create the basis for compliance with the prescription of the ruling
group. Changes in the underlying structure are often the precursor of
and condition for alteration in the political system's "superstructure," the
formal system of power. Basic alterations in the former, the substructure
of power, can be thought of as involving political transformation, and
can be distinguished from political transition, the movement from one
formal arrangement of power to another. Transformation prepares the
way for transition.[261]

"South Africa in 1994 did not become free. South Africa in 1994 voted
to learn how to be free."
                                                    --Nelson Mandela

With the 2004 national elections completed, many observers have

heralded South Africa as a democratic success story. Having agreed reluctantly

to become democrats, elites of different political stripes need only to remain

committed to their agreement for democracy to succeed.[262] In a similar vein, by

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[261]Robert Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South
Africa: 1975-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[262] One of the more extreme pronouncements in this tradition comes from Giuseppe
DiPalma, who states, "The decisive role in establishing democracy belongs to the agreement

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focusing on the transition to democracy, other scholars argue that there is no precondition necessary for democracy to emerge and flourish.[263]

However, as this study has argued throughout, democratic transformation must take into account existing institutions, cultural norms, and other actors in the movement towards a consolidated, stable democracy. Moreover, there must be some connection between politics at the top and the broad social, economic, and demographic forces that affect peoples' lives in society. While South Africa has successfully transitioned into a democracy, two key questions still remain: Can democracy continue to survive if it does not lead to economic growth, lessen economic inequalities, and create national unity and norms of tolerance? Second, in the absence of these conditions, can the democratic process be stable? In short, what must be *transformed* in South Africa for democracy to flourish into the future?

The relatively painless nature of South Africa's initial transition has turned out to be a bit of a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it has left a substantial infrastructure intact and critical interest groups comforted, both of which can be mobilized to consolidate the process of transformation. On the other hand, the privileged beneficiaries of the old regime who have survived into the new one, and who are joined by a new emerging elite, often display

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phase, not to consolidation." See his *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

[263] Terry Lynn Karl, "A Research Perspective," in *Transitions to Democracy: Proceedings of a Workshop,* Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991), 32.

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irritation, even disgust, that "things are not going better." South Africa's quiet revolution has had the result of failing to appreciate the key issues that have to be resolved if South Africa is to emerge as a mature, stable democracy. [264]

What are some of the "things" that are going wrong in South Africa? South Africa is and continues to be in a state of incredible flux. In the words of one observer, South Africa is a society that was bred in division, greed, and bigotry, now finds itself a new "rainbow nation" struggling to be born.[265] South Africa continues to undergo major changes in the early twenty-first century. For instance, on a local level, whole bureaucracies are being wiped away and new ones put into place. In the Cape Town metropolitan area, home to over three million people, the thirty-nine former municipalities, which included separate town councils for each racial group, were collapsed into one new metropolitan council and six local councils in 1996. These "unicities" make up the metropolitan centers of South Africa—Johannesburg, Durban, and Cape Town.[266] While South Africa has crafted a 180-page constitution that has a bill

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[264] F. van Zyl Slabbert, "Key Issues in Post-Liberationist Politics in South Africa," Paper presented at A Future South Africa: Prospects for 1999 and Beyond (Stellenbosch, South Africa: University of Stellenbosch, 1999).

[265] David Goodman, *Fault Lines: Journeys into the New South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 7.

[266] One of the key challenges unicity officials face revolve around issues of economic redistribution. Unicity structures collect and levy taxes from the entire metropolitan area and redistribute monies to those communities and townships that have been viewed as historically disenfranchised under the old regime. This practice is coming under increasing criticism. It appears to be clear that the current unicity structure will be unable to meet the needs of its residents. Insights were gathered from attendance at a Breakfast Meeting: Metropolitan Durban, The Challenges of Our New Unicity. The breakfast was sponsored by the Diakonia Council of

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of rights and is among the world's most inclusive and democratic bodies of law in the world, South Africa's economic and social legacy is dire. These disparities remain not by chance but by design. During the negotiation phase, a central compromise between the ANC and the old regime was that the regime would relinquish political power but economic structures would remain in place. One particularly visible example is the often emotional and volatile issue of land redistribution. Land that may have been taken illegally or taken by force by the apartheid regime could only be restored to its rightful owners on a willing-buyer willing-seller basis. South Africa has the largest number of people living with HIV/AIDS—5 million. Some studies suggest that 9 million South Africans will have the disease by 2010.

One of the questionable advantages of repressive domination is that it simplified analysis. The issues were stark and uncomplicated. This was indeed the case in many fundamental respects with regard to pre-liberationist South Africa. Post-liberationist politics is infinitely more complex both from an analytical point of view, as well as from the point of view of political stability and control.

The challenges facing South Africa that could become barriers to democratic transformation coalesce around six major themes: liberal versus liberationist democratic trajectories, the economic legacies of apartheid which

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Churches, which are a member of the South African Council of Churches, at the Port Yacht Club, Durban, South Africa, September 26, 2001.

now need to be analyzed in the larger context of globalization, the legacies of the 1980s and early 1990s in South Africa, the ideology of nation-building, the potential of the ANC to assume hegemonic control over the political process, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

Liberal versus Liberationist Democratic Trajectories

The democracy that has been constituted in South Africa is a liberal democracy. This may be obvious but it should be recognized this was not the type of democracy that the ANC visualized when it was struggling for the liberation of South Africa's oppressed majorities, and it was certainly the kind of democracy which the Nationalist Party (NP) tried to prevent from coming about at all costs under the old regime. In many respects, the South African case is one of the most prominent intellectual exports of North American academia, and is often cited by institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as a paradigm of "good governance." [267]

While there appears to be consensus that South Africa is a liberal democracy, this consensus is highly misleading. In South Africa, the political reality is that there are *two* strong political traditions present. These two strong traditions continue to play themselves out in the outcome of civil society debates, both theoretically and practically. Specifically, these two traditions are

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[267] Adam Pzreworski, "The Neo-Liberal Fallacy," *Journal of Democracy,* vol. 3, no. 3.

termed *liberal* and *liberationist* respectively.[268] A closer scrutiny of these two traditions reveals subtle differences in nomenclature as well as a number of more obvious differences concerning the choices of effective strategies for continued democratic consolidation.

Liberals argue that "genuine" democracy is contingent upon the *separation of the spheres* of politics, economy, and society. Given the prevalence of inequality in all modern societies, such inequality that exists is best mediated by the institutional separation of democratic politics from system of inequality in the economy and society. The logical corollaries of liberal democracy are the market economy and civil society—both of which serve to maximize the freedom of individuals and associations of individuals.

Liberationists, drawing from socialist, Marxist, and neoMarxist themes, argue that the role of democracy in a historically deeply divided society such as South Africa must first concern itself with redistributive justice issues, such as the highly contentious land debates. Government has an obligation to intervene and insure that economic resources are not only accessed, but accessed in a relatively equal manner.

These two theoretical streams of thought play themselves out in the current political and economic climate. Religious traditions continue to have to make decisions on how they respond to these traditions of thought.

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[268] Jannie Gagiano and Pierre Du Toit, "Consolidating Democracy in South Africa: The Role of Civil Society," (Stellenbosch, South Africa: University of Stellenbosch, 1999).

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Globalization: Market-Dominant Ethnic Minorities, Impoverished Democratic Majorities and Their Discontents

> A society divided by a large impoverished mass and a small
> favored elite results either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the
> small upper stratum) or in tyranny (popular-based dictatorship).
> --Seymour Martin Lipset[269]

A wide consensus among scholars holds that South Africa's skewed

economic system and its inequalities will pose the greatest threat to democracy.

Fredrick van Zyl Slabbert has argued that "development without democracy is

possible, but democracy without development has a very short life span."[270]

In addition to these realities, South Africa's policies have placed it in the

vortex of globalization trends spanning the globe. Collectively, globalization

refers to the increasing international flexibility and transferability of

information, capital, skills, and technology. In the post Cold War world, where

the idea of free market liberalization policies have been adopted as the major

economic paradigm to generate and distribute wealth, private corporations of

varying size and scale shift and concentrate, reshift and reconcentrate the

commodities of globalization with great rapidity into, and across, nation state

boundaries. This new dynamic in the international system at times severely tests

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[269] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1959), 50.

[270] F. van Zyl Slabbert, *The Quest for Democracy: South Africa in Transition* (London: Penguin, 1992), 91.

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the capacity of the nation state to maintain its sovereignty and control its own destiny.[271]

In addition to the overarching debates in globalization, another phenomenon has emerged that merits attention in the South African context. In many countries, globalization has the potential to turn free market democracies

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[271] Globalization can be thought of initially as the widening, deepening, and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social, political, and cultural life. While there still substantial disagreement as to how globalization is best conceptualized, how one should think about its causal dynamics, and how one should characterize its structures, it is possible to distinguish between three broad schools of thought, which will be referred to as the *hyperglobalizers*, the *skeptics*, and the *transformationalists*. For hyperglobalizers, contemporary globalization defines a new era in which peoples everywhere are increasingly subject to the disciplines of the global marketplace. Globalization defines a new epoch in human history in which traditional nation-states have become unnatural, even impossible business units in a global economy. Such a view of globalization generally privileges an economic logic, and in its neoliberal variant, celebrates the emergence of a single global market and the principle of global competition as the harbingers of human progress. Within this framework there is considerable normative divergence between, on the one hand, the neoliberals who welcome the triumph of individual autonomy and the market principle over state power, and the radicals or neo-Marxists for whom contemporary globalization represents the triumph of oppressive global capitalism. By comparison the skeptics, drawing on statistical evidence of world flows of trade, investment and labor from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, maintain that contemporary levels of economic interdependence are by no means historically unprecedented. Rather than globalization, the historical evidence at best confirms only heightened levels of internationalization. The forces of internationalization themselves depend on the regulatory power of national governments to ensure continuing economic liberalization. At the heart of the transformationalist thesis is a conviction that, at the dawn of a new millennium, globalization is a central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order. The piece that is historically unprecedented is that governments and societies across the globe are having to adjust to a world in which there is no longer a clear distinction between international, domestic, external and internal affairs. The literature on globalization is vast. For notable works on the literature please see David Held and Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), K. Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State* (New York: Free Press, 1995), Walter Wriston, *The Twilight of Sovereignty* (New York: Charles Scribner Sons, 1992), J.M. Guehenno, *The End of the Nation-State* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), P. Hirst and G. Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and Possibilities of Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), James Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), and J.G. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," *International Organization* (41). For a recent discussion of the "clash" between globalization and international relations in the new millennium, please see Stanley Hoffmann, "Clash of Globalizations," *Foreign Affairs* (81, 4), July-August, 2002: 104-115.

into engines of ethnic conflagration. This pattern can be characterized as market-dominant minorities, who for varying reasons, tend under market conditions to dominate economically, often to a startling extent, the "indigenous" majorities around them.[272]

For over two decades now, with increased fervor at the end of the Cold War, globalization, often under the leadership of the United States' foreign policy establishment, business interests, and foundations, has vigorously promoted free market democracy throughout the developing and post-socialist worlds. The prevailing view among globalization's supporters is that markets and democracy are a kind of universal prescription for the multiple ills of underdevelopment.[273] For globalization's enthusiasts, the cure for group hatred and ethnic violence is more markets and more democracy.

However, in many countries in the non-Western world, including South Africa, the global spread of markets and democracy is a principal, aggravating cause of group hatred and ethnic conflict. In the numerous societies around the world that have a market-dominant minority, markets and democracy are not mutually reinforcing. Because markets and democracy benefit different ethnic groups in such societies, the pursuit of free market democracy produces highly

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[272] Amy Chua, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), 6.

[273] One of globalization's champions is Thomas Friedman. In his book, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, Friedman observes that "globalization...tends to turn all friends and enemies into competitors." See Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), ix, xvi, 12.

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unstable and combustible conditions. Market conditions concentrate enormous

wealth in the hands of an "outsider" minority, fomenting ethnic envy and hatred

among often chronically poor majorities.[274] In absolute terms the majority may

or may not be better off, but any sense of improvement is overwhelmed by their

continuing poverty and the hated minority's extraordinary economic success.[275]

The Economic Legacy of South Africa's Market-Dominant British and Afrikaners

In the South African economic context, the English-speakers (the

British), have historically held the reins of free market power. The most

prominent and visible markers of this power are the Oppenheimer/De Beers

families who control the most lucrative industries in South Africa: gold,

platinum, diamond mining, finance, insurance, and technology. Afrikaners, for

much of their history, have been a rural, economically backward underclass

compared to the British.[276] This changed dramatically with the rise of the

Nationalist Party victory of 1948. As was discussed in earlier chapters, the

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[274]Chua, *World on Fire*, 9.

[275]At a conference sponsored by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that centered on land redistribution, one of the attendees from the Spear of the Nation remarked, "Political rights are fine, but without land and economic resources, we have nothing." Tape recording, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Land and Redistribution*, St. George's Cathedral, Cape Town, South Africa, October 3-5, 2001.

[276] On the historical economic dominance of South Africa's English speakers vis-à-vis the Afrikaners, see Milton J. Esman, "Ethnic Politics and Economic Power," *Comparative Politics* 19 (1987): 395-418.

systematic implementation of apartheid gave the Afrikaners a gargantuan head start and deepened the market dominance of the British.

Apartheid advanced whites in all aspects of life, complete with well-designed roads, first-class hospitals, and some of the world's best vineyards, to name just a few of the many amenities, while the black majority was turned into cheap labor, uneducated, disenfranchised, and dehumanized by a police state. Catching up in the new South Africa will not be easy. Again, the statistics are staggering. Sixty-six percent of black South Africans live in abject poverty. Eighty-eight percent have less than a high school education. A quarter over the age of twenty have had no formal schooling at all. In some parts of Soweto and Guguletu, four thousand people share five toilets. Moreover, data suggests that unemployment among blacks is between 40-50 percent and townships are *growing* at the rate of one million per year. Ten years after the end of apartheid, whites own 80 percent of South Africa's land and account for 90 percent of the country's commercial agricultural production.

Those who govern the state can, under increasing domestic pressure, choose to ignore the impact of globalization dynamics. In doing so, they risk becoming even more vulnerable to its consequences. Most states have decided, in varying degrees, to cooperate, coexist, or coopt globalization trends. This option tends to yield trends within its borders that claim that the state is "selling out" and relinquishing its sovereignty to foreign powers, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), or multinational capital flows. One of the more

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significant responses of 1990s South Africa to its own political and economic context and the forces of globalization has been the development of various public policy initiatives most notably regarded as Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR). From many quarters, this public policy response has been regarded as nothing more than conventional International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank policies in another form. Extending the argument further, these policies are often accused of being new forms of foreign domination in developing states such as South Africa. However, other arguments, and these often originate in state institutions, assert that these policies are necessary to generate wealth and job creation. The end result would be to create and provide resources to those who continue to resist these policies.

It is this dilemma which globalization poses to the state that has prompted some leading analysts to observe that "the nation-state is a dinosaur waiting to die.[277] In its place, they predict will come regional entities with common, primarily economic interests that will become progressively more powerful in determining international relations and the flow of capital, technology, information, and skills. To the extent that this occurs, the conventional concept of the nation-state will begin to evaporate and the stateless person or international/regional citizen will take its place. While these debates

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[277] K. Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economics* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995).

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may appear to be removed from the South African case at times, the forces of globalization are having profound effects on illegal immigrants, skilled immigrants and emigrants, and migration patterns which will have long-standing consequences for South African political and economic realities. One possible scenario is if the South African government continues its commitment to GEAR policies, skilled workers may be drawn to South Africa from other parts of Africa and elsewhere, while it delivers none of the fruits of neoliberalism to the millions of South Africans who have been disenfranchised for centuries and especially during the apartheid regime. Other possible scenarios would argue that South Africa will be driven into regional development schemes in which it would constantly be guarding against charges of imperialist ambition, or sacrifice its independence to an emerging regional entity, in which case it undermines its sovereignty as a nation state.

Economic and Growth Trends Amongst the Impoverished Majority

Observers of the South African landscape are sharply divided about the extent to which ethnicity may hinder the development of stable democracy. With the exception of two very notable observers[278], most analysts believe that

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[278] Those two exceptions in recent South African scholarship have been Donald Horowitz and Arend Lijphart. See Donald Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Arend Lijphart, *Power Sharing in South Africa.*

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negative aspects of ethnicity has been blown out of proportion as a present or likely future factor in South African political life.

To bolster their claims, most black South Africans identify themselves as South Africans before any racial or ethnic category. Only one political party in South Africa, the Inkatha Freedom Party, mobilizes on the basis of ethnicity. Outside of Natal and the KwaZulu homeland, conflict has reflected a materially and politically based struggle between the "haves" and "have-nots."

However, what may appear to be a political and class-based conflict can easily devolve into indiscriminate hatred and stereotyping of people based on ethnicity. Zimbabwe is probably one of the world's most graphics case studies in this regard.

However, some important points are worth noting here. South Africa has some unique features that set it apart from other developing countries that are experiencing the combustibility of hated market-dominant minorities/impoverished democratic majorities. First, there is no "favored" black minority in South Africa's historical legacy vis-à-vis the British or Afrikaner masters. Kenya is a good counter example. The colonial legacy of British rule there favored the Kikuyu indigenous black group over the 40-plus ethnic groups within Kenya's borders. The Kikuyu today have been the beneficiaries of free market principles, business ownership, and have internalized cultural norms that encourage entrepreneurial endeavor. This has not been the case in South Africa. The legacies of vertical and grand apartheid

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during apartheid's height as discussed earlier prevented any such transfer of knowledge and skills to take place between the British English-speakers, the Afrikaners, and all of the other racial and ethnic classes in South African society.

Second, the ANC has been remarkable in its attempts to acknowledge the importance of ethnic cultural identity. However, symbolic gestures must eventually translate into material gains for all of South Africa's historically marginalized millions. Otherwise, the forces of free market dynamics and democracies may result in a societal meltdown.

In addition to these trends other observers who note growth and delivery dynamics argue that the liberation movement and subsequent fall of the apartheid regime in 1990 was the *first reconstruction*. The four-year period of negotiation and transition, which culminated in the April, 1994, elections, was the political or *second reconstruction*. With the "honeymoon phase" of Nelson Mandela as history, South Africa must now pass through the economic *transformation* or *third reconstruction*.

South Africa is the second most economically polarized country in the world. As was mentioned earlier, the statistics measuring economic indicators reveals staggering inequalities.[279] Recent scholarship suggests that the overall

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[279] The scholars who have made this case are Stephen R. Lewis, Jr., *The Economics of Apartheid* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990), Michael McGrath, "Income Redistribution: The Challenge of the 1990s," in *Critical Choices for South Africa: An Agenda for the 1990s*, Robert Schrire, ed. (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990), and Francis Wilson and Mamphele Ramphele, *Uprooting Poverty: The South African Challenge. Report of*

level of inequality has not declined since 1994.[280] Only Brazil holds the dubious

distinction of being the world's most economically polarized country. Half of

South African's people are poor, earning less than $75 monthly. More striking,

the ranks of the poor are grossly disproportionately filled by the ranks of

nonwhites: 61 percent of Africans and 38 percent of Coloureds are poor, while

just 1 percent of whites are classified as impoverished. In striking contrast, the

average household income of whites is nearly five times that of black Africans,

and the wealthiest 6 percent of South Africans consume over 40 percent of the

nation's goods and services.[281] Only 21 percent of South Africans have piped

water, 28 percent have sanitation facilities, and less than half of the population

has electricity.

The income and consumption gap will remained entrenched because of

the lack of skilled jobs. In 1998, national unemployment figures were officially

at 34 percent. However, that figure rises to over 80 percent in many black

townships. These changes have provided opportunities for some to experience

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the Second Carnegie Enquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1989).

[280] Despite the accelerating deracialization of public policy from the early 1970s, the Gini coefficient has remained broadly stable at a stubbornly high level. The Gini coefficient for South Africa is about 0.6, much the same as Brazil and slightly higher than Chile. For a complete discussion, please see Nicoli Nattrass and Jeremy Seekings, "Democracy and Distribution in Highly Unequal Economies: The Case of South Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39; 3 (2001), 471-498.

[281] World Bank/Reconstruction and Development Program, *Key Indicators of Poverty in South Africa* (Cape Town, 1995); Office of the Deputy President, "Poverty and Inequality in South Africa," Summary Report (Pretoria: May, 1998); Suzanne Daley, "A Post-Apartheid Agony: AIDS on the March," *New York Times*, July 23, 1998.

tremendous gains or losses in personal fortunes. One particular group that has found themselves on the threshold of unprecedented opportunities, are the so-called emerging "black elite." But the vast majority of South Africans have been left with raised but unrequited hopes.

The free market economic model will continue to generate an inequality of outcome in the short term. This dynamic incurs political costs, especially as a rights culture asserted by a liberal democratic constitution promises equality of outcome. The enduring dilemma of this administration and for those that follow, at least in the next ten-twenty years, is how to manage the inevitable political costs of necessary economic reform, as it waits for the capacity to develop the civil service sector to effectively deliver the fruits of a capitalist market regime. This is particularly more challenging given the historical, social, and cultural context of the ANC-dominated leadership and its alliance partners, who were couched in socialist redistributive populism during the struggle for liberation.

This dilemma is referred to as the problem of simultaneity. In the South African case democracy, which is a discussion around *liberty* and *freedom*, is in tension with *equality* and *outcomes*. These discussions are in many respects, mutually exclusive. Even mature democracies struggle to maintain this balance. Transitional and transformational democracies walk a delicate tightrope. South Africa is no exception in this regard. The government's inability to articulate policy priorities will reinforce the impression of indecision and paralysis. If the

state is unable to act effectively, civil unrest could rise, which could devolve into some of the other "failed states" of sub-Saharan Africa.

Given these political and economic realities, South Africa has fared relatively well with the challenges of diversity and globalization. There has not been a full-scale drift into racial and redistributive populism, as many had predicted, nor has there been unrestrained retribution against formerly privileged minorities. However, many observers note that democratic transformation and consolidation can take thirty years to reach maturity.

The Ideology of Nation-Building

South Africa has attempted to embrace the notion that it is a "South African Nation." Some observers refer to it as the "Rainbow Nation." This ideological assertion often comes across as a statement of fact. This powerful ideology has been a source of political mobilization in the new South Africa. This ideology is a particular preoccupation of historically deeply divided societies, where issues of diversity, systemic economic inequality, and the struggle between traditionalism and modernity pose fundamental challenges to successfully consolidating the nation-state.

Leading observers typically note three broad categories of nation-building ideologies. The first is xenophobic, or exclusive nationalism, which is intolerant of those identified as "outsiders." The early years of Afrikanerdom in

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South Africa is the notable example. The second is Jacobean egalitarianism, which is inclusively intolerant. Most of the former Communist Eastern Bloc countries fall under this category. The final category is syncretistic patriotic nationalism, which is inclusively tolerant of diversity. India and Indonesia are the notable examples here. These are certainly ideal prescriptive types that are found in deeply divided societies, and in practice, all three types can be found operating in society. Most observers argue that to the extent that inclusive tolerance becomes the dominant feature in nation-building, the more likely that the deeply divided nature of society will diminish. If one of the other two aspects of nation-building becomes a dominating feature, then nation-building attempts will be wrought with conflict and polarization.

All three nation-building aspects find themselves present in the new South Africa. However, at present, the dominant nation-building "ideology" has been inclusive tolerance. The country embraced the goals of the new, and interim, Constitution, and in many respects, was bound together under the moral authority of Nelson Mandela. Additionally, while being symbolic in nature, the rise of sporting teams into the international spotlight has galvanized much of the population around the national flag. However, the language of the "Rainbow Nation" has too often been devoid of stark realities that face the new South Africa.

One particular trend that continues to have influence in society is the revival and endurance of various forms of racial and ethnic intellectualism. For

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most of the twentieth century, South Africa was subjected to the self-serving historiography of exclusivist Afrikaner nationalism and Colonial imperialism. While these arguments and claims have been repudiated, they have been replaced to a significant degree, by "black" and "exclusivist African" intellectualism. The validity of the argument is found in the person who puts forth the argument, and the resulting discourse is the "insider" against the "outsider." The result is often considerable intellectual intolerance. Unchecked, these trends may result in the same divisiveness as in the old South Africa. The emerging intelligentsia in the new South Africa must resist attempts to solely frame nation-building debates along racial lines.

Still others argue that South Africa should focus its efforts on *institution* building, as opposed to *nation-building*. Historically deeply divided societies such as South Africa face the challenges to build institutions that can cope with and become masters at mediating the conflicts inherent in a diverse society. Institutions such as a viable and transparent criminal justice system, a fair and reliable police force, educational institutions, open and accessible economic structures, to name a few.

ANC Hegemony

The ANC has enjoyed hegemonic rule in South Africa since the 1994 elections. In the face of daunting economic and social challenges, the ANC has

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argued that the democratic processes in the West are too slow to address the immediacy of present demands. This trajectory has been witnessed in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. However, arguments that South Africa's one-party system will degenerate into a "pseudodemocratic patronage system...characterized by high levels of corruption and little democratic accountability"[282] need to be nuanced in the South African context.

First, South Africa does have significant opportunities for employment in business for skilled black workers. Because of this reality, this trend will mitigate the tendency of the civil service to expand too quickly and wastefully.

Second, a strong private sector economy will not allow a post-apartheid government to sabotage the effects of economic growth through poor governance.

Finally, the vast numbers of social forces and a vibrant associational life in South Africa mitigates the possibility of authoritarianism.[283]

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[282] Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, *The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (Parklands, South Africa: Jonathan Ball, 1993), 203-205.

[283] Adam and Moodley, *Negotiated Revolution*, 159.

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HIV/AIDS: A Generation of Orphans

The scale of the AIDS crisis in South Africa continues to spiral upwards. With the incidence of infection still rising, it has had more HIV positive citizens in the world for several years, with most recent estimates at over 5 million. The death rate is beginning to climb, life expectancy to fall, and the reality of more than one million AIDS orphans is clamouring for the attention of the nation.

The Scope of the AIDS Crisis in South Africa

While AIDS is a global crisis, it is also a major threat to the social fabric in sub-Saharan Africa and South Africa. In aggregate terms, more than 5 percent of the adult population is infected. In the worst affected countries, such as neighboring Zimbabwe, the figure is approaching one adult in four. Eight-three percent of all deaths from AIDS since the beginning of the epidemic have been in sub-Saharan Africa, which has only 10 percent of the world's population.[284] In the absence of an affordable cure or vaccine, only modified sexual behavior, to include fewer partners and/or higher condom use, will slow the spread of the virus.

One reason why the disease spreads so widely through the population is the long incubation period. Although over 3-4 million adults are estimated to be

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[284] "A Global Disaster," *The Economist* 2 February 1999; "AIDS in Africa 2000," *UNAIDS Factsheet*, 30 November 2000.

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HIV positive, AIDS is still an invisible disease. This is compounded by under-reporting of a disease that still attracts a great deal of social stigma. For instance, in 1995, only 3,306 cases of AIDS were reported in South Africa, compared to the projection of 20,000 cases.[285]

Evidence from other African countries suggests that levels of infection in the whole population will plateau, albeit at high levels, as the number of sexually active people is reduced and lifestyle changes eventually come into effect. According to most predictions, this plateau will be reached in South Africa after 2010, with 25-30 percent of the adult population infected. At that point, at least 500,000 people will be dying of AIDS yearly.[286]

What will be the demographic effects of these predicted death rates? For one, life expectancies will be reduced up to ten years using conservative estimates and up to twenty years, accompanied by a doubling in child mortality rates, both in South Africa and its neighbors.[287] Another effect of the epidemic will be to reduce the proportion of economically active adults, thereby increasing burdens on the elderly and the young. By the year 2010, South Africa will most certainly have 2 million AIDS orphans. According to many

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[285] Department of Health (Government of South Africa 1999), *AIDS Analysis Africa* 8, 3:3 June/July 1998.

[286] Robert C. Garner, "Religion and AIDS in South Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 38, 1 (2000), 41-69.

[287] US Bureau of the Census, Population Division, *AIDS Analysis Africa* 8, 3:2, June/July 1998.

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observers, "the changes in the age structure of the population and the resulting disruption of family economic units could well prove to be the most damaging effect of the HIV epidemic."[288]

Despite this significant demographic impact, most of the recent estimates of the impact of AIDS on the *macro-economy* are modest. Some estimates had predicted total costs to the national economy to range between 2-9 percent, but these figures appear to be exaggerated.[289] Current estimates place losses at about 1 percent annually.

Several reasons can be asserted to explain this "soft landing" of the economy. First, businesses have been very flexible and adaptable than what was previously anticipated. More specifically, and bolstering observations about ethnic-dominant market minorities, skilled laborers are not affected by the AIDS epidemic directly, and the skills of the British and Afrikaners can easily be transferred across boundaries in the global economy. Moreover, many of these skilled workers are leaving South Africa in droves to Australia, New Zealand, and elsewhere.[290] Second, lost unskilled labor is easily replaced in a national economy with high unemployment.

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[288] Peter Doyle, "The Demographic Impact of AIDS on the South African Population," in Cross and Whiteside, *Facing Up to AIDS*

[289] For example, World Bank reports placed GDP losses at only 0.5 percent. However, these figures are still somewhat preliminary as the impact of rising healthcare costs for businesses, the government and other non-profit organizations, and the increased constraints on skilled labor. See World Bank, 1997.

[290] Robert Mattes, "The Brain Drain," *IDASA*, 2002. Interview with the author, Cape Town, South Africa, October, 2001.

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However, the *micro-economic* impact on households which experience AIDS firsthand will be unambiguously negative, and will be amplified among the poor. AIDS will strike, in most cases, the most productive members of households, changing them from being main income providers into costly recipients of healthcare. Summarizing findings from World Bank reports, three trends emerge in poor households. First, food consumption per capita falls significantly. Second, child malnutrition increases, with orphans on average 5-75 percent more likely to be stunted in growth. Third, school enrollment drop, especially if the mother dies.[291] AIDS will plunge the poor into even deeper holes of despair, further widening levels of inequality and potentially adding fuel to the impoverished majority/wealthy market minority arguments flowing from globalization debates.

It is in the midst of such a daunting crisis that religious traditions, like other actors in South Africa, must make decisions about how to respond, if at all. The discussion now turns to how religious traditions are responding to these new political, economic, and social trajectories and realities.

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[291]   World Bank Report, 1997: 27.

Chapter 4

The Changing Religious Context of Churches, 1990-2002

With a new political dispensation in place after the elections of 1994,

South Africa is now well into the process of consolidating its democratic gains.

As was discussed in Chapter 3, the challenges are daunting. Attitudes toward

democracy, while modestly favorable, may deteriorate if the government is

unable to respond effectively to key issues of the day. South Africans, in most

surveys and reports, consistently list job creation, crime, security, the economy,

HIV/AIDS, and housing as the top issues that face the country.[292]

The framework for this study has been to ask the question of how

religious traditions respond to a changing political context. South Africa in the

1990s and into the twenty-first century is an ideal case study for these questions.

First, this study examined and explained the role of religious traditions and their

response to the apartheid regime. Now, in the first decade of the twenty-first

century, with the transition to democracy accomplished at the macro level and in

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[292] Robert Mattes, et. al. *Views of Democracy in South Africa and the Region: Trends and Comparisons* (Cape Town: Southern African Democracy Barometer, 2000), 54-55.

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formal institutional structures, the new political context is one of transformative

processes. Compared with the apartheid era, the issues are far more complex,

nuanced, and often overlapping. It is in this new pluralistic setting that religious

traditions must first decide which issues to focus their efforts upon, and then

engage in the process of how to respond effectively. With the new realities and

new trajectories as the backdrop for discussion, analysis now turns to the three

religious traditions and their responses in the new South Africa.[293]

The NGK Churches: Pruning Dead Branches to Make Way for New Growth

The NGK's Position in a Non-Racial, Democratic South Africa:
Accommodationist/Antithetical, Intensive, and Hierarchical/Autonomous

As was discussed in Chapter 3, from 1934 to 1947, state-NGK relations

were described as coexisting conflict, a situation characterized by moderate

policy collusion and moderate to low official interaction. The factions

dominating the NGK and the state were relatively autonomous from one another

regarding the development of race policy in this phase. Although cooperation

between the NGK and the state occurred, they held differing opinions on the

implementation of race policy. The dominant factions in both the NGK and the

state promoted segregationist legislation aimed at reproducing a cheap labor

force; however, the "purist" faction dominating the NGK supported a stricter

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implementation of segregation than the UP-dominated state based on particular class interests and sociopolitical concerns. From the mid- to late- 1930s, the NGK became increasingly dissatisfied with the UP-dominated state's commitment to partial segregation and came to endorse political change through the Nationalist Party in an effort to achieve the objectives of Afrikaner nationalism in its broadest terms.

From 1948 to 1961 the NGK and the NP-dominated state exhibited a relationship of mutual engagement in which the groups dominating each faction held similar opinions on the majority of policy issues. Situations did arise periodically in which NP leaders and NGK leaders arrived at different opinions concerning strategies and tactics related to race policy. Overall, church and state officials interacted closely and even held the same goal of Afrikaner supremacy in political and economic spheres, but they formulated independent policies on how to achieve these goals. The reason for these discrepancies between NGK and state strategies lay in the diversity of positions that existed in Afrikaner nationalist circles. Within the NGK, purist and pragmatist factions forwarded vertical apartheid or partial apartheid respectively. From 1948 to 1961, the purist faction dominated the NGK, leading to the NGK's adoption of separate development, which contrasted with the NP-dominated state's *baasskap* position—a form of segregation that involved white domination within a racially segregated society. From 1958 to 1961, a switch in factions occurred. As NGK

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leaders began suggesting the relaxation of vertical race policy, state leaders

implemented the more comprehensive policy of separate development.

Collaboration described NGK-state relations from 1962 to 1978. During

the era of collaboration, or Grand Apartheid, leaders in the NP-dominated state

and the NGK were committed to the maintenance of three goals: (a) white,

mainly Afrikaner, supremacy in the political and social arena, (b) economic

prosperity through white or Afrikaner-based capitalism, and (c) the

implementation of a racial policy that maintained ethnic purity and overcame the

criticisms of "negative" apartheid. As leaders within the NGK and the state

collaborated with one another, the two entities became almost indistinguishable

with the NGK paralleling the NP-dominated state's perspectives on race policy.

South Africa's era of collaboration was characterized by strong authoritarian

rule in an Afrikaner-dominated state that engaged heavily with white civil

society institutions. The NGK found itself being coopted by the state during this

period.

From 1979 to 1994, the NGK and the state again exhibited a relationship

of mutual engagement. Most of the time, the NGK continued to give its

unequivocal support to the state, as it had during the first three decades of

apartheid rule; however, situations arose periodically in which leaders within the

NP-dominated state and the NGK arrived at different opinions concerning

policies, directions, and strategies. During these years, NP leaders ruling the

state began responding to and implementing pragmatic political directives. The

NGK lagged behind, supporting the goals of white, but more specifically, Afrikaner, survival and economic prosperity through slower reforms. The NGK's reluctance to embrace reforms was in large part due to NGK leaders attempting to accommodate the needs of more conservative and moderate members who were not ready nor willing to support political reforms that appeared to repudiate the ideals of apartheid and weakened the cohesion of the Afrikaner *volk*.

Now, in the 1990s and beyond, the NGK is in a situation of a mixture of coexisting conflict to balanced pluralism vis-à-vis the ANC-dominated government. During the apartheid era, the NGK's theological stream was one of dominant transformation, intensive socialization, and exclusion of the Afrikaner people from the rest of society, and hierarchal in its institutional dynamics. Today, the NGK is in a period of flux, a sort of "identity crisis." As an institution, it is no longer a legitimate transforming actor, and focuses on a pietist role. With this new emphasis, the NGK draws more upon an antithetical and accommodationist theological tradition. Moreover, some NGK ministers are becoming more autonomous and partnering with other churches across denominational lines in an effort to engage in the process of nation-building. Others have become further entrenched, and these churches within the NGK are dying branches within South Africa.

Some broad trajectories can be discerning regarding the NGK's position in a nonracial, democratic South Africa. In general, the NGK will not be as

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politically prominent as it was during most of the twentieth century. Church

leaders will concentrate on the evangelical expression of their mission and

ministry, in part because they want to avoid the detrimental effects that

collaboration and engagement brought to the NGK during the apartheid years.

Those effects—the loss of autonomy, transparency, and respect—may have

consequences for at least one generation.[294] Moreover, the ANC leadership does

not have a strong or natural affinity with the NGK because of the church's

strong identification with Afrikaners.

Nevertheless, the state's new leaders cannot ignore the importance of

religion and the church, and more specifically, the continuing important role of

the NGK in South Africa. Nelson Mandela was very proactive towards the NGK

during his term as president:

> Let me indicate to you that there is not a single opinion-
> maker, as an organization among the Afrikaners, that I have
> not seen...I have twice seen the full leadership of the Dutch
> Reformed Church...I have done so because it is absolutely
> necessary for us to speak with one voice on all the major
> national questions in this country...[295]

The new government has recognized the importance of establishing

warm relations with the NGK because of its continued "moral force" among

Afrikaners who hold prominent positions in all areas of society. The NGK will

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[294] Tracy Kuperus, *State, Civil Society and Apartheid*, 155.

[295] Nelson Mandela, as cited in Tracy Kuperus, *State-Civil Soicety in South Africa*, 156.

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continue to have influence with these Afrikaners and persuade them to support

the government's programs and to assist the country with national unity.

Certainly, the NGK's overt political influence has diminished sharply

over the past decade. The open door NGK leaders once had with the government

no longer exists. NGK leaders have indicated that this is a healthy situation for

the NGK in that the church is no longer linked with the government. In the

words of one prominent church leader:

> Our church [the NGK] will have a tremendous role in the new
> South Africa. Perhaps circumstances will force the church to
> be a real church, and not to play a sort of semi-political role and
> not to be so closely linked with a particular party or with the
> culture of one group or population—the white Afrikaners. The
> church was much too closely tied to the state and the Afrikaner
> *volk* in the past, and this hurt the church...Obviously, this won't
> be the case now—to the betterment of the church.[296]

From interviews and conversations with leaders and faithful adherents to the

NGK, there is a sense of relief that the NGK would no longer have an inner

connection to the government nor would it have to represent only the needs and

interests of the Afrikaner people. Responses from leaders indicated that the

church could participate with other churches, especially black congregations in

efforts to encourage reconciliation and healing. In Johannesburg, an interview

with a local NGK minister yielded this observation:

> In today's South Africa, the NGK must recognize that we must
> develop new ways to work with all churches in our country, in
> order to build trust and mutual respect for one another. It will

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[296] J.A. Heyns, as cited in Tracy Kuperus, *State and Civil Society in South Africa*, 157.

take generations to heal, but if the NGK wants to be a viable civil society institution, we must become a part of the new South Africa and join hands with our black brothers and sisters.[297]

Within the Dutch Reformed tradition, there are actually three major "sisters": the national NGK, the *Hervormerde Kerk* (NHK), and the smallest of all, the *Gereformeerde Kerk* (GK). NGK structures are hierarchal and more extensive than in the GK tradition. GK churches are small, exercise a great deal more autonomy, and decisions rest more with the local congregation. Unlike the elder sister, GK congregations are more intensive and participatory.[298]

These factors have allowed individual GK congregations to make decisions about their new role in South Africa. Some have made the decision to partner with other churches across denominational boundaries to engage in the process of reconciliation and healing. The GK has never issued a formal statement acknowledging past injustices under the apartheid regime. However, some GK congregations, as they engage in the process of reconciliation, are training some of their leadership along with their partnering churches, in conflict resolution. This is a new development within the Dutch Reformed tradition. However, this development is not widespread. As the DRC continues to evaluate its role in South Africa, perhaps this trend will take further root in the NGK.[299]

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[297] Jakob Pretorius, NGK Minister, Johannesburg, South Africa, interview by author, October 17, 2001.

[298] Jakob Pretorius, interview by author, Johannesburg, South Africa, October 17, 2001.

[299] The NHK has historically identified with the most conservative elements of Afrikanerdom, namely the Voortrekkers of the nineteenth century. This breakaway sister of the DRC developed in the early 1800s after the arrival of the British to South Africa. Feeling

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From Cottesloe to the TRC: Reluctantly Repentant?

While individual ministers are making efforts to be involved in the processes of reconciliation, the top leadership and official position of the NGK reveals a different story. For generations, Afrikaner institutions promoted the message that blacks could not be trusted because of their liberal and undisciplined nature, that blacks were of a different nature and culture than whites and so forth. The NGK leadership, which now dismisses these caricatures, will not be able to convince members overnight to rid themselves of these ideas. In conversations with Afrikaners, most express veiled concerns about the "viability of black government" and a sense of "betrayal" by the church. Many Afrikaners have left their church tradition as a result. Moreover, because the government controlled much of the media apparatus under the apartheid regime, many people, including Afrikaners, are still learning of the atrocities of apartheid.[300] A new generation of people who are exposed to a wide variety of perspectives about modern South African histoty is necessary. Other leading observers have come to this same conclusion. As Herbie Brand, a

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threatened by the ideals of the Enlightenment, rationalistic philosophy, and the imperialistic nature of the British, the Boers began to move away from the Cape. Disappointed by the NGK's "lukewarm" response to what they viewed as a direct assault on their culture and people, these Boers broke away from the NGK to form what has come to be known as the NHK.

[300] In one conversation with a key informant, this individual, after reading one of the author's drafts of the legacy of the SACC communicated how little she knew of the SACC. Her only impression of the SACC was that it was liberal and communist. This antidote points to larger debates that suggest that the consolidation of democracy is a ten to thirty year process as people continue to engage in a pluralistic society and become comfortable with information from all perspectives.

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minister of a NGSK congregation in Cape Town, said, "It will take a whole generation of people, maybe even two, before they can accept the situation that has been created. It will take a long time."[301]

Moreover, the NGK has had a difficult time effectively divorcing itself from the needs of the Afrikaner people and pursuing efforts at national unity among all Africans. At national meetings and other venues, NGK leaders appear to be more concerned about preserving Afrikaner values and principles. The growth of English as the language of communication within the government has been a cause of great concern for the Afrikaner people. Afrikaans is their mother tongue and it carries strong cultural ties.

More pointedly, however, is the ongoing debate about how the NGK should "cleanse" itself. Many prophetic voices have suggested that the NGK officially support the notion of "collective guilt" as an institution that helped to nurture the structures of apartheid. Although the NGK has acknowledged that apartheid became a political ideology protecting white minority interests to the exclusion of others, and while it has admitted that it sided with Afrikaner interests for too long, it has not supported the expression of "collective guilt" because it views the confession of guilt as a personal matter.[302]

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[301] Herbie Brand, as cited in Tracy Kuperus, *State and Civil Society*, 158.

[302] Kuperus, *State-Civil Society*, 158.

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However, other observers are in sharp disagreement with the NGK's position. Many continue to be concerned that this position will leave the impression that the atrocities of apartheid were the deeds of "the disturbed few."[303] However, the NGK as an institution shaped the minds with the powerful value of separateness and a parallel value of over-againstness among whites in comparison to all other groups in society. The NGK further strengthened this value orientation by assisting with the institutionalization and development of tradition of separateness. Its embodiment manifested itself in its role in the apartheid regime. Because of this relationship, one observer has noted:

> The society and the religious or ideological community
> or cultural group which has contributed towards shaping
> the mind of the offender shares in the responsibility of
> the offense and is in need of repentance on its part and
> forgiveness on the part of God and the victims with the
> view to facilitating a process of healing and taking pre-
> cautions against a repetition of the offense.[304]

The NGK has not gone any further in terms of embracing the notion of collective guilt and moving through the process of truth-telling than its document, *The Story of the Dutch Reformed Church's Journey with Apartheid, 1960-1994.* In its "statement of confession and witness" the NGK acknowledged "past mistakes...that apartheid was 'church policy'...that the

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[303] H. Russel Botman, "The Offender and the Church," in *Facing the Truth: South African Faith Communities and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,* James Cochrane, John de Gruchy, and Stephen Martin, eds., (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press), 126.

[304] Wolfran Kistner, "The Legacy of the Past in the New South Africa," unpublished paper, 16.

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church pushed hard to get the National Party regime to enact laws against mixed

marriages...to establish group areas...and that it received secret funding from

the government for propaganda purposes.[305] The church leadership even

acknowledged that it provided a theological and biblical justification for

apartheid in its 1974 document, *Race, Peoples and Nations in Light of Scripture*,

which was discussed in Chapter 2.

However, prophetic voices assert that acknowledgement is not full

recognition, and the NGK appears unwilling and unable to enter into full

recognition of its role in the devastation of millions who now must live with the

legacies of apartheid. Recognition of the magnitude of one's actions denotes the

building blocks of reconciliation.[306] Without recognition, one cannot offer

forgiveness, and the process of reconciliation cannot move forward. In

summary, the NGK statements do not appear to fully grasp the magnitude of the

inherent gross violation of human dignity that is in every act of apartheid.[307]

The NGK's *Journey* statement could not bring itself to an unequivocal

rejection of apartheid—which was, according to the statement, a good idea gone

wrong; a well-intended system that degenerated into an oppressive one.

According to the *Journey*, those who had the responsibility for the political

management of apartheid are to blame for the atrocities. The NGK appears to

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[305] Botman, "The Offender," 129.

[306] Jon Sobrino, *The Principle of Mercy: Taking the Crucified People from the Cross* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1994), 83-88.

[307] Botman, "The Offender," *Facing the Truth*, 130.

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still be in denial about its instrumental role in the making of the mind of the perpetrators, or even the inherent evil of apartheid. As Villa-Vicencio keeps reminding us, "History is ahead of the churches."

The Pentecostals: The Segregated Branches Speak

Antithetical/Conversionist/Accommodationist, Intensive, and Autonomous: A Civil Society in a Situation of Balanced Pluralism

Christianity was established in north Africa and Ethiopia in antiquity, but most expansion throughout the rest of the continent was coterminous with European colonization in the nineteenth century. With the notable exception of the Reformed Calvinist tradition that came to South Africa in 1652 with the Afrikaners, mainline Protestant traditions came to South Africa in the same manner as the rest of the continent. Christianity's rapid growth since the Second World War has resulted in Africa having one of the largest concentrations of Christians on any continent at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Part of this growth can be attributed to the way in which African Christianity has managed to overcome its foreign image and become indigenous. As has been discussed, this can be seen in the phenomenal growth of African Independent Churches in which African culture and Christianity have blended.[308] The result has been not only growth in quantity, but expansion in the scale of

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[308] A classic on this subject is Bengt G.M. Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa* (London: Lutterworth, 1948).

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complexity.[309] The fruit of this blending has been African Pentecostalism and its status as the fastest growing Christian family in the twenty-first century.

As has been discussed, the African and South African Pentecostal religious traditions acquiesced in the social system of apartheid in South Africa. Its early integration and fellowship were short-lived. Black people were denied basic human rights in the very churches in which they had found "freedom" in the Spirit. One result of this segregation was that many African Pentecostals withdrew to African Independent Churches. Another consequence was that many black South African Pentecostals rested in the theological antithetical/conversionist tradition: this world is beyond redemption and the body of believers is waiting for the New Jerusalem.

It must continue to be emphasized that Pentecostalism in both North America and South Africa has its roots in marginalized and underprivileged people who continue to struggle to find identity and dignity. It expanded among oppressed African people who were neglected, misunderstood, and deprived of everything but token leadership by white leaders who had apparently ignored and overlooked biblical concepts of the priesthood of all believers and the equality of all people in Christ.[310] And yet the ability of Pentecostalism to adapt and fulfill African aspirations has been its principal strength.

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[309] Adrian Hastings, *A History of African Christianity: 1950-1975* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 262.

[310] Anderson, *"The Segregated Spirit: The Pentecostals,"* Christianity in South Africa, 240.

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This strength has enabled African Pentecostalism, of which indigenous

Pentecostal-type churches are its predominant demonstration, to grow and

become the major force in South African Christianity. These churches

demonstrate what happens when Pentecostalism encounters the traditional

spirituality of Africa, and what African people, when left to themselves, do with

Pentecostalism. The overriding African concern for spiritual power from a

mighty God to overcome all enemies and evils that threaten human life results in

an extensive ministry of healing and exorcism. African Pentecostalism created

a Christian liturgy in a free and spontaneous way that does not betray

its essential Christian character, but liberates it from the foreignness of European

forms. Of particular note is that from the outset, healing has played an important

role in African Independent Churches. By the 1950s and 1960s, the emphasis on

healing had assumed its own unique African style.[311] As African Pentecostalism

has evolved in South Africa and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, healing has

become the central focus of worship, with the liturgy and preaching revolving

around it. But more importantly, the concept of healing has broadened to

include not only bodily recuperation and revitalization, but finding remedies for

unemployment, family disputes and brokenness, racism, despair, hopelessness,

and marital discord. In the words of Colin la Foy, the Secretary General of the

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[311] M.L. Daneel, *Fambidzano: Ecumenical Movement of Zimbabwean Independent Churches* (Gweru Press, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989) as cited in Harvey Cox, *Fire From Heaven*, 254.

Assembly of God Churches in southern Africa:

> The most important objective of nation-building...is to restore
> the self-worth, dignity, and humanity of people of color in South
> Africa...Apartheid systematically not only stripped people of political
> and economic power, but stripped them of their humanity. We have
> a lost generation of people who are damaged psychologically,
> emotionally, and spiritually. Our task is nothing short of the restoration
> of the whole person, this lost generation.[312]

This broadened conceptualization of healing placed African indigenously based

Pentecostals in direct tension with white Pentecostals in South Africa and in the

United States. White Pentecostals often were under attack by mainline

Protestant liberal theologians and laypeople for embracing the "superstitious"

nature of divine healing, and by fundamentalists, who argued that healing

miracles had ceased with the New Testament. The "spectacular" healing claims

of Pentecostals did not appeal to the modern, rational, positivist, and enlightened

Western theological mind. Additionally, American Pentecostals shied away

from addressing social ills with structural analysis because such an association

would place them squarely in a social gospel framework, the alternative

transformationist stream. Such an association was suspect at best, and in

collusion with communism and evil at worst.

Healing is the area in which African Pentecostals have the most to offer

to the world. Many observers are quick to point out that healing is the very

practice that results in "syncretism" or relapsing back into pre-Christian tribal

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[312] Colin la Foy, Secretary General, Assembly of God Churches in southern Africa, interview, September 26, 2001, Durban, South Africa.

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practices. However, this is precisely the point of African Pentecostal strength. Its strength lies in its distinct ability to absorb *premodern* and *preChristian* understandings into an explicitly Christian framework.

Pentecostalism and HIV/AIDS

As has been established, the HIV/AIDS epidemic is and will continue to be a priority issue for South Africa. While most people would agree that something needs to be done to address the crisis, responses vary widely. This is also true of religious traditions.

Some research seems to indicate that Pentecostals have been more effective in persuading and encouraging members to reduce the numbers of sexual partners. The success of Pentecostal church traditions in this regard thus reduces the numbers of people who transmit the HIV virus.[313] What accounts for this success vis-à-vis other religious traditions? Unlike most other religious traditions, and certainly in comparison to the SACC and the NGK, Pentecostals place a great deal of emphasis on socialization, group meetings, Bible study, and accountability.

Members are taught to marry only other "born-again" Christians, from their own or another Pentecostal church. This teaching encourages the concept of exclusivity among members and has been observed elsewhere in the

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[313] Robert Garner, interview with the author, April 5, 2001.

worldwide Pentecostal movement. Additionally, men and women, and especially women, take vows to abstain from sexual activity until marriage, and the issue appears to be a very matter-of-fact reality to many young adults.[314]

Several factors help Pentecostals abide by these purgative modes of behavior. Regular and specific teaching, at services and at summer camps, is one factor. These activities, which are well organized and financially supported by local congregations, point to the indoctrination, socialization, and exclusivity of Pentecostal daily life, the *intensive* church life of members. In contrast, the SACC does not exhibit intensiveness toward individual members. Instead, the SACC focuses on structural issues—access to resources and broad educational objectives, as examples. Additionally, the SACC and leaders who work within these organizations do not prescribe behavioral guidelines for individuals. The SACC's theological tradition, which is also firmly grounded in social justice, places less emphasis on personal or pietist behavioral issues. The NGK, while intensive, is intensive along cultural and ethnic lines but not on matters such as personal finances and sexual behavior. These are private matters and should be left to individuals to make appropriate choices for themselves.

High levels of socialization increase the credibility that one will be held accountable and be disciplined in the event of sin. Group members know each

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[314] Garner, interview, April 5, 2001.

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other too well, meet too often, to hide much from each other.[315] Exclusion operates at two levels: eschatologically, in which sexual sin will imperil salvation, and socially, in the contrast between God's will and the sin of the world.

Pentecostals achieve high levels of sexual change through indoctrination, that is, inappropriate sexual activity is displeasing to God, a view reinforced by high levels of teaching and Bible reading. To stray from this code is to imperil salvation, and, risk exclusion from the community of the saved. The young member's primary social network, the youth group, offers the reciprocal support of other group members, who also monitor each others' behavior. Finally, the spiritual resources of a charismatic religious subjective experience assist the maintenance of this counter-cultural behavior.

While the official position of the NGK (and other mainline Christian traditions), the SACC, and other faith traditions would certainly discourage inappropriate sexual activity, it is hard to demonstrate that the actual behavior of members is substantially different from non-church members. Members of the NGK or other mainline traditions tend to make promiscuous sexual behavior less acceptable, but members are not threatened with expulsion or discipline, unless members are in direct positions of leadership in church structures. More

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[315] Other ground-breaking scholarship makes this very point. A.A. Dubb, studying black Pentecostals in Port Elizabeth observed that sexual morality is enforced by the mutual surveillance of its members, and the threat of discipline or expulsion from the congregation. See his *Community of the Saved: An African Revivalist Church in the East Cape* (Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand Press, 1976).

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importantly, the leadership does not directly address these issues and in some cases, it is not even clear if churches discourage this type of behavior.[316]

Of these three traditions, Pentecostals have expectations that one should and will be held accountable to other members about the most private aspects of members' lives. It is this intensive experience that seems to account for reduced levels of sexual partners among members. The emphasis on personal piety, of holiness and living the virtuous life, stems from the antithetical theological stream. To reiterate, the antithetical stream assumes that culture is beyond redemption and that one must take steps to remove oneself from culture and live counterculturally. Pentecostals fit squarely into this theological stream and this is emphasized among the leadership and members.

To conclude this discussion, Pentecostals are the most effective in preventing inappropriate sexual behavior that would place members at risk for infection of HIV. Because fewer members within Pentecostal congregations and settings will develop AIDS and die, this may suggest that Pentecostals will experience some upward socioeconomic mobility, especially as compared to other religious groups. This will be an interesting trend to watch as the AIDS epidemic peaks in South Africa around 2010. For the other traditions, some of the church type dynamics are missing. For the NGK, a mainline tradition,

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[316] In a study of Catholicism in Uganda, Ronald Kassimir applied Mann's extensive-intensive distinction in a study of rural Catholicism in Uganda, and draws out the way a lack of exclusion dilutes a church's power. In many respects, Catholicism is the archetype of extensive religion, yet its impact on matters cultural, sexual, and financial is slight: by sacrificing the intensity of commitment for purposes of inclusiveness, the moral and social content of Catholic membership is diffuse. See Ronald Kassimir, "Catholics and Political Identity in Toro," in H.B. Hansen and M. Twaddle, *Religion and Politics in East Africa* (Oxford: James Curry, 1995), 131.

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members and clergy are generally the best educated and most urbane. They object theologically to many of the practices described within Pentecostal traditions. This is especially true in Methodist and Anglican mainline traditions. It tends to be their policy to soften the conservative moral teaching, exclusion and high socialization associated with groups that often are disparagingly described as "fundamentalist," and to downplay charismatic, subjective religious experience. Each of these stances serves to weaken the potential of mainline traditions to be a source of change in sexual behavior. While the NGK as an institution is decidedly more conservative than either of the Methodist and Anglican mainline traditions, the NGK is noticeably silent on the topic in most cases. Again, individual DRC congregations, such as the GK, as they partner with congregations with many of their members who are suffering from the HIV/AIDS epidemic firsthand, are recognizing the need to develop an effective response to members.[317] However, because extensive-type churches have weekly access to large numbers of people, they are likely to participate and play a key role in the care of those sick with AIDS and the children left parentless by the epidemic. The SACC appears to be poised to play this role. Like the mainline traditions, the SACC focuses more on education and choices. However, studies show that education alone does not often change behavior,

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[317] Jakob Pretorious, interview by author, October 17, 2001.

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especially when compared to indoctrination.[318] So, while their collaboration

with the state is minimal, Pentecostals are a good example of a civil society

actor that is in a situation of balanced pluralism in a democratic political context.

Pentecostalism's focus on healing will continue to place them in the vortex of

the many pressing issues in South Africa for the foreseeable future.

The South African Council of Churches: Growing New Branches—From a Theology of Liberation to a Theology of Reconstruction

The SACC: Transformationist, Extensive, Autonomous with a Diffused Impact

As has been maintained throughout this study, the great majority of

South Africans identify themselves as Christians. Moreover, this identification

is an *active* as opposed to *nominal* expression of religious faith and practice.

And, as has been demonstrated, the South African Council of Churches and the

Institute for Contextual Theology formed the basis of the liberation struggle and

promoted democratic reform. This wide array of religious expression will

continue to have effects on South Africa today. To cite Nelson Mandela again,

he stressed that religious leaders can give the current government guidance in

setting moral standards:

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[318] One observer has noted that given the low probability of a peaceful and prosperous life for most young Africans, a reckless fatalism, often manifested in high- risk sexual behavior, might even be "logical" in utilitarian terms. Colin la Foy also observed that the valley of despair that overshadows so many can lead to self-destruction and a loss of the respect for one's own life and the life of others. See D. Webb, *HIV and AIDS in Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 1997), and Colin La Foy, interview by author, Durban, South Africa, September 26, 2001.

What I'm stressing is that the church is a very powerful organiza-
tion, which has played an important role in our struggle for demo-
cratic changes and it is necessary for us to recognize that role. And
the church is committed to high moral values...the involvement of
the church in government will help us to raise moral standards in
government.[319]

The long liberation struggle, coupled with the demands of South Africa's

industrialization and urbanization, has resulted in the formation of vibrant,

popular-based associational organizations, especially in the 1980s. The state had

systemically disenfranchised the majority of its people and banned national

movements, but the basis of civil society's infrastructure was nourished within

the struggle.[320] Even though these civil society institutions were created under

very difficult circumstances, they were voluntary organizations that existed to

temper and transform state power in an effort to establish full-scale

democracy.[321]

In today's South Africa, civil society organizations, including the SACC,

do not operate in a context of semi-authoritarianism. After 1994, majority rule

emerged out of South Africa's three-year negotiation process that led to an

eventual agreement between the ANC and the National Party on the form of

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[319] Nelson Mandela as quoted in "Discusses Challenges Ahead," FBIS-AFR-94-082-S,
28 April 1994, 24, as cited in Tracy Kuperus, *State, Civil Society in South Africa,* 156.

[320]Steven Friedman, "Democratic Selections: Civil Society and Development in South
Africa's New Democracy," in E. Maganya and R. Houghton, eds., *Transformation in South
Africa?* (Johannesburg: Institute for African Alternatives, 1996), 230-250.

[321] P. Fitzgerald, "Democracy and Civil Society in South Africa," *Review of African
Political Economy* 49: 94-110.

government—a nonracial liberal democracy protecting group rights within a

capitalist economy. From the perspective of leading observers, the government

continues to make proper room for the diversity of civil society in South Africa.

Steven Friedman notes that:

> There are no legal mechanisms which restrict civil society today.
> The government, in that sense, has made room for civil society.
> However, we're a polarized society and this has obvious impli-
> cations. There are parts of civil society the government will
> listen to and others that it won't, but this is part of any society...
> Our country has a diverse civil society arrangement that has a
> complex relationship with the government. [322]

Given that there is a full range of civil society actors in South Africa, the SACC

continues to identify itself as a prophetic voice in South Africa. The SACC has

moved from an overtly confrontational role to an accountability role. As has

been argued, the SACC was one of the few unbanned liberationist movements in

the country in the 1980s during the spiral of involvement. Its legitimacy with the

people deterred the government from engaging in direct conflict with the SACC

and other prophetic organizations.[323] Leaders such as Desmond Tutu, Beyers

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[322] Steven Friedman, "An Unlikely Utopia: State and Civil Society in South Africa," *Politikon* 19, 1: 5-19.

[323] One of the other major prophetic church actors in South Africa was the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC). The SACBC worked closely with the SACC, although ultimately, its actions and pronouncements were not as overt and vocal. The laity and parishes lagged in their support for contextual theology and the liberation struggle, while the leadership struggled to be more out in front in backing prophetic theology in the form of letters and reports throughout the 1980s, including the condemnation of the 1983 constitution, revelation of acts of police brutality, and attacks on government policies of forced relocation. The SACBC was unable to assume a more overt prophetic stance due to several interrelated factors: the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church (bishops had to ultimately pledge their allegiance to Rome), laypeople and parishes were overwhelmingly white and did not feel the full effects of apartheid's systematic disenfranchisement, and finally, institutional dynamics

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Naude, and Frank Chikane continued to forward the SACC's critique of apartheid's political, social, and economic structures. As political oppression increased, the SACC provided support for conscientious objectors to military service, opposed foreign investment in South Africa, and resolved that churches should withdraw from cooperation with the state in all areas and organizations where the law and state contradicted the law of God's justice.[324] The SACC's actions were directed toward transforming white power structures and mobilizing the resources of oppressed communities.

The SACC was sympathetic to the ANC during the apartheid years, endorsing the Freedom Charter as a document that embraced a just vision of the future, and supported the aims and goals of the liberation struggle. Therefore, many expected that the SACC's relationship to the current government to be one of strong support, or the "ANC at Prayer." However, unlike the "NGK at Prayer," the SACC continues to embrace an *alternative* transformationist theological stream as opposed the NGK's historic *dominant* transformationist theological stream. The alternative tradition focuses on issues of the poor, the oppressed, and the marginalized. As a result, the SACC has tried to not be an

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inhibited more direct engagement of contextual theology within the church structures. See Peter Walshe, *Prophetic Christianity and the Liberation Movement,* and Tristan Anne Borer, *Challenging the State,* for an exhaustive analysis of this church actor in South Africa.

[324]Peter Walshe, *Prophetic Christianity and the Liberation Movement in South Africa* (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications, 1995).

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instrument of the state or be co-opted by the state.[325] Instead, the SACC has positioned itself in a situation of coexisting conflict and balanced pluralism. The SACC and the majoritarian ANC government have the same broad policy goals, but there are significant differences on how those goals should be achieved. SACC leaders have tried to maintain a critical distance from the ANC-dominated state to maintain legitimacy, even as they support the state's overall goals concerning nation-building and reconstruction.

More specifically, in the 1990s, religious leaders, especially those connected to the SACC, decided that a different contextual theology—a theology of reconstruction, rather than resistance—was needed to ground the churches' goals and purposes in the new South Africa.

Charles Villa-Vicencio described this theology of reconstruction as one that denounced all forms of exploitation but simultaneously affirmed the process of nation-building in a democratic society when it involved "meaningful political, socio-economic and cultural changes such as one-to-one person vote, economic justice, ecological renewal, gender sensitivity, and so on."[326] A

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[325] In direct contrast, civil society sctors in Zimbabwe were co-opted by the state and the results are now coming to tragic fruition in the twenty-first century, some twenty years since the independence of Zimbabwe under the leadership of Robert Mugabe. For a comparison of civil society actors in South Africa and Zimbabwe, see Tracy Kuperus, "Religious Associations: South Africa and Zimbabwe," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37, 4 (1999): 643-668.

[326] Charles Villa-Vicencio, "The Church and Violence," in *A Long Struggle: The Involvement of the World Council of Churches in South Africa,* ed. Pauline Webb (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1994), 102-115. Insights were also obtained with an interview with the author, October 3-5, 2001, St. George's Cathedral, Cape Town, South Africa.

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theology of reconstruction involves churches that are in critical solidarity with a democratically elected government.[327] Churches and religious organizations cannot simply retreat to saving souls and letting politicians do the politicking, nor can they continue to criticize and resist the state, making unrealistic, utopian demands. This view of retreat is one of antithetical/conversionist roots at best and accommodationist roots at worst, as viewed from a transformationist theological perspective. Instead, the church "must be critical, but from within the context of solidarity and support for what is good and laudable in the government's programs."[328]

The SACC and other prophetic associations have had to keep alive a social vision that avoids the twin evils of exploitative *laissez-faire* capitalism and dogmatic socialism. This vision is not afraid to give special attention to the poor through race and gender preferences because of historic marginalization. Conferences in the 1990s such as Cottesloe II and Kairos II reaffirm the prophetic churches' original commitments to stamping out racial and economic oppression and supporting the path to a true, uninhibited democracy.

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[327] This view receives some critique from radical theologians who insist that moving to a theology of reconstruction has been premature given the reality that the vast majority of South Africans have not experienced complete liberation and justice. The idea that there is a "change in attitude" is questionable even if transition has occurred politically. These scholars and others would argue that the prophetic voice must continue to resist and overtly hold the state accountable until material and social gains are attained throughout society.

[328] Albert Nolan, *God in South Africa: The Challenge of the Gospel* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995). 21.

With regard to the nation-building process, the SACC has been instrumental with its involvement with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The commission, led by former Secretary General of the SACC, Desmond Tutu, argued forcefully that the efforts of the TRC to establish truth, forgiveness, reconciliation, confession, and restitution could help to heal the nation.[329] Churches were also involved in civic education campaigns concerning the TRC's structure, and they provided pastoral care for both the victims and perpetrators of atrocities committed under the apartheid regime.

One of the SACC's most recent, ongoing, and visible policy difference with the government is its criticism of the government's macroeconomic growth, employment and redistribution strategy (GEAR). Church leaders are suspicious of economic plans that seem to be more committed to privatization and investment opportunities than to meeting the needs of the poor. Beyers Naude, longtime veteran of the liberation struggle, pointed out that because GEAR is a "party political issue" that affected fundamental Christian beliefs about the church's obligation to the poor, the church has no option but to intervene.[330]

One of the sister prophetic organizations under the broad umbrella of the SACC is the Diakonia Council of Churches (DCC). The DCC is an interchurch

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[329] B.H. Bam, "The Church in South Africa," in B. Pityana and Charles Villa-Vicencio, eds., *Being in the Church in South Africa Today* (Johannesburg: SACC, 1995), 43-53.

[330] W. Hlongwa, "Churches go to War Against GEAR," *Electronic Mail and Guardian*, www.mg.co.za/mg/news/9jul98-gear-html.

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agency, working with churches and church organizations in the Durban

Functional Region (Unicity) to promote justice, reconciliation, development,

and peace in the context of poverty and AIDS. The priorities of Diakonia are:

> Economic justice

> Economic empowerment

> HIV/AIDS prevention and care

> Democracy in Action

> Peace, healing and reconciliation[331]

Responding to the growth of joblessness and inequality, Diakonia and its

affiliates place economic justice and empowerment as the two top priorities for

South Africa's future. As one panelist noted at a recent workshop on the New

Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): "...we must always remember

that God takes the side of the poor."[332] At the advent of the twenty-first century,

the deepening aftermath of apartheid has trapped some 22 million South

Africans into abject—or destitute—poverty. On average, these millions survive

on less than $15 monthly. Diakonia has intensified its efforts to promote

economic literacy within Diakonia's member churches as well as strengthen

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[331] Diakonia Council of Churches, *Annual Report 2002/2003*, 4.

[332] Nomabelu Mvambo-Dandala, Deputy Director, Diakonia Economic Justice
Programme, *Workshop on the New Partnership for Africa's Development*, Durban, South Africa,
November 19, 2002.

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links with other stakeholders, both nationally through the SACC networks and in its local circles of influence in Durban and KwaZulu Natal.[333]

In addition to these realities, one of the new trends in contextual theology is empowering the historically *voiceless* to speak and not be silenced. Responding to NEPAD's tendency toward relying upon private capital to sustain economic growth to reduce poverty, participants resolved that the prophetic voice needs to remain proactive and not be co-opted into the engines of privatization. More specifically, one panelist, a scholar at the Mzwandile Rodrigo Nunes School of Theology at the University of Natal, posed these rhetorical reflective questions for the workshop:

> The majority of adult Christians today are either
> unemployed or are working in poorly paid jobs.
> Do we in our pastoral practice really count the
> unemployed and poorly paid Christians as members
> of our church? Or, do we behave as if we are a
> middle class church doing good works *for* the poor
> who are outside our church boundaries?...Does it
> really encourage the unemployed to consider them-
> selves full members of the church when the collection
> plate is passed around in a very public way?[334]

This remarkable insight poses a new question for contextual theology. In the past, one of the major tenets of prophetic theology was to speak for the voiceless. Now, the voiceless can speak. What do they say about themselves?

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[333] Paddy Kearney, Director, Diakonia Council of Churches, interview with the author, September 27, 2001.

[334] Nomabelu Mvambo-Dandala, Deputy Director, interview with the author, Diakonia Council of Churches, October 2001.

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This process is important in the process of reconciliation and was one of the features of the TRC's work in the mid-1990s. It is important for the prophetic voice to speak *with* the poor in the new South Africa. In response to these new realities, Diakonia is on the cutting edge in educating people to participate in their own decisions. Mxolisi Zondi, Program Organizer, states that: "Before, the people were not included in decisions. Now, we are role players in democracy."[335] Focus now needs to emphasize that people have control over their lives, and can petition the government in healthy ways to lobby for the resources they need for the lives. "Advocacy and lobbying is a new way of looking at things...we can get what we want without fighting."[336]

The SACC continues to support the overall goals of nation-building and democratic consolidation, but it faces significant barriers to effectiveness because of decreased financial resources and the movement of some of the top leadership into government and the challenges of engaging with and providing moral leadership within a pluralist, democratic society.[337] The SACC needs to continue to address this issue if they are to remain a viable institution in South Africa.

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[335] Mxolisi Zondi, Program Organizer, Diakonia Council Churches' Democracy in Action Program, interview by author, October 2, 2001.

[336] DCC, Annual Report, 2002/2003, p. 23. Conflict resolution programs are executed by the African Centre for the Peaceful Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), which is based in Durban and maintains a regional and continental presence in sub-Saharan Africa.

[337] Charles Villa-Vicencio, interview with the author, October 3-5, 2001, Cape Town, South Africa. See also Peter Walshe, *Prophetic Christianity,* 143.

Umuntu Ngumuntu Ngabantu: The Key to Understanding "Socialist" Democracy?

The failure of political orders in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa since the second wave of independence indicates that systems of government—whether liberal democratic, socialist, or Marxist-Leninist—that are foisted on the people of Africa cannot be expected to take root without taking into account Africa's political, economic, social, and cultural trajectories. After all, this is what occurred in the so-called top-tier democracies of the United States, France, and Great Britain.[338] While attempts by Western public policy practitioners, nonprofit professionals, politicians, and academics to prescribe democratic solutions for Africa have to be considered seriously, they have to be treated with critical caution. Kwame Appiah rightly stresses that Africa will only solve its problems if they are seen as human challenges arising out of an African context.[339]

Of particular significance in this regard is Basil Davidson's contention that democracy in Africa requires a synthesis rooted in its past yet able to deal

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[338] John W. de Gruchy, interview, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa, October 3, 2001.

[339] Kwame Anthony Appiah, *In My Father's House: What Does it Mean to be an African Today?* (London: Methuen, 1992), 220.

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with the challenges of the present.[340] What is necessary is the harnessing of resources that are part of African tradition, and their critical integration with those democratic values, institutions, and procedures that have developed more universally.[341] Democracy will not be a reality, nor can it be sustained in Africa, without the creation of a genuinely African form of democratic government, and an African civil society.[342]

One of the problems with organic societies, and especially those with a sacralized notion of authority, is that they find it difficult to handle dissent and plurality. Traditionally, African communalism was not ethnically based; people from different communities could pass from one to another and be accepted without much difficulty. Still, African communalism assumed a homogeneity, which is very different from the pluralism of modern nation-states. In order for African societies to become democratic within a modern pluralist context, they have to retrieve and carry communal participation over into a nation-state context. Christianity could play a critical and formative role in this process, challenging hierarchical domination, affirming community, stressing the

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[340] During the height of structural adjustment programs and the crystallization of Cold War politics, Basil Davidson made this observation. See "Questions about Nationalism", *African Affairs,* 76, 302, January 1977, 44.

[341] Claude Ake, "Rethinking African Democracy", *Journal of Democracy,* 2,1 Winter 1991, 33ff.

[342] Lionel Cliffe and David Seddon, "Africa in a New World Order", *Review of African Political Economy,* 50, 3-11, 1991, 10.

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importance of interpersonal relations rather than possessive individualism, and promoting an integrative spirituality.[343]

Fundamental to African culture is the understanding of the human being (*ubuntu*) enshrined in the Xhosa proverb *umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu:* a person is a person through other persons.[344] Its contemporary reaffirmation is essential for the renewal of democracy in Africa and more universally. This does not imply the denial of individuals or individual rights. On the contrary, a respect for each person is fundamental.[345] But it is different than possessive individualism.[346] The emphasis is on human sociality, on interpersonal relations, on the recognition that each person has something to offer to others in order to be fully human.[347] This, rather than liberalism or Marxism, is the root of African humanism, and it relates well to biblical anthropology.[348]

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[343] John de Gruchy, interview with author, University of Cape Town, October 4, 2001.

[344] Augustine Shutte, *Philosophy for Africa* (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1993), 46.

[345] Kwesi Dickson, *Theology in Africa* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1984), 135.

[346] Jannie Malan, Research Fellow, African Centre for the Peaceful Resolution of Disputes, interview by author, Cape Town, South Africa, October 7, 2001.

[347] Martin Luther King's famous *Letter from a Birmingham Jail* in 1968 makes this same point on the need to realize that human beings are human beings through an awareness of other human beings and that we all have something to offer each other.

[348] John de Gruchy, interview by author, October 4, 2001.

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African theologians outside southern Africa have struggled to develop a critical political theology able to help churches resist tyranny, overcome ethnic tension, and establish a just democratic order. In South Africa this has been the reverse, where contemporary theologies have been honed in the struggle against apartheid. Theologians and others are understandably wary of the abuses of ethnicity. However, now the current multicultural context requires continued work in responding to two streams—without the prophetic, there is no critical insight; without the cultural, there is no creative engagement.[349]

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[349] John de Gruchy, interview, October 4, 2001.

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Chapter 5

What Now for Churches in
South Africa?:
Conclusion

The primary contribution of churches in South Africa during the process

of democratic consolidation and transformation will be their ability to mediate

between conflicting factions, and to facilitate national reconciliation and

reconstruction. In pursuing this role, some church and faith-based leaders in

South Africa have come to recognize that they can no longer be identified with a

particular political party in the way they may have previously identified with

liberation movements and post-independent governments. What was necessary

in the struggle against apartheid is no longer helpful where the separation of

church and state is of fundamental importance if the church is to fulfill its role as

a viable civil society actor.

Religious traditions in South Africa are in a unique position to influence

political developments, providing social cohesion. They are in daily contact with

people and often have a larger and more committed membership than political

parties, and in many instances, their understanding of the situation on the ground

is better than that of politicians. While the witness of the church to the central

government is obviously critical, it is at the local community level that churches

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and religious traditions is often strongest and able to make the greatest difference in the democratic and social fabric of South African society.

Cooperation, Accommodation and Conflict Between the State and Religious Traditions

This study examined how three religious traditions—the NGK, the Pentecostals, and the SACC—related to the state from the early to the late twentieth century. The focus of this study compared the responses of these three religious traditions and answered why, given that they are informed by a Christian theological framework, they have responded very differently to given political, economic, and social contexts over time. Specifically, this study sought to examine how religious response might change in an authoritarian and democratic political context. For the NGK, three distinct types of NGK-state relations were observed:

> ➤ From 1934 to 1947 and from 1994 to the present, NGK-state relations were in a situation of coexisting conflict.

> ➤ From 1947 to 1961 and 1978 to 1994 NGK-state relations were in a situation of mutual engagement.

> ➤ From 1961 to 1978 NGK-state relations were in a situation of collaboration/cooptation.

For the SACC, four distinct types of relations were discovered:

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➢ From 1934 to 1952 the SACC was in a situation of conflictual resistance.

➢ From 1952 to 1977 the SACC was in a situation of enforced disengagement.

➢ From 1978 to 1990 the SACC continued to be in a situation of enforced disengagement. However, unlike the previous era of enforced disengagement, the SACC's response shifted from separation from the state to confrontation of the state.

➢ From 1990 to the present, the SACC has been in an evolving situation of coexisting conflict and balanced pluralism.

For Pentecostals, three distinct relations were observed:

➢ From 1904 to 1955 Pentecostals were in a situation of enforced disengagement. However, unlike the SACC, Pentecostals acquiesced to the apartheid regime during this phase.

➢ From 1955 to 1990 this situation of enforced disengagement continued. However, individuals and individual congregations did join the growing liberation movement, especially during the 1980s.

➢ Finally, from 1990 to the present, Pentecostals have been in a situation of balanced pluralism.

The NGK, as a civic institution, limited itself to racial, ethnic, and class interests. The NGK did not forward widespread democratic interests and represented a civil society institution that was reluctant to embrace political reforms, especially during the 1980s, when the state was making gestures to promote it. The NGK's dominant transformationist theological stream created a universe of ideas that encouraged leaders to transform society utilizing theological constructs. That stream, combined with a strong hierarchical decision-making structure and intensive church behavior, made the NGK a formidable institution in developing the foundations of apartheid.

From 1934 to 1947, state-NGK relations were in a situation of coexisting conflict. The factions dominating the NGK and the state were relatively autonomous from one another regarding the development of race policy during this phase. Although cooperation between the two entities occurred, they held different opinions on the implementation of race policy. The dominant factions in both the NGK and the state promoted segregationist legislation aimed at reproducing a cheap labor force. However, the "purist" faction dominating the NGK supported a stricter implementation of segregation than the UP-dominated state based on particular class interests and socio-political concerns. Over time, the NGK grew increasingly dissatisfied with the UP-dominated state's commitment to partial segregation, supporting political change through organs such as the Nationalist Party in an effort to transform and achieve the objectives of Afrikaner nationalism.

From 1948 to 1961 the NGK and the NP-dominated state exhibited a relationship of mutual engagement in which the groups dominating each entity

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held similar opinions on the majority of policy issues. However, situations arose periodically where NP leaders dominating the state and NGK leaders arrived at different opinions concerning strategies related to race policy. Within the NGK, purist and pragmatist factions disagreed over the implementation of apartheid. In other words, purists forwarded *vertical* apartheid and pragmatists forwarded *partial* apartheid, with the purists as the dominant faction. The NP at this time advocated a pragmatist position. The major faction of this pragmatist position, the *baaskap*, was slightly more lenient but insured white domination in society. From 1958 to 1961, a switch occurred, in which the NGK began to suggest a relaxation of race policy, while the state implemented the more comprehensive policy of separate development.

Collaboration described NGK-state relations from 1962 to 1978. During the era of collaboration, leaders dominating the NP-dominated state and the NGK were committed to the maintenance of three goals: 1) white, mainly Afrikaner, supremacy in the political and social arena, 2) economic prosperity through white or Afrikaner-based capitalism, and 3) the implementation of a racial policy that maintained ethnic purity and tried to justify the benefits of separate development. The two entities were virtually indistinguishable with one another during this period.

From 1979 to 1994 the NGK and the state again exhibited a relationship of mutual engagement. Most of the time, the NGK continued to give its unequivocal support to the state, as it had during the first three decades of

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apartheid rule. However, situations arose where leaders within the NGK and the NP-dominated state arrived at different opinions concerning policy directions and strategies. During these years, the state found itself in a spiral of involvement that brought it into confrontation with other civil society actors, to include the SACC. The state began implementing reforms to relax race policy. When these did not satisfy the demands of the SACC, ANC, and other civil society actors, the state became increasingly repressive in an attempt to stamp out these actors. While the NP attempted to respond effectively to a rapidly changing political context and middle-class interests by promoting the attainment of white survival and continued economic prosperity, the NGK lagged behind, supporting the goals of white and Afrikaner survival and economic prosperity through a slower implementation of reform. The NGK lagged behind because the leadership was beholden to conservative members who were unwilling and not ready to embrace political reform that repudiated the ideals of apartheid and weakened the cohesion of the Afrikaner *volk*.

From 1994 to the present, NGK-state relations are in an evolving situation of coexisting conflict. The ANC-dominated state maintains no official religious, to include Christian, viewpoint. However, the ANC government has been relatively transparent in allowing civil society actors, to include religious organizations such as the NGK, to participate in the building of political institutions. The NGK, while acknowledging that apartheid became a political ideology protecting white interests to the exclusion of others, and admitting that

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it sided with Afrikaner interests for too long, has not supported the expression of "collective guilt" because it views the confession as a personal matter. These NGK positions bind Afrikaners together but they do not necessarily find common ground with the ANC-led government. Moreover, the NGK's reluctance to embrace the government because it does not adopt a "Christian viewpoint" creates an automatic distance between the two entities. It is likely that the NGK's relationship with the state will be one of continued coexisting conflict as the church respectfully disagrees with and distances itself from many of the ANC-promoted policies dominating the state.

The South African Council of Churches

> The SACC, as a civic institution, committed itself to the liberation struggle in the early to mid-twentieth century. As an extensive religious tradition, the SACC forwarded widespread democratic interests. Although the SACC can be characterized as transformationist, that is, committed to bringing about change in political, economic, and social life, its focus is on the disenfranchised and the poor. This difference in emphasis characterizes the SACC as an alternative transformationist actor. The SACC developed its prophetic Christian voice through an extensive and collaborative grassroots movement that would reach fruition in the 1980s. In the 1990s to the present, the SACC's role has weakened somewhat, but its work has shifted from the macro-level to the micro-level.

From 1934 to 1952 the SACC was in a situation of conflictual resistance. During this period, the state implemented policies that further entrenched the privileged positions of whites by continuing to strip away the political and economic roles of Africans in society. As a result of the Hertzog Bills, the

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CCSA was formed which would eventually become the SACC. While the state increasingly was unwilling to allow Africans to participate in political, social, and economic institutions, the SACC and other civil society actors continued to make efforts to lobby and work with the state to bring about reform. In 1948, with the victory of the National Party, all hope for reform through traditional legal tactics steadily evaporated.

From 1952 to 1977 the SACC was in a situation of enforced disengagement. The SACC, along with other liberationist civil society actors, found themselves in a situation of state-civil society separation. The NP-dominated state increasingly implemented policies that demonstrated its unwillingness to deal with the SACC and other civil society actors committed to reform. The Defiance Campaign of 1952 was the watershed event that attempted to build a mass movement and more importantly, build networks of support to meet the needs of people increasingly disenfranchised from the state. As the NP-dominated state continued to implement policies that would culminate in total and comprehensive apartheid, the SACC developed the tenets of prophetic Christianity during this period. To build the foundation of prophetic Christianity, the SACC drew upon a wide range of organizations, activists, laypeople, and others, both within South Africa and internationally. The four major trends which made up the "universe of ideas" for prophetic Christianity—the Second Vatican Council, The Christian Institute, Black Theology, and Institute for

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Contextual Theology—raised awareness about the liberation movement and the prophetic Christian response to the apartheid regime.

From 1978 to 1990 the SACC continued to be in a situation of enforced disengagement. However, unlike the previous era, the SACC's situation changed from separation from the state to confrontation of the state. The Soweto Massacre of 1976 was the watershed event that propelled the liberation movement from awareness to action. The foundations of the mass movement, which began in the early 1950s, mobilized into black labor resistance efforts that took the form of strikes, sit-ins, and consumer boycotts. The state, recognizing that total apartheid policies were no longer viable, made gestures towards reform. However, the SACC and other actors increasingly challenged the state and ultimately declared that the state was illegitimate and unfit to rule. This created a spiral of involvement in which all other civil society actors were stamped out except the SACC. As the NP-dominated state became more repressive, the SACC became more overtly political and took a prophetic stand and confronted the state.

From 1990 to the present, the SACC has been in an evolving situation of coexisting conflict to balanced pluralism. From 1990 to 1994, the SACC played the role of "honest broker", often shuttling back and forth between the two major political actors, the ANC and NP. With the sweeping victory of the ANC in 1994, the SACC has tried not to be an instrument of the state. Its leaders today recognize the complex situation in which they find themselves, and they

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have tried to maintain a critical distance from the ANC-dominated state to maintain their legitimacy, even as they support the state's overall goals concerning nation-building and reconstruction. More specifically, leaders within the SACC have moved from a theology of resistance to a theology of reconstruction. This theology of reconstruction involves churches that are in critical solidarity with a democratically elected government. These religious actors continue to keep alive a social vision that avoids the twin evils of exploitative *laissez-faire* capitalism and dogmatic socialism. This vision continues to speak with and for the poor because of their continued situation of marginalization. In today's political and economic context, the SACC has focused many of its efforts on economic transformation and social ills, most notably housing, employment, and HIV/AIDS.

The Pentecostals

> The Pentecostals, as a civic institution, has had a self-perception of opting out of political and economic life. However, because Pentecostalism has had the vast majority of adherents from disenfranchised portions of the South African population, combined with Pentecostalism's remarkable ability to adapt itself to specific cultural contexts, it has grown into the single largest Christian grouping in South Africa. Pentecostals have developed vibrant associational structures. It remains to be seen if Pentecostals will be agents to encourage cross-cutting association among other religious traditions or secular civic institutions.

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From the beginnings of the Pentecostal movement in Wakkerstroom in
1904 to 1955 the Pentecostals were in a situation of enforced disengagement.
Leaders within the Pentecostal tradition opted out and disengaged from the state.
This appeased state structures as they continued to implement policies that
institutionalized the separation of racial groups and channeled economic
resources to the white English-speaking and Afrikaner groups. Pentecostals
grew at a rapid rate because of the increased mariginalization of Africans in
society and their adaptability to traditional African religious practices. With the
rise of the Nationalist Party in 1948, the informal segregation of black and white
Pentecostals was further deepened as white Pentecostals began to be represented
in the government. Eager to improve its image with the Nationalist Party, white
Pentecostals encouraged practices that required formal schooling for clergy and
discouraged the "exuberant" practices of black Pentecostals, to include speaking
in tongues, hand-clapping, and "dancing in the Spirit."

From 1955 to 1990 Pentecostals continued to be in a situation of
enforced disengagement. However, individuals and individual churches began to
join the liberation struggle. One of the more notable individuals who
participated in the liberation struggle from the Pentecostal tradition was Frank
Chikane, who would become the Secretary General of the SACC during the era
of the spiral of involvement in the 1980s.

From 1990 to the present Pentecostals have been in a situation of
balanced pluralism. Within the various Pentecostal traditions, there have been

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efforts to reevaluate their theological orientation towards the state. Additionally, leaders within the Pentecostal tradition have made attempts to reconcile the relationship between black and white Pentecostal churches. In the midst of these efforts, the Pentecostal movement is one of the fastest growing phenomena in South Africa. As a church-type, they are other-worldly, and have developed an extensive social network to meet the needs of their congregations and communities.

The Future of Civil Society in South Africa: Theoretical Conclusions

By almost any standard, South Africa's new political system fully qualifies as a genuine democracy. It has run three peaceful national elections. It has conducted local elections, with the next round coming in 2005. It has one of the most progressive constitutions in modern human history. Larry Diamond, satisfied that South Africa provides genuine political competition, has called South Africa a "liberal democracy,"[350]

But a constitution, well-run elections, and stable elected representative institutions do not complete the process of democratic consolidation. Regardless of how well designed its political institutions are, a sustainable and consolidated democracy requires people who are willing to support, defend and sustain democratic processes. If political institutions are the "hardware" of the

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[350] Larry Diamond, "Introduction," in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds. *Democratization in Africa* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

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democratic system, then what people think about democracy and those institutions constitute the "software" of that system.[351] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argue that regardless of the quality of political processes and institutions, a democracy is only consolidated once it is legitimated, or seen by all significant political actors and an overwhelming majority of citizens as the "only game in town."[352]

Recent findings about South African attitudes towards democracy reveal significant challenges to complete the transformation process. While South Africans exhibit modest levels of support for democracy, overall support levels have not increased in any substantial manner since 1998. Across a broad range of indicators, South Africans' assessments of their political institutions and leaders are becoming more pessimistic. South Africans also exhibit relatively low levels of interest and participation in the democratic process.

With regard to the frequency of civic participation, South Africans still participate the most actively in religious organizations. According to studies performed by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Center for Democracy and Development in Ghana, and Michigan State University, over 35% of South Africans indicated significant levels of frequent participation in

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[351] Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haefpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 7.

[352] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Towards Consolidated Democracies," *Journal of Democracy* 7, April 1996.

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church and faith life. This statistic is higher than secular self-help associations, groups that gather on a given issue, such as schools or housing, or local commercial organizations. This sustained legitimacy of churches in South Africa suggests that religious traditions will continue to play an important role in South African associational and the development of political culture in the twenty-first century.

Since the 1980s, the concept of civil society has been resurrected in scholarly work. In large part, this is due to the wave of global democratization and the belief that civil society organizations play a pivotal role in democratic transitions. Additionally, there have been trends that suggest that the state in many parts of the developing world will not be a viable entity to allocate and deliver resources to its people with rising expectations. This situation is further exacerbated in countries with a market-dominant minority in the midst of an impoverished majority.

This study contributes to contemporary debates. South Africa's white settler colonial heritage and its unique type of authoritarianism inarguably shaped the nature and role of civil society during the twentieth century. South Africa's oligarchic, racist government disenfranchised and limited the civic activities of millions of South Africans. The NGK, the dominant transformationist church tradition, aligned itself with the Afrikaners and provided support, justification, and mechanisms for the apartheid regime. The vast majority, however, were excluded from engaging in autonomous,

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independent civic activities and joined the liberation movement instead. The SACC, the alternative transformationist church tradition, was one of the major religious actors in this arena during the apartheid era. The Pentecostals opted out of the political process, and formed civic associations to meet the needs of their people. As momentum gained in the liberation struggle, individuals and individual Pentecostal churches and groups joined in the antiapartheid campaign.

Despite the limitations of South Africa's civil society arrangements under apartheid, it can be argued that associational activity within white and black civil society helped foster the relatively robust and pluralist civil society in South Africa today.

As we have seen, different religious traditions flourished, even under the heavy-handedness of the apartheid regime. With all these developments, the jury is still out on the long-term viability of civil society to contain governmental abuses, encourage and generate a democratic political culture, and structuring a multitude of political channels that represent societal interests. The enormity of the challenges facing those engaged in the transformation process in South Africa is daunting. What might be taken for granted in countries with a long experience of democratic government, with a well-trained civil service and adequate resources, an educated and literate population, and a vibrant civil society, cannot be assumed. The sheer logistics involved in voter education, organizing the ballot and ensuring free and fair elections, to say nothing of what

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then needs to happen, is overwhelming at best.[353] All of these challenges point

in the direction of the urgent need for people and politicians to be educated in

the meaning of democracy, civil society, and conflict resolution if

transformation is be sustained. As a vital part of this task it is essential that

Africans discover the resources of their own traditions and do not simply rely on

imported political systems and structures.[354]

In fact, some observers argue that civil society in South Africa is too

divided, exclusive, or co-opted to be considered healthy and autonomous. What

lessons can be learned from South Africa's past so that civil society and hold the

state accountable and strengthen democracy?

First, the South African citizenry must engage in an extended debate

about the role of state and civil society. Although trends are starting to change,

most of these debates center around and within academic institutions and

political leaders. Some of the leading revisionist thinkers argue for a democratic

socialist state and avoid the anti-democratic elements of a socialist

democracy.[355] With this in mind, state leaders need to encourage a vibrant civil

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[353]   Larry Diamond, "The Second Liberation", *Africa Report*, 37, 6, November-December
1992, 41.

[354]   John W. de Gruchy, interview, University of Cape Town, October 3, 2001.

[355]   Mark Swilling, "The Case for Associational Socialism", *Works in Progress*, no. 76
(1991): 20-3. Swilling and other revisionists argue for a democratic socialist society because the
inequalities from the apartheid regime are too great to leave to liberal democratic and free
market capitalistic structures to rectify. The state needs to be interventionist, but also be
transparent and allow for the development of viable and autonomous civil society actors. A
socialist democracy is undesirable because in this arrangement, the assumption is that the
citizenry has had an extended debate about the role of the state and civil society and have
collectively decided to allow the state to have more control over political and economic life. This

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society where groups can engage in voluntary and autonomous activity constrained by the law and oriented towards grassroots, local self government.

Other observers criticize these views because they ignore the reality of the South African situation and civil society. The state and civil society are interdependent entities and need to be viewed together. Second, and more importantly, civil society does not guarantee democracy; in fact, it usually represents bourgeoisie or elite interests that often conflict with democracy. Finally, civil society may not be necessary for the democratic process of consolidation because it diminishes the state's role in constructing socialism.[356]

The more liberal perspectives envision a civil society and a limited, but strong and autonomous state that allows for the autonomy of civil society, and encourage a truly representative democracy. However, some national leaders have assumed that civil society institutions oriented towards the liberation struggle epitomize the essence of participatory, grassroots democracy. However, this perspective ignores the reality that liberationist movements are not homogeneous in their interests nor do they represent the interests of all South Africans.

While the Marxist perspective is overly suspicious of the beneficial role that civil society can play in consolidating democracy, the neo-liberal

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has been the case with Scandinavian countries such as Sweden and Norway. Moreover, these countries have a relatively homogeneous and less diverse population.

[356]Blade Nzimande and Mpume Sikhosana, "Civil Society and Democracy", *African Communist*, 1 (1992): 37-51.

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perspective tends to hold too closely to a Western notion of state-civil society relations. Its emphasis on the functional separation of societal spheres does not adequately address the ongoing issues of economic apartheid that may hinder, and possibly undermine, the consolidation of democracy.

Second, South Africa must avoid the situation that has occurred all too often in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, that is, a semi-authoritarian, weak state trying to control and co-opt civil society actors in the process.[357] State structures need to be transparent and autonomous, and able to deliver public goods in an equitable manner to its citizens.

Third, churches and religious leaders can assist in nurturing the moral values upon which democracy can flourish. A culture of tolerance, civility and accommodation of diverse ethnic groups needs to be established in South Africa. The examination of South Africa's historic state-civil society relations has shown that a civil society constructed along ethnic, particularistic lines damages a country's political future and democratic prospects. On the other hand, an inclusive civil society can be established in South Africa if prejudice and distrust of other groups is attenuated and an appreciation of other cultures is encouraged. Moreover, a sustained ethical and theological reflection on significant political and social issues by religious traditions can offer unique perspectives on state-civil society relations.

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[357] Zimbabwe is the most notable example in the early twenty-first century.

Fourth, religious traditions can join other civil society actors in enhancing skills for managing crises and handling conflict. Conflict management skills can be fostered through the work and outcome of civic education campaigns, church programs committed to reconciliation efforts, to include the landmark TRC proceedings. Religious traditions and organizations have the skills, resources, and legitimacy to nurture values like honesty and discipline, as well as general respect for democratic institutions. The SACC, with its pivotal role during the TRC proceedings, has been the most proactive in becoming an agent for sustainable reconciliation. As has been discussed, the Diakonia Council of Churches manages programs that allow for the constructive expression of issues such as housing and policing. Many more conflict resolution efforts need to emerge in civil society actors, to include churches, in South Africa.

Religion and Politics in the 21st Century: New Research Trends in Southern Christianity

"I've lost faith in both science and progress and the holy church."
—British rock star *Sting*

Fundamentalism and "Experientialism": Two Theological Streams Vying for the Pentecostal Church Family

For three centuries in the West, two principal contenders—scientific modernity and traditional religion—have clashed over the privilege of being the

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ultimate source of meaning and value. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, these two overarching worldviews have reached a stalemate. While people continue to rely upon the substantial contributions of science and what it can do well, many in the West have come to recognize that modernity cannot answer questions of meaning and value. And, many are intrigued with the *ancient* and *sacramental* aspects of religion, but have little interest in conventional churches.

As both scientific modernity and conventional religion progressively lose their ability to provide a source of spiritual meaning, two new contenders appear to be coming forward on the religious horizons—fundamentalism and "experientialism." As has been explored in certain aspects of this study, fundamentalists are heterogeneous and attempts to categorize them as a monolithic entity can be misleading. However, as Scott Appleby has noted in his work, the "family resemblance" of fundamentalists are its non-negotiable beliefs. In most cases, these fundamental beliefs are articulated in response to attacks from secular forces in the modern era. The other main source for the articulation of fundamentals is collusion and accommodation of culture that has, from the fundamentalist perspective, eroded the core of Christian belief. If fundamentalist articulation then finds its voice in one ethnic group, the recipe is a hotbed for conflict and tension in society and can highlight the divisions of societies. As has been seen worldwide, this lethal combination results in the conflicts witnessed around the world.

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The other major contender for spiritual ascendancy in this century is "experientialism." By its very nature it is infinitely harder to define than fundamentalism but like fundamentalism, the "family resemblance" is the attempt to assign meaning to experience. Liberation theology, which includes the prophetic voice of South Africa, have often drawn from this well of knowledge. Experientialists, like fundamentalists, attempt to reach back to the sources of faith and to make these sources relevant to the present day. Unlike fundamentalists, experientialists do not claim to be the authoritative voice of their tradition and often find much in common with people on other paths.[358]

Experiential spirituality places more responsibility on the individual and in turn requires a different form of religious affiliation. New patterns of church and spiritual life are more network than hierarchy. The traditional authority of the clergy is displaced by a company of seekers who support each other and provide a setting in which they can search and reassemble religious tradition's treasures.

This larger battle between fundamentalism and experientialism, between reactionary traditionalism and progressive traditionalism, has direct implications for religious traditions worldwide. In the context of this study, this larger

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[358]   One of the best treatments of the experiential stream is the work of Daniele Hervieu-Leger. Her claim is that millions of people today are turning to historic religious traditions not as pre-packaged answers, but as "toolboxes." Rather than a complete worldview, these people see their religions as invaluable depositories from which they can freely draw the symbolic and practical sustenance they need to make sense of the world and their lives. What is key is that the emphasis of cohesion rests with the *person* not with the *institution.* See her "Present-Day Emotional Renewals: The End of Secularization or the End of Religion?" in W.H. Swatos, ed., *A Future for Religion?: A New Paradigm for Social Analysis* (London: Sage, 1992).

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tension has a particularly profound impact on Pentecostals. Although many critics continue to dismiss them as an anachronism, Pentecostals are on the cutting edge of bringing meaning to faith. As has been argued throughout this study, the ranks of Pentecostals are people who struggle with identity and dignity, who face the full brunt of social, cultural and economic upheaval. It is not clear which way the Pentecostal movement will go, that is, in the direction of fundamentalism or experientialism. From a cursory perspective, the tide appears to be on the side of fundamentalism.

Some Pentecostals want to cooperate with ecumenical groups. Some do not. In South Africa, these trends are the same. Pentecostal groups were present at a breakfast meeting sponsored by the Diakonia Council of Churches, in Durban. The discussion, which centered around improving the bureaucratic mechanisms of the unicity project and the growing tension between white suburban homeowners and impoverished black city and urban dwellers and housing issues, was engaged by Pentecostals and liberal theological practitioners of the DCC in a spirit of respect and undersatnding. On the other hand, the pastor of an Apostolic Faith Mission in Clayville, South Africa,

adamantly resists any gestures of working with liberal theologians and practitioners who want to tinker with secular ideas to address what can only be resolved through "spiritual" means.[359]

Another trend that is emerging is that the division between northern Pentecostals and southern Pentecostals are also economic in nature. Many white and suburban African-American Pentecostals have embraced the health-and-wealth gospel, while black South African Pentecostals are more focused on serving the poor. Interestingly, Coloured Pentecostals and the emerging black elite are also beginning to embrace more of the health- and-wealth gospel. On one occasion, I was invited to a lunch with a colleague to meet other members of a local Pentecostal church. They proceeded to show me a video of one of the rising stars in South Africa, with close links with the Rhema Church, one of the largest megachurches in South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. The majority of the message centered on the "prosperity teachings" found in many American middle-class Pentecostal-style worship services. Moreover, the speaker in the video acknowledged the teachings of mentors in the United States throughout his sermon.

Holistic, ecstatic, and experiential religious practices are now found in Pentecostal liturgy throughout the world, because they were borrowed from the nineteenth-century African-American Holiness movement, which, in turn, had

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[359] The Future of the Unicity Framework, Breakfast Meeting, Durban Yacht Club, Diakonia Council of Churches, September 24, 2001, and interview with Carel Smuts, Clayville, South Africa, September 7, 2001.

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some of its roots in traditional African religion—the shout, antiphonal singing, the call and response, simultaneous and spontaneous prayer, and dance. Early Pentecostals emphasized the freedom, equality, the community, and the dignity of people in sight of God. During the apartheid era, Pentecostals acquiesced in the societal forces that divided them, finding spiritual comfort in separate spiritual spheres. Much of this separateness has its roots in an antithetical theological tradition of removing oneself from culture and found expression in African-American Holinesss movements. While in these separate spheres, Pentecostalism's intensive, subjective religious experience, emphasis on exclusion and high socialization of members has placed Pentecostals in the vortex of daunting societal ills in South Africa. Whether the separatist or egalitarian tendencies of Pentecostalism will triumph in the new South Africa will be a major question in decades to come.

The Southern Christian Family: A New Research Agenda[360]

There is an increased need to understand the new branch of the Christian family, southern Christianity. Southern Christianity is not merely a transplanted

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[360]   Marcus J. Borg, *Meeting Jesus Again for the First Time* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1995) and *Reading the Bible Again for the First Time* (San Fransciso: HarperSanFrancisco, 2001).

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version of the familiar religion of the older Christian branches which were nurtured and matured in the West.

Given the present and future distribution of Christians worldwide, a case can and should continue to be made that understanding religion in its non-Western context is a prime necessity for research agendas in the field of religion and politics. This study has made a small contribution to this discussion.

Even more specifically, while the insights gleaned from the NGK and the SACC have been significant, the emergence of the Pentecostal family should be the next major research program in the field of religion and politics.

One of the realities to "see" again for the first time is to recognize that Christianity is deeply associated with poverty, speaks a great deal about the poor, and bringing justice to the poor. The Christianity of the United States and western Europe is typically middle-class and accommodationist. One of the lasting images of Christianity from a southern perspective is a poor person, African and Semitic, and unimaginably poor by Western standards.

The grim reality of Christian impoverishment becomes all the more true as Africa assumes its place as the religion's principal center. By now, the statistics tend to desensitize, whether one is looking at life expectancy, child mortality, or deaths from AIDS. Africa continues to only contribute to less than two percent to world GDP, although the continent is home to over thirteen percent of the world's population. The whole GDP of sub-Saharan Africa is equal to that of the Netherlands. In a sobering U.S. intelligence report, "In sub-

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Saharan Africa, persistent conflicts and instability, autocratic and corrupt governments, over-dependence on commodities with declining real prices, low levels of education, and widespread infectious diseases will combine to prevent most countries from experiencing rapid economic growth."[361] This is the underlying reality for the Christian masses of this new century.

Looking at southern Christianity gives us new perspectives on theological traditions. Southern religious traditions read the Bible in a way that is wholly different from the faith of advanced prosperous societies of Europe and North America. Southern religious traditions appear to be quite at home with biblical notions of the supernatural, dreams, and prophesy. Just as relevant in their eyes are the Bible's core themes: oppression, wandering, exile, and martyrdom. When Jesus was not talking about and addressing issues of healing and exorcism, his recorded words were devoted to issues about economics, suffering, persecution, and martyrdom. He talked about what believers should do when on trial for the faith, or how to respond when expelled and condemned by families and villages.

Southern Christianity is flourishing among the poor and the persecuted, while it continues to atrophy among the rich and secure. Using the traditional Marxist/Feurbach view of religion as the opium of the masses or a construct to placate man's fears, it would be tempting to draw the conclusion that religion

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[361]   Paul Gifford, *African Christianity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 15. The status of Africa as part of the *n*th World is viewed in the context of the report, "Global Trends 2015," http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/.

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does coalesce with pre-modern and underdevelopment, and will disappear as society progresses. That conclusion would be highly misleading. As has been discussed, modernity and its discontents have resulted in new streams of theological reflection. For all of its benefits, modernity has not been able to provide the tools of meaning.

Christianity has been on the verge of destruction several times in history. From the time of Christ until Constantine, it was the persecuted religion. From Constantine until 500 A.D., it was the overarching worldview with no contenders, the religion of empire and domination. From 500 A.D. until 1500, it consolidated its power but began to be in competition with the rise of modernity. From 1500 until 1850 it was the religion in decline as modernity gained ascendancy. From 1850 until 1990, it was the defunct religion as modernity began to wane as well. And now, Christianity stands in a new place of potential ascendancy. Christianity's implicit distrust of power and success places it in a position of weakness, and often there, Christianity finds its greatest strength. Whatever the trajectories of the twenty-first century, Christianity will continue to play a role in political, economic, cultural, and social life, in South Africa and in the world.

Conclusion

As South Africa continues to mature into a consolidated democracy, the SACC, which has relied upon international churches for financial support, has had to slash its budget and cutbacks in staff.[362] The NGK, despite some movement in repenting for the effects of apartheid, continues to resist the challenge to disengage from the *Broederbond,* and to merge into a unified non-ethnic church with NGSK, the NGKA, and the Reformed Church in Africa.[363] Pentecostals, the largest Christian grouping in South Africa, appear to be uncertain to embrace fundamentalist or experientalist spiritual traditions as conventional and mainline western traditions continue to wane in South Africa and elsewhere.

Whatever the future holds for South Africa, what is clear is that religious traditions will continue to engage and make decisions about their role in South African political, economic, social, and cultural life. This study has contributed to the ongoing conversation between religion and politics in South Africa.

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[362] These same trends are being observed in the Diakonia Council and the Intstiute for Contextual Theology, which operate with a bare bones staff and less resources.

[363] Peter Walshe, "Christianity and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle," *Christianity in South Africa,* 399.

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APPENDIX 1
Christian Church Membership in South Africa[1]

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION TO CHRISTIAN CHURCHES

RELIGION	TOTAL
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK)	3,212,693
Gereformeerde Kerk (GK)	159,826
Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk (HNK)	266,754
Anglican	836,015
Church of England in South Africa	39,836
Church of England	162,249
Methodist	1,813,365
Presbyterian	402,621
United Congregational Church	383,622
Lutheran	773,631
Roman Catholic	2,343,944
Apostolic Faith Mission	402,621
Other Apostolic Churches	423,505
Baptist	249,028
Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk	32,175
Full Gospel Church (Pentecostal)	201,909
Greek Orthodox	26,673
Mormon	7,844

[1] Figures are from *Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa* (Pretoria: South African Communication Service, 1993).

Pentecostal Church	22,185
Salvation Army	32,629
Seventh-Day Adventists	84,112
New Apostolic Church	144,727
Swiss Church	42,610
Assemblies of God	155,218
Pentecostal Protestants	70,344
Zion Christian Church	1,517,021
Other African Independents	5,366,925
Other Christian Churches	1,274,518
TOTAL	20,582,794

APPENDIX 2
List of Key Informant Interviews

Vusi Mthuli. Ward I Councillor, Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Council. Clayville, South Africa, 4 September 2001.

Joseph J. Phasha. Pastor, Apostolic Faith Mission Church. Midrand, South Africa, 5 September 2001.

Linda Nechrony. Amy Biehl Foundation. 6 September 2001.

Carel Smit. Pastor, New Apostolic Church. Clayville, South Africa, 7 September 2001.

Matshediso Mokoena. Parishioner. Soweto, South Africa, 8 September 2001.

Ben and Peggy Potgieter. Parishioners, New Hope Pentecostal Church. Eldorado Park, South Africa, 12 September 2001.

Jons Flentge. Parishioner, Linden *Gereformeerde Kerk*. Linden, South Africa, 13 September 2001.

Brian George. Assistant for Cultural Affairs, United States Department of State. Pretoria, South Africa, 16 September 2001.

Karthi Govender. Director of Operations, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). Durban, South Africa, 17 and 18 September 2001.

Colin la Foy. General Secretary, Assembly of God Churches in Southern Africa. Durban, South Africa, 26 September 2001.

Mxolisi Zondi. Programme Organizer, Diakonia Council of Churches (DCC). Durban, South Africa, 27 September 2001.

Paddy Kearney. Director, Diakonia Council of Churches. Durban, South Africa, 28 September 2001.

Shaun Callahan. Research Fellow, ACCORD. Durban, South Africa, 29 September 2001.

Andre du Toit. Professor, University of Stellenbosch. Stellenbosch, South Africa, 3 October 2001.

Kevin Lancaster. Organizer, Community Dispute Resolution Trust. Cape Town, South Africa, 3 October 2001.

Jannie Malan. Senior Research Fellow and Professor, ACCORD and the University of the Western Cape. Belville, South Africa, 4 October 2001.

John de Gruchy. Professor, University of Cape Town. Cape Town, South Africa, 5 October 2001.

Charles Villa-Vicencio. Theologian and Director of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, University of the Western Cape. Cape Town, South Africa, 5 October 2001.

Robert Mattes, Professor and Research Fellow, University of Cape Town. Cape Town, South Africa, 6 October 2001.

Elias Mzami. Former Political Prisoner, Robben Island. Cape Town, South Africa, 7 October 2001.

Jeremy Routledge. Director, Quaker Peace Centre. Cape Town, South Africa, 8 October 2001.

Gift Moerane. Provincial Secretary, Gauteng Council of Churches. Benoni, South Africa, 15 October 2001.

Solomon Hussein. Professor, University of Pretoria. Pretoria, South Africa, 16 October 2001.

Jakob Pretorius. GK Minister. Melville, South Africa, 17 October 2001.

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RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS AS

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SOUTH AFRICA, 1910-2002

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ABSTRACT

This study focuses on three religious traditions in South Africa—the *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk* (NGK), the South African Council of Churches (SACC), and the Pentecostals—and their changing relationship with the South African state from 1910 to 2002. With the resurgence of democracy around the world, civil society debates have assumed a central place in understanding regime change. Additionally, this study argues that religious actors can enlarge our understanding of South Africa's state-civil society relationships by treating them as the primary units of analysis. This study argues that more scholarly attention is needed to systematically explain the role of religion in politics.

In order to explain religious and church change, this study incorporates the factors of theology, church type, institutional dynamics, as well as the intervening variables of race, ethnicity, and class. What results from this theoretical framework is a state-civil society continuum that can be described in terms of cooperation, conflict, or some mix of the two.

Utilizing a predominantly inductive comparative case study approach, this study gathered information from research libraries, nonprofit organizations, conferences, and semi-structured interviews. This study concludes that religious actors can behave differently in the same political context. Some religious actors, such as the NGK, were found to be an impediment to democratic change

because of their close association with narrow, ethnic interests. Others, such as the SACC, were successful in confronting state structures to demand change because of the institutional dynamics of the SACC and its theological perspectives on justice. Finally, other religious actors, such as the Pentecostals, while self-identifying themselves as disengaged from political and economic life, find themselves as one of the most important civil society actors in South Africa as the country is faced with daunting socio-economic issues.

This study will broaden our understanding of the intersection between religion and politics, state-civil society relations, and conflict resolution. This study adds to the literature about South Africa and other African countries. Finally, this study should encourage more research as civil society becomes more relevant to our understanding of an inclusive democracy.